The Methods of Ethics - Sidgwick Henry

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413-417 CHAPTER II THE PROOF OF UTILITARIANISM Common Sense demands a Proof of the first Principle of this method, more clearly than in the case of Egoism and Intuitionism. Such a proof, addressed to the Egoistic Hedonist, was in fact given in Book iii. chap. xiii. § 3: it exhibited the essence of the Utilitarian Principle as a clear and certain moral Intuition. But it is also important to examine its relation to other received maxims. 418-422 CHAPTER III THE RELATION OF UTILITARIANISM TO THE MORALITY OF COMMON SENSE 1. Taking as our basis Hume’s exhibition of the Virtues as Felicific qualities of character, we can trace a complex coincidence between Utilitarianism and Common Sense. It is not needful—nor does it even help the argument—to show this coincidence to be perfect and exact. 423-426 2. We may observe, first, that Dispositions may often be admired (as generally felicific) when the special acts that have resulted from them are infelicific. Again, the maxims of many virtues are found to contain an explicit or implicit reference to Duty conceived as already determinate. Passing over these to examine the more definite among common notions of Duty: 426-430 3. we observe, first, how the rules that prescribe the distribution of kindness in accordance with normal promptings of Family Affections, Friendship, Gratitude, and Pity have a firm Utilitarian basis: and how Utilitarianism is naturally referred to for an explanation of the difficulties that arise in attempting to define these rules. 430-439 4. A similar result is reached by an examination, singly and together, of the different elements into which we have analysed the common notion of Justice: 439-448 5. and in the case of other virtues. 448-450 6. Purity has been thought an exception: but a careful examination of common opinions as to the regulation of sexual relations exhibits a peculiarly complex and delicate correspondence between moral sentiments and social utilities. 450-453 7. The hypothesis that the Moral Sense is ‘unconsciously Utilitarian’ also accounts for the actual differences in different codes of Duty and estimates of Virtue, either in the same age and country, or when we compare different ages and countries. It is not maintained that perception of rightness has always been consciously derived from perception of utility: a view which the evidence of history fails to support. 453-457 On the Utilitarian view, the relation between Ethics and Politics is different for different parts of the legal code. 457-459 CHAPTER IV THE METHOD OF UTILITARIANISM 1. Ought a Utilitarian, then, to accept the Morality of Common Sense provisionally as a body of Utilitarian doctrine? Not quite; for even accepting the theory that the Moral Sense is derived from Sympathy, we can discern several causes that must have operated to produce a divergence between Common Sense and a perfectly Utilitarian code of morality. 460-467 2. At the same time it seems idle to try to construct such a code in any other way than by taking Positive Morality as our basis. 467-471 3. If General Happiness be the ultimate end, it is not reasonable to adopt “social health” or “efficiency” as the practically ultimate criterion of morality. 471-474 CHAPTER V THE METHOD OF UTILITARIANISM (continued) 1. It is, then, a Utilitarian’s duty at once to support generally, and to rectify in detail, the morality of Common Sense: and the method of pure empirical Hedonism seems to be the only one that he can at present use in the reasonings that finally determine the nature and extent of this rectification. 475-480 2. His innovations may be either negative and destructive, or positive and supplementary. There are certain important general reasons against an innovation of the former kind, which may, in any given case, easily outweigh the special arguments in its favour. 480-484 3. Generally, a Utilitarian in recommending, by example or precept, a deviation from an established rule of conduct, desires his innovation to be generally imitated. But in some cases he may neither expect nor desire such imitation; though cases of this kind are rare and difficult to determine. 485-492 4. There are no similar difficulties in the way of modifying the Ideal of Moral Excellence—as distinguished from the dictates of Moral Duty—in order to render it more perfectly felicific. 492-495 CONCLUDING CHAPTER THE MUTUAL RELATIONS OF THE THREE METHODS 1. It is not difficult to combine the Intuitional and Utilitarian methods into one; but can we reconcile Egoistic and Universalistic Hedonism? 496-498 2. In so far as the latter coincides with Common Sense, we have seen in Book ii. chap. v. that no complete reconciliation is possible, on the basis of experience. 498-499 3. Nor does a fuller consideration of Sympathy, as a specially Utilitarian sanction, lead us to modify this conclusion; in spite of the importance that is undoubtedly to be attached to sympathetic pleasures. 499-503 4. The Religious Sanction, if we can show that it is actually attached to the Utilitarian Code, is of course adequate: 503-506 5. but its existence cannot be demonstrated by ethical arguments alone. Still, without this or some similar assumption, a fundamental contradiction in Ethics cannot be avoided. 506-509 APPENDIX on Kant’s Conception of Free Will 511 INDEX 517

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