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328-329
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3. Nor is it easy to give a clear definition of the maxim of Purity—but in fact common sense seems averse to attempt this. We must note, however, that suicide is commonly judged to be absolutely wrong.
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329-331
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CHAPTER X
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COURAGE, HUMILITY, ETC.
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1. The Duty of Courage is subordinate to those already discussed: and in drawing the line between the Excellence of Courage and the Fault of Foolhardiness we seem forced to have recourse to considerations of expediency.
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332-334
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2. Similarly the maxim of Humility seems either clearly subordinate or not clearly determinate.
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334-336
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CHAPTER XI
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REVIEW OF THE MORALITY OF COMMON SENSE
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1. We have now to examine the moral maxims that have been defined, to ascertain whether they possess the characteristics of scientific intuitions.
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337-338
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2. We require of an Axiom that it should be (1) stated in clear and precise terms, (2) really self-evident, (3) not conflicting with any other truth, (4) supported by an adequate ‘consensus of experts.’ These characteristics are not found in the moral maxims of Common Sense.
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338-343
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3. The maxims of Wisdom and Self-control are only self-evident in so far as they are tautological:
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343-345
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4. nor can we state any clear, absolute, universally-admitted axioms for determining the duties of the Affections:
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345-349
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5. and as for the group of principles that were extracted from the common notion of Justice, we cannot define each singly in a satisfactory manner, still less reconcile them:
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349-352
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6. and even the Duty of Good Faith, when we consider the numerous qualifications of it more or less doubtfully admitted by Common Sense, seems more like a subordinate rule than an independent First Principle. Still more is this the case with Veracity:
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352-355
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7. similarly with other virtues: even the prohibition of Suicide, so far as rational, seems to rest ultimately on utilitarian grounds.
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355-357
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8. Even Purity when we force ourselves to examine it rigorously yields no clear independent principle.
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357-359
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9. The common moral maxims are adequate for practical guidance, but do not admit of being elevated into scientific axioms.
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359-361
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CHAPTER XII
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MOTIVES OR SPRINGS OF ACTION AS SUBJECTS OF MORAL JUDGMENT
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1. It has been held by several moralists that the “Universal Conscience” judges primarily not of Rightness of acts, but of Rank of Motives.
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362-365
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2. If, however, we include the Moral Sentiments among these motives, this latter view involves all the difficulties and perplexities of the former, yet it is paradoxical to omit these sentiments.
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365-367
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3. But even if we leave these out, we still find very little agreement as to Rank of Motives: and there is a special difficulty arising from complexity of motive. Nor does Common Sense seem to hold that a “higher” motive—below the highest—is always to be preferred to a “lower.”
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367-372
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CHAPTER XIII
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PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITIONISM
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1. The Philosopher, as such, attempts to penetrate beneath the surface of Common Sense to some deeper principles:
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373-374
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2. but has too often presented to the world, as the result of his investigation, tautological propositions and vicious circles.
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374-379
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3. Still there are certain abstract moral principles of real importance, intuitively known; though they are not sufficient by themselves to give complete practical guidance. Thus we can exhibit a self-evident element in the commonly recognised principles of Prudence, Justice, and Benevolence.
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379-384
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4. This is confirmed by a reference to Clarke’s and Kant’s systems:
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384-386
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5. and also to Utilitarianism: which needs for its basis a self-evident principle of Rational Benevolence; as is shown by a criticism of Mill’s “proof.”
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386-389
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Note
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389-390
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CHAPTER XIV
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ULTIMATE GOOD
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1. The notion of Virtue, as commonly conceived, cannot without a logical circle be identified with the notion of Ultimate Good:
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391-394
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2. nor is it in accordance with Common Sense to regard Subjective Rightness of Will, or other elements of Perfection, as constituting Ultimate Good.
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394-395
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3. What is ultimately good or desirable must be Desirable Consciousness.
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395-397
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4. i.e. either simply Happiness, or certain objective relations of the Conscious Mind.
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398-400
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5. When these alternatives are fairly presented, Common Sense seems disposed to choose the former: especially as we can now explain its instinctive disinclination to admit Pleasure as ultimate end: while the other alternative leaves us without a criterion for determining the comparative value of different elements of ‘Good.’
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400-407
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BOOK IV
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UTILITARIANISM
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CHAPTER I
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THE MEANING OF UTILITARIANISM
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1. The ethical theory called Utilitarianism, or Universalistic Hedonism, is to be carefully distinguished from Egoistic Hedonism: and also from any psychological theory as to the nature and origin of the Moral Sentiments.
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411-413
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2. The notion of ‘Greatest Happiness’ has been determined in Book ii. chap. i.: but the extent and manner of its application require to be further defined. Are we to include all Sentient Beings? and is it Total or Average Happiness that we seek to make a maximum? We also require a supplementary Principle for Distribution of Happiness: the principle of Equality is prima facie reasonable.
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