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2. on sentient, chiefly human, beings; especially in certain circumstances and relations, in which affections—which are hardly virtues—prompt to kind services. Rules for the distribution of Kindness are needed,
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241-246
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3. as claims may conflict; but clearly binding rules cannot be obtained from Common Sense in a definite form;
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246-247
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4. nor clear principles from which rules may be deduced; as is seen when we examine the duties to Kinsmen, as commonly conceived:
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247-250
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5. and the wider duties of Neighbourhood, Citizenship, Universal Benevolence; and the duties of cultivating Reverence and Loyalty:
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250-254
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6. and those springing from the Conjugal relation:
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254-256
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7. and those of Friendship:
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256-259
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8. and those of Gratitude: and those to which we are prompted by Pity.
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259-263
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Note
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263
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CHAPTER V
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JUSTICE
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1. Justice is especially difficult to define. The Just cannot be identified with the Legal, as laws may be unjust. Again, the Justice of laws does not consist merely in the absence of arbitrary inequality in framing or administering them.
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264-268
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2. One element of Justice seems to consist in the fulfilment of (1) contracts and definite understandings, and (2) expectations arising naturally out of the established order of Society; but the duty of fulfilling these latter is somewhat indefinite:
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268-271
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3. and this social order may itself, from another point of view, be condemned as unjust; that is, as tried by the standard of Ideal Justice. What then is this Standard? We seem to find various degrees and forms of it.
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271-274
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4. One view of Ideal Law states Freedom as its absolute End: but the attempt to construct a system of law on this principle involves us in insuperable difficulties.
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274-278
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5. Nor does the realisation of Freedom satisfy our common conception of Ideal Justice. The principle of this is rather ‘that Desert should be requited.’
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278-283
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6. But the application of this principle is again very perplexing: whether we try to determine Good Desert (or the worth of services),
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283-290
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7. or Ill Desert, in order to realise Criminal Justice. There remains too the difficulty of reconciling Conservative and Ideal Justice.
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290-294
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CHAPTER VI
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LAWS AND PROMISES
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1. The duty of obeying Laws, though it may to a great extent be included under Justice, still requires a separate treatment. We can, however, obtain no consensus for any precise definition of it.
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295-297
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2. For we are neither agreed as to what kind of government is ideally legitimate,
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297-299
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3. nor as to the criterion of a traditionally legitimate government,
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299-301
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4. nor as to the proper limits of governmental authority.
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301-303
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5. The duty of fulfilling a promise in the sense in which it was understood by both promiser and promisee is thought to be peculiarly stringent and certain
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303-304
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6. (it being admitted that its obligation is relative to the promisee, and may be annulled by him, and that it cannot override strict prior obligations).
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304-305
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7. But Common Sense seems to doubt how far a promise is binding when it has been obtained by force or fraud:
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305-306
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8. or when circumstances have materially altered since it was made—especially if it be a promise to the dead or absent, from which no release can be obtained, or if the performance of the promise will be harmful to the promisee, or inflict a disproportionate sacrifice on the promiser.
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306-308
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9. Other doubts arise when a promise has been misapprehended: and in the peculiar case where a prescribed form of words has been used.
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308-311
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CHAPTER VII
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CLASSIFICATION OF DUTIES. TRUTH
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1. I have not adopted the classification of duties into Social and Self-regarding: as it seems inappropriate to the Intuitional method, of which the characteristic is, that it lays down certain absolute and independent rules: such as the rule of Truth.
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312-315
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2. But Common Sense after all scarcely seems to prescribe truth-speaking under all circumstances: nor to decide clearly whether the beliefs which we are bound to make true are those directly produced by our words or the immediate inferences from these.
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315-317
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3. It is said that the general allowance of Unveracity would be suicidal, as no one would believe the falsehood. But this argument, though forcible, is not decisive; for (1) this result may be in special circumstances desirable, or (2) we may have reason to expect that it will not occur.
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317-319
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Note
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319
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CHAPTER VIII
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OTHER SOCIAL DUTIES AND VIRTUES
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1. Common opinion sometimes condemns sweepingly malevolent feelings and volitions: but Reflective Common Sense seems to admit some as legitimate, determining the limits of this admission on utilitarian grounds.
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320-324
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2. Other maxims of social duty seem clearly subordinate to those already discussed: as is illustrated by an examination of Liberality and other cognate notions.
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324-326
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CHAPTER IX
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SELF-REGARDING VIRTUES
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1. The general duty of seeking one’s own happiness is commonly recognised under the notion of Prudence.
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327-328
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2. This as specially applied to the control of bodily appetites is called Temperance: but under this notion a more rigid restraint is sometimes thought to be prescribed: though as to the principle
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