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that certain Rules are prescribed without reference to ulterior consequences. The Methods corresponding to these different principles reduce themselves in the main to three, Egoism, Intuitionism, Utilitarianism.
6-11
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5. These methods we are to examine separately, abstracting them from ordinary thought, where we find them in confused combination, and developing them as precisely and consistently as possible.
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11-14
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CHAPTER II
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ETHICS AND POLITICS
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1. In considering the relation between Ethics and Politics, we have to distinguish between Positive Law and Ideal Law.
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15-18
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2. But at any rate the primary object of Ethics is not to determine what ought to be done in an ideal society: it therefore does not necessarily require as a preliminary the theoretical construction of such a society.
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18-22
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CHAPTER III
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ETHICAL JUDGMENTS
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1. By ‘Reasonable’ conduct—whether morally or prudentially reasonable—we mean that of which we judge that it ‘ought’ to be done. Such a judgment cannot be legitimately interpreted as a judgment concerning facts, nor as referring exclusively to the means to ulterior ends: in particular, the term ‘ought,’ as used in moral judgments, does not merely signify that the person judging feels a specific emotion:
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23-28
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2. nor does it merely signify that the conduct in question is prescribed under penalties:
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28-31
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3. The notion expressed by “ought,” in its strictest ethical use is too elementary to admit of formal definition, or of resolution into simpler notions; it is assumed to be objectively valid; and judgments in which it is used when they relate to the future conduct of the person judging, are accompanied by a special kind of impulse to action.
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31-35
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4. This ‘dictate of reason’ is also exemplified by merely prudential judgments; and by merely hypothetical imperatives.
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35-38
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CHAPTER IV
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PLEASURE AND DESIRE
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1. The psychological doctrine, that the object of Desire is always Pleasure, is liable to collide with the view of Ethical judgments just given: and in any case deserves careful examination.
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39-42
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2. If by “pleasure” is meant “agreeable feeling,” this doctrine is opposed to experience: for throughout the whole scale of our desires, from the highest to the lowest, we can distinguish impulses directed towards other ends than our own feelings from the desire of pleasure:
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42-51
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3. as is further shown by the occasional conflict between the two kinds of impulse.
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51-52
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4. Nor can the doctrine derive any real support from consideration either of the ‘unconscious’ or the ‘original’ aim of human action.
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52-54
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Note
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54-56
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CHAPTER V
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FREE WILL
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1. The Kantian identification of ‘Free’ and ‘Rational’ action is misleading from the ambiguity of the term ‘freedom.’
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57-59
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2. When, by definition and analysis of voluntary action, the issue in the Free Will Controversy has been made clear, it appears that the cumulative argument for Determinism is almost overwhelming:
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59-65
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3. still it is impossible to me in acting not to regard myself as free to do what I judge to be reasonable. However the solution of the metaphysical question of Free Will is not important—Theology apart—for systematic Ethics generally:
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65-70
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4. it seems however to have a special relation to the notion of Justice:
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71-72
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5. The practical unimportance of the question of Free Will becomes more clear if we scrutinize closely the range of volitional effects.
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72-76
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CHAPTER VI
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ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND METHODS
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1. The Methods indicated in chap. i. have a prima facie claim to proceed on reasonable principles: other principles seem, in so far as they can be made precise, to reduce themselves to these:
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77-80
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2. especially
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