LITMIR.BIZ

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forces in and out of the battle to maintain pressureon the Soviet and DRA garrisons. The suburbs of Kandahar were oneof the major scenes of Mujahideen road blocks and ambushes duringthe war. Hardly a day would pass without a Mujahideen attack onenemy columns along the main highway connecting the city withGhazni in the northeast and Girishk in the west. The enemy columns were most vulnerable on a stretch of the roadbetween the western suburbs of the city and Hauz-e Madad, locatedabout 40 kilometers west of Kandahar. In this area, the Mujahideenwere able to hide in the orchards and villages to ambush enemycolumns. As the road leaves Sanjari on the Arghandab River, the greenzone runs parallel to the highway in the south and an arid plain, thatgradually rises toward the mountains, flanks the road to the north.(See Map 10a - Deh-Khwaja 1 in Vignette 9.) The Herat Column In one of their early large-scale ambushes, the Mujahideen groupsaffiliated with different parties planned a series of ambushes alongthe main highway from Girishk to Kandahar (Map 12 - Kandahar).In September 1984, a Soviet/DRA supply column moved fromTorghundi on the Soviet Turkmenistan border through the Shindandair base in western Afghanistan to the Soviet garrison in Kandahar.The column consisted of several hundred trucks escorted by tanksand APCs. Most of the trucks were loaded with gasoline which they MuIla Malang, now 38, is a Pashtun from the northwestern province of Badghisat. He wasa student (taleb) at a religious school (madrassa) in Kandahar when the communists cameto power in a bloody coup in Kabul in 1978. MuIla Malang joined a resistance cell in thesouthern suburbs of Kandahar (Malajat) and started fighting the communist regime. Hewas arrested in the fall of 1979 for spreading anti-government leaflets and later releasedin general amnesty after the Soviet invasion in January 1980. Mulla Malang immediatelyfled to Pakistan and joined Mawlawi Mohammad Nabi Muhamrnadi's Harakat faction. Hereturned to Kandahar for combat. Mulla Malang later joined HIK and became a major com-mander of the faction in the province with bases in Arghestan, Malajat, Pashmol andKhakrez. [Map sheet 2180]. Page 44 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War brought from Shindand. Shindand was supplied with gasoline froma Soviet-built field pipeline. Saranwal Abdul Wali of NIFA and I coordinated the Mujahideenplan. We planned to position several interconnected ambushes,manned by small groups of Mujahideen, to surprise and take theentire length of the column under simultaneous fire. This requiredselection of a favorable stretch of the road that could accommodateall the ambushes required to attack the entire column. We selected astretch of nearly seven kilometers between a point at the end ofSanjari (the beginning of Ashoqa villages) and a point immediately to the east of Pashmol as the killing zone for the enemy column. We esti-mated that this stretch of the highway corresponded to the length ofthe enemy column. We decided to divide the 250 available Mujahideen into severalgroups. The groups were armed with RPG-7 antitank grenade launch-ers and four-to-five 82mm recoilless rifles. All ambushes were sited inthe green zone to the south of the road. Each ambush group had anassigned sector of the kill zone. All groups were instructed to open firesimultaneously as the head of the column reaches the Ashoqa villages.It was expected that at that time the tail of the column would have justcleared the Pashmol villages.

      At that time, most of the local population still lived in their homesalong the road. Few had migrated to Pakistan since no major Sovietmilitary actions had taken place there. The Mujahideen groups comingfrom Malajat (the southern and southwestern suburbs of Kandahar)and other neighboring bases moved during the night to their designat-ed ambush sites. The ambush plan was kept secret from the localpopulation and local Mujahideen units since resistance groups basedin the ambush area were reluctant to participate, fearing retaliationdirected at their homes and families still living there.

      The ambush groups moved into position during the night anddeployed patrols to secure the area. As the day began and localsstarted moving around, Mujahideen patrols temporarily detainedthe villagers to ensure secrecy. The Soviet convoy reached the killzone at 0900 hours. As instructed, the Mujahideen groups openedfire simultaneously, surprising the enemy. The column stopped andmany vehicles began moving north onto the open plain. The escort-ing tanks and APCs fired randomly in panic from on the roadwithout trying to maneuver or close with the ambush sites. Enemyvehicles moving north off the highway soon were out of range ofmany of the Mujahideen weapons.

      In the meantime, several gasoline trucks caught fire and the firequickly spread to other vehicles. The chain reaction set off severalexplosions which threw burning debris on both sides of the road. Wescored direct hits on about 50 vehicles while many others were dam-aged in explosions caused by the blown up trucks and gas tankers. Theaction lasted 30 minutes. We withdrew before enemy aircraft could bescrambled. The enemy did not pursue us.

      This ambush marked the beginning of a continuous battle forcontrol of the western road to Kandahar. Until the Soviet withdrawalin 1989, this road was under constant threat by the Mujahideen whowould set up road blocks, conduct ambushes, mine long stretches ofthe road and demolish bridges, underpasses and viaducts using unex-ploded aerial bombs. Faced with continuous Mujahideen ambushesand attacks on convoys along the highway, the Soviet forces estab-lished several security posts and fire bases in the area. They built amajor fire base at Kandahar Silo and another at Karez Slim in thenorthern plain overlooking the Kandahar western highway.

      The Soviets set three security outposts at the points whereorchards and the green zone stretched to the road providing conceal-ment for Mujahideen in ambush. They were established on bothsides of Pasab and at Hauz-e Madad (Map 10a Deh-Khawaja 1 inVignette 9). The posts were protected by earth berms. The road-sidesecurity posts were connected to the main fire base at Karez Slim bycommunications trenches which allowed safe, rapid reinforcement.The twin Pasab posts were each manned by 10–15 men and each hada tank, a howitzer and a mortar. The security post at Hauz-e Madadwas two times as large as the two Pasab posts combined.

      The new security arrangement impeded Mujahideen movement inthe area. Repeated attempts by the Mujahideen failed to knock out the Soviet outposts. Lala Malang sent for me and asked me to join in a coordinated attack on the Soviet security posts in November 1985. Mujahideen forces lacked the ability to knock out security posts sincethey had to fight from exposed positions with little cover and theylacked engineering equipment to neutralize mine fields around theenemy positions. Therefore, the Mujahideen could not sustain pressure on the outpost garrison. We Kandahar Mujahideen decided to first enhance our tactical sur-vivability and then renew attempts to destroy the enemy security 7 Lala Malang was a well-known Mujahideen commander who was based in Pashmol (hewas killed during a major Soviet sweep of the Arghandab Valley in 1987). Page 46 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War posts. We began to steadily improve field fortifications areas aroundKandahar. We dug trenches with overhead cover overlooking theenemy security posts. We constructed bunkers, underground nightshelters and covered access trenches, and stocked ammunition andsupplies in these prepared positions. Wherever possible, we built over-head cover using timbers covered with a thick layer of dirt as protec-tion against artillery and aviation. We prepared firing positions forour multi-barrelled rocket launchers. Each of these positions had apool of water so that the firing crew could splash water on the sitebefore firing to absorb the flames and fumes from the rocket launch. These positions significantly enhanced Mujahideen field sustain-ability and enabled them to fire on the enemy outposts aroundthe clock. Enemy attempts to dislodge the Mujahideen with airstrikes and artillery fire repeatedly failed. Enemy tanks and motor-ized rifle forces were also unable to penetrate the green zones toeliminate the positions.

      Finally the enemy was forced to abandon his posts at Pasab andHauz-e Madad and shift his forces to Karez Slim. A local Mujahi-deen commander, Mulla Nek Mohammad, and some others intensi-fied their daily harassment of enemy movements in the area close to the green zone. Every morning, the Soviets would deploy securitypatrols from their base at Kandahar Silo to secure the highwayfrom the city to Sanjari area. The Karez Slim fire base covered thearea west of Sanjari.

      As Mujahideen attacks further threatened the security of theenemy convoys on the highway, the Soviets decided to avoid the stretchof road they could not control. They constructed a detour road to thenorth of the highway. The bypass road was built in 1985 and connect-ed Sanjari and Karez Slim (See Map10a - Deh-Khwaja 1 in Vignette 9).

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