The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Ali Ahmad Jalali

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residential areas and caused much destruction. However, Mujahideen fire finally struck the ammunition trucks. They caught fire and hundreds of rockets and boxes of other ammunition began to explode. The explosions were so powerfuZ that burning tires from APCS were thrown as far away as Bala Karz, some two kilometers from the ambush site. The ambush destroyed about 30 enemy supply trucks and damaged many others. The rest of the Soviet convoy turned back. The Mujahideen roadblock at Shahr-e Naw and Sarpuza had no enemy to attack.

      This Mujahideen ambush had a decisive impact on the enemy operation in that it forced the Soviet forces to end their siege of Mujahideen forces in Panjwayee and return to Kandahar. However, in order to prevent future ambushes in the area, the Soviet forces bulldozed Deh-Khwaja homes along the main road out to a distance of 300 meters from the highway.

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      Security of the lines of communication was a constant challenge facing the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Security of the lines of communication determined the amount of forces which the Soviet could deploy in Afghanistan and also determined the scale and frequency of offensive combat directed against the Afghan resistance forces. In this example the Soviets had to move supplies to a large group of forces about 50 lulometers away. The road, although an all-season major highway, was vulnerable to Mujahideen ambushes at almost The large green zone to the south of Kandahar. Page 38 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War every point. Further, the Soviets and Mujahideen fought for control of Kandahar for the entire war. The Soviets knew that the road was not secure. And yet, the convoy commander did little to ensure the security of the movement along the supply route. A preliminary road-clearing patrol could have preempted the Mujahideen's successful ambush. Instead, their entire operation was disrupted due to their failure to move the supplies to Panjwayee.

      Normally, the Soviets spaced APCs throughout the convoy as security vehicles. In case of ambush, the APCs would stop in the kill zone and return fire while the rest of the convoy caught in the kill zone would drive out of it. The portion of the convoy not under attack would stop and wait for the APCs to drive off the ambushers. Then, when the ambushers had been driven off, the convoy would reform and continue. This is why the Mujahideen established two ambush zones. They did not think that they would stop the convoy at the first ambush and so the second ambush was ready to hit the Soviet convoy again. On the other hand, it took the Mujahideen about three weeks to decide to help the resistance forces in Panjwayee by hitting the Soviets elsewhere. Had they launched their attack earlier, it could have forced their enemy to terminate his operation against Mujahideen groups in Panj wayee earlier.

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      by Commander Haji Mohammad Seddiq

      (Haji Mohammad Seddiq is from No-Burja village in Logar Province. The village is in theTangi-Wardak area which connects the Saydabad District of Wardak Province to the BarakiBarak District in the Logar Province. Commander Seddiq's village is located on the borderbetween the two provinces. Therefore, his command fought in both provinces in coordi-nation with other Mujahideen. Commander Haji Mohammad Seddiq was affiliated withHekmatyar's HIH. )

      In September 1983, my group and I were visiting the area of Maidan. The Maidan Mujahideen had heard about a future convoygoing from Kabul to Ghazni and were planning to ambush it. I joined HIH commanders Ghulam Sakhi, Captain Amanullah, Mawlawi Halim and Zabet Wali in setting up an ambush some 30 kilometerssouthwest of Kabul. Together, we had some 60 Mujahideen armed withAK-47s, 60mm mortars, RPG-7s and an 82mm recoilless rifle. Weplanned two ambush sites. One group would deploy east of the roadbetween Duranay Bazar and Sur Pul. The other group would deploy west of the road on the forward slope of Duranay mountain close to the road (Map 11 - Duranay). The Mujahideen already had well-prepared positions at both these sites.

      We occupied our positions at dawn and waited for the column. At about 0900 hours, the convoy came from Kabul. It was a column of trucks and armored vehicles. A forward security element preceded the convoy. It drove through the ambush area, but failed to detect our forces. Then the convoy entered the ambush area. We let it pass through until the head of the column reached the second ambush site at Duranay mountain. Now, the column was in about a five-kilometer stretch of kill zone. We opened up from all positions along the entire length of the exposed column.

      A heavy battle ensued as we fired at all the vehicles in the open. The enemy had a security outpost at Sur Pul which joined in the battle and fired on our positions. Despite this security post fire, and the fire from the armored vehicles, the Soviet response was fairly passive. Our prepared positions protected us, and the Soviets apparently did not have any infantry accompanying the convoy, so they could not dismount and maneuver against us. Our positions were vulnerable to a flank attack through Kashmirian or Ghlo Ghar, but the apparent lack of Soviet infantry support kept their vehicles pinned down on the lower ground where we continued to shoot them without anti-tank weapons.

      Later in the day, the enemy brought reinforcements to the battle-field and began to pound Mujahideen positions with artillery and airstrikes. We began to gradually withdraw our ambush force and by 1500, there were no Mujahideen left in the area. A major Mujahideen commander, Ghulam Sakhi, and several other Mujahideen were killed and many were wounded. We damaged or destroyed 33 armored vehicles and 27 trucks. We captured some 40 weapons of different types.

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      The Mujahideen showed good planning and discipline in this ambush, but used prepared positions that they had used before. They also knew that these positions had exposed flanks, but took no precautions. They felt that the Soviets would not dismount to check the known ambush sites and did not expect immediate Soviet counter-actions to turn their flanks. They were right. The Mujahideen were setting a pattern, but the Soviets failed to react to it. The Mujahideen stocked their positions with sufficient ammunition for a fight of several hours duration. They apparently took many of their casualties from artillery and air strikes while moving to the burning vehicles to loot or when pulling back.

      The Soviet convoy movement was no secret. The Mujahideen had contacts within the DIVA and agents near the assembly areas. The Soviets usually left after first light and therefore arrived in the area between 0830 and 0930. This made it convenient for the Mujahideen who did not have to stay in position all day. The Soviets knew that this was an ambush site, but did not destroy the ambush positions, put security elements on the high ground with helicopters or put a dismounted force through the area to check for ambushes. Further, they did not have helicopter gunships flying overhead or on strip alert. They did not carry an immediate reaction force which could get up into the mountains and turn the flanks of the ambush sites. Instead, they relied on the combat power of their armored vehicles and slow-reacting artillery and air support.

      The Mujahideen commander had 60 combatants spread over a five kilometers stretch of ambush on both sides of the road. He did not have radio communications with all his people. Instead, the signal to initiate fire was the commander firing the first shot. Other commands were given by messenger or visual signals—mirrors, flares, smokegrenades and waving. Command and control depended greatly on thecommander's pre-ambush briefing and SOP actions.

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      by Commander Mulla Malang

      Despite their best efforts, the Soviets were never able to gain fullcontrol of the major Pashtun city of Kandahar. The battle forKandahar was unusual in that all guerrilla factions cooperated andregularly rotated

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