LITMIR.BIZ

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on June 14 noted that approximately half of the armored corps’ Shermans, AMX-13s, and half-tracks were no longer fit for action.⁴⁸ The armored corps, which used the AFVs, and the ordnance branch, which was responsible for their maintenance, blamed each other for the situation.⁴⁹ Dayan accused the armored corps commander of putting Israel’s survival at risk.⁵⁰ He ordered that 100 tanks remain continuously operable and on full alert; this, in effect, canceled all training until new tanks arrived.⁵¹

      Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and training for the AMX-13 encountered problems due to mistranslations of the tank’s operating instructions from French to Hebrew. The tactical training material also had to be translated. “In mid-1956, the amount of official instruction material that was published reached its low point,” for two reasons:⁵² the volume of armored corps headquarters’ training and organizational assignments in recent years, and the shortage of professional officers at headquarters.

      Regarding efficient force buildup, a quantitative imbalance existed between the number of tanks acquired and the number of trained crews. At the beginning of the Sinai War, the IDF had 104 fully manned AMX-13s out of 180 tanks (58 percent); it had 120 fully manned Shermans of various models out of 166 operational tanks and 205 in total (72 and 58 percent, respectively).⁵³ “Although the replenishment of the main fighting equipment was impressive, armor lacked certain items (ammunition for the M-1 cannon, refueling pumps, fillers for loading the cartridge belts, lubrication equipment, and camouflage netting) that prevented it from exploiting the large number of AFVs and hampered the fighting units from realizing their potential.”⁵⁴

       Organization of the Antitank Units

      When Israel grasped the full extent of the threat from Arab armor, it accelerated its force buildup and went further than just upgrading its medium tank force and purchasing AMX-13 light tanks.⁵⁵ It now increased its tank destroyer layout and acquired antitank cannons, missiles, and rocket launchers. The cutbacks of the previous years had resulted in the concentration of antitank platoons into brigade antitank companies, the truncation of regular army antitank units (which subsequently created a manpower shortage in the reservist units), and a gap between the number of cannons (57mm or 6-pounder) in service and the table of equipment. Instead of purchasing additional cannons, Dayan acquired light AMX-13s from France, upgraded the Sherman cannons, and waited for Israel Military Industries (IMI) to produce rocket launchers. The light tanks’ disadvantage was their price tag—$150,000, compared with $5,000 for antitank cannons—and the relatively long assimilation period. The development of the 82mm rocket launcher also proved more troublesome than envisaged, and replenishment was scheduled for the beginning of 1957 at the earliest. As an interim solution, 500 73mm rocket launchers were acquired in 1954 and concentrated in company-level antitank squads. Although they were effective, they were too few for Israel’s needs.⁵⁶

      Antitank Cannons

      In late 1955 the antitank battalions’ situation was flawed. Although the battalions’ manpower status in the infantry brigades was acceptable, most of the antitank units had undergone training only at the crew and battery level, not as battalions. Furthermore, the transfer of batteries between battalions in the first months of 1956 detracted from their combat proficiency. In 1955–1956 six antitank battalions of the elder infantry brigades were established without undergoing combat training. Another drawback was the need for vehicles to tow the antitank cannons. The vehicle fleet allocated to this task and to transporting the crews and ammunition was unsuited for the job. Nearly one-third of the ammunition carriers were civilian vehicles that had been conscripted, and their use was limited because of their diversity, the shortage of spare parts, and the absence of towing hooks on many of them. Mobility was especially problematic for the heavy 17-pound cannons, which had a greater penetrating ability than the 6-pounders and were more effective against the enemy’s heavy tanks (Stalins and Centurions). Half-tracks were supposed to be used for towing, but instead, five-ton 6-by-6 trucks—unsuited for towing heavy antitank cannons—were allocated. To make matters worse, the 6-pounders failed to receive proper technical maintenance: their sights were not calibrated, and their range tables were found to be off. Thus, in May–June 1956 a frantic effort was made to calibrate the cannons and correct the range tables. According to Ze’ev Elron, the weakness in the antitank and armor layout, as revealed by the Pelet exercise in May, was probably one reason that Ben-Gurion decided not to initiate hostilities and opted instead for a defensive posture.⁵⁷

      SS-10 Missiles

      Israel purchased SS-10 antitank guided missiles from France in late 1955. In early 1956 it was decided that the artillery branch would establish four antitank battalions, each with three batteries: three regional command battalions and one as a general staff reserve. In March thirty-five missiles and two launchers arrived from France, and the first unit was set up under a veil of secrecy. In early April the trainees returned from France and began to organize the unit. The first battery was expected to be operational in July 1956, the second in August, and three more by July 1957. However, the organization took longer than planned, and in the end, the missiles were not used in the Sinai War.⁵⁸

      Rocket Launchers

      In early 1955 the IDF had 560 73mm rocket launchers and 3,000 PIAT launchers, far short of the 5,000 launchers and 100,000 rockets it required. To close the gap, Israel decided to purchase American 3.5-inch rocket launchers and additional 73mm rocket launchers and to order 1,000 82mm rocket launchers and 20,000 rockets from IMI. France agreed to supply an additional 500 73mm rocket launchers. With these acquisitions and the possibility of purchasing thousands of rocket launchers of various models, discussions were held regarding the units’ table of equipment. Four types of rocket launchers were acquired and produced in this period:

      1. American 3.5-inch (89mm) rocket launchers. In November 1955 the director of the Ministry of Defense, Shimon Peres, recommended buying these launchers because of their low price. At the same time, he warned that the manufacturer might be unable to supply them within the one month promised. The 350 launchers that arrived in July 1956 turned out to be inferior to the French 73mm ones, and they were assigned to regional defense and noninfantry units.

      2. Belgian 83mm rocket launchers. The IDF purchased 1,000 rocket launchers from Belgium before testing them. The ammunition that came with them had apparently passed the expiration date, and two years after the transaction, one-third of the rockets were deemed unfit for use.

      3. Israeli 82mm rocket launchers. Despite the plan to produce 60 to 90 rocket launchers and 1,000 rockets each month, the IDF had only six launchers in its inventory in early October 1956. Distribution to the units began only in early 1958—a major miscalculation in planning.

      4. French 73mm rocket launchers. The IDF doubled the number of these weapons (compared with early 1955) to 1,090 launchers and 19,000 rockets. The 200 launchers that were taken out of the French army and urgently sent to Israel proved to be inoperable. One thousand additional launchers and 30,000 rockets arrived on the eve of the Sinai War but came too late to be used in combat.⁵⁹

      Given the sense of urgency, some of these weapons were acquired before their suitability to Israel’s professional needs or technical conditions had been thoroughly examined, only because their price was attractive or an early delivery date was promised.

      Given the pace of events, there was little opportunity to discuss the new equipment’s assimilation and employment before it arrived in the country. Thus, the army had to develop doctrine for using equipment it had not requested or that it suddenly found itself in possession of—often in quantities far exceeding its needs. Instead of an orderly procedure in which equipment is acquired because of its applicability to a fighting concept, in this period, the IDF had to devise a combat doctrine for the weapons it already had.

      The basic change in the work plans was necessitated by the acquisition of tanks in June 1956 that far exceeded the army’s needs. The procurement was incompatible with professional requirements, devoured huge sums of money, and weighed heavily on the maintenance budget in the following years. The funds required for this tank acquisition were thus not available for vital investment in the readiness of many defensive weapons purchased in early 1956 or for ammunition, operational accessories,

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