Military Agility - Meir Finkel AUSA Books - Foreign Military Studies

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ammunition, and replacement parts versus reliance on domestic production. The dilemma revolves around the relatively high costs of developing, maintaining, and expanding independent production versus reliance on a foreign state in an emergency, with the inherent risks of embargo, delayed delivery, partial or gross incompatibility with the army’s needs, and so forth. This is one of the most complex tensions, and it involves an assessment of the political situation and long-term economic considerations. Although this aspect is irrelevant to the United States, it is a major consideration for America’s smaller allies, and US decision makers must understand this.

      Training and exercises for assimilating new weapons are necessary steps whether those weapons are acquired from foreign sources or domestically. The dilemma is whether to gain proficiency in the use of a current weapon or wait for a more advanced weapon to become available, at the price of less time for assimilation and training. It must be remembered that the transition from a known weapons system that the forces are skilled in operating to a new weapons system often entails not only learning new procedures but also unlearning or overriding old habits.2 Another issue is the diversity and scope of the retraining required. For example, training pilots to fly new aircraft demands many flight hours. In addition, ground-crew technicians need time to learn how to identify and fix problems in the new aircraft. There are other tensions related to the supply of ammunition and weapon operability (due to the numerous replacement parts and the time needed to repair breakdowns that occurred in the training period) and between the desire to train as much as possible and the need to maintain a sufficient degree of readiness in case of sudden war. Another source of tension is the ability to modify trainers (instruction teams), training areas, and training aids.

      In the area of force organization, the dilemma is whether to restructure the forces based on the specific needs of the coming conflict (even though this lengthens the time needed to assimilate changes and bring them to fruition on the battlefield) or to act within known frameworks that may be less suited to the specific threat. (This refers to the establishment of new units, headquarters, and so forth—not to manning the combat forces.)

      A final risk involves a low level of compatibility between the force elements: weapons replenishment (which includes several factors, such as the number and quality of weapons, the amount of ammunition, and the availability of replacement parts), the level of proficiency in their use (training and exercises), and the level of maintenance. When compatibility is low, the weak link in the chain dictates a unit’s operability. For example, there is no sense in maintaining a highly trained division equipped with the latest weapons if ammunition is in short supply.

      I claim that once a decision has been made, readiness can be significantly improved within a matter of months. The main improvement results from the force’s increased competency and not from the assimilation of new weapons. This chapter analyzes the IDF’s accelerated force buildup after the decision had been made to prepare for war. Strong points and shortcomings are identified, and rules are presented for future scenarios. Although the focus is on the IDF’s experience, other events in other armies could have been used, for example, the Red Army’s preparation for war after the German invasion of Poland and France, the preparation of American armed forces for war between September 1939 and the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, or the Allied landings in North Africa in late 1942.

       The Sinai War

      The year before the Sinai War (which started in October 1956) was a special period for the IDF in terms of force design and buildup. Armor’s operational order of battle increased more than twofold, and the Israeli Air Force (IAF) was in the midst of converting from piston-engine (propeller-driven) aircraft to jet planes. The accelerated force buildup taking place under the constant threat of war involved numerous risks and therefore serves as a model, allowing us to analyze risk management and learn the necessary lessons. All the while, the fledgling state of Israel was struggling to absorb massive waves of immigrants and recuperate economically from the lengthy War of Independence. Economic measures at the time included gasoline and food rationing.

      During most of the first half of the 1950s, the IDF operated based on the assumption that war was unlikely in the near future (within two or three years); therefore, the 1953 three-year plan was built on this premise.3 A dramatic change in the regional balance of power occurred in September 1955 when Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser announced a huge arms deal with Czechoslovakia. Prior to that deal, Egypt enhanced its armored force by acquiring British Centurions and upgraded cannons for its Sherman tanks. Israel estimated that Egyptian armor would increase from 130 tanks in late 1955 to between 310 and 430 tanks with the addition of Russian T-34s and Stalins to the British Centurions and French AMX-13s.4 Furthermore, the Egyptians were scheduled to receive a large number of modern Mig-15s and Mig-17s.5 The Syrian army, too, would be replenished with tanks and armored fighting vehicles (AFVs). On October 18,

      1955, Israeli prime minister Moshe Sharett announced that “something has happened in the Middle East that portends the bleak prospect of our strongest enemy state gaining a decisive military advantage that will confront us with dangers unlike any we have known since the War of Independence.”6 At a government meeting in December 1955, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion (who had returned to office after Sharett’s resignation) stated that the Egyptians would be ready for war in a few months and would attack Israel in the spring or summer of 1956. While Israel studied the possibility of an Israeli-initiated war before Egypt could assimilate its new weapons, it attempted to purchase offensive arms to counterbalance the Egyptian acquisition.

       Armor Buildup

      In September 1955 the IDF had 86 operational tanks (76 Shermans with M-3 cannons and 10 AMX-13 reconnaissance tanks); in addition, there were 131 nonfunctioning tanks without armament. The IDF planned to organize the Shermans in four tank battalions and to attach three of the battalions to armored brigades (the 7th, 27th, and 37th), with the fourth as a general support to the infantry units.7

      In May 1955 the French government expressed a willingness to sell a large number of aircraft, tanks, and antitank missiles to Israel. The deal was stymied, however, due to opposition from the French Foreign Office and gaps in Israeli financing. In early November these obstacles were overcome (the reasons for the removal of French opposition have been studied in detail elsewhere) because of the shock of the Egyptian acquisition. The director of Israel’s Ministry of Defense, Shimon Peres, went on a procurement mission to Europe and succeeded in signing sales agreements for French Ouragan and Mystère aircraft, 60 AMX-13 tanks, 40 Super-Shermans, 175 75mm M-50 cannons for mounting on the Shermans, SS-10 missiles, and 500 73mm bazooka rockets.8 “Some of the items, such as the Super-Shermans and bazookas would be taken out of French army stores and units and quickly supplied, while the rest, the planes, light tanks and missiles, were still in production which meant that their delivery would take a few months.”9 The French put a freeze on the deal after signing it, but in April, after learning that Egypt was aiding the rebels in Algeria and determining that strengthening Israel would be in France’s interest, French and Israeli negotiators agreed on the sale of 72 Mystère-4s, 120 AMX-13 tanks, 40 Super-Shermans (with 76.2mm cannons), and 18 selfpropelled cannons. Delivery was scheduled for late July to late September 1956.

      Within a year, the IDF’s number of operational tanks had more than doubled, from 86 in 1955 to approximately 181 tanks that took part in the Sinai War (120 Shermans of various models and 61 AMX-13s). The IDF’s total tank force rose that year to nearly 450, more than twice the number in September 1955. Between late July and the opening of hostilities in late October 1956, 233 tanks arrived: 120 AMX-13s, 40 Super-Shermans, 25 Sherman M-50s, and 48 Sherman M-1s.10 Israel’s beefed-up strength made a major impact on the order of battle (the establishment and dismantlement of units), crew training, and unit exercises with the new weapons. All this was carried out mainly between July and October while assimilating the weapons.

      Tank Procurement and Upgrade

      The case of the AMX-13 illustrates the problems inherent in the rapid procurement of an existing weapon with limited capabilities, when taking into account the enemy’s threat and serious technical serviceability weaknesses. Israel complied with French demands to purchase 180 light tanks, a larger number than its operational

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