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(nearly $150,000 per tank), compared with a smaller number of Shermans at $25,000 per tank.¹¹ The relatively new AMX-13 tank (production began in France in 1951) had a three-man crew, weighed fourteen tons, offered a high speed and high muzzle velocity, and had the only shell that could penetrate the Egyptians’ Centurion armor. Nevertheless, the tanks’ protective armor was very thin (a 0.5-inch machine gun bullet could penetrate it), and it was unsuited for Israel’s combat conditions of heat and dust. Because of these limitations, the AMX-13 was originally defined as an antitank (or tank destroyer) weapon and not as a battle tank.¹² After testing and trials, the ordnance branch concluded that basic changes were needed to improve the tank’s durability in Israel’s soil and climate conditions: modifying the cooling system, switching the air filters to oil filters, and replacing the gear system. The decision was made to buy the tank before the necessary changes and repairs had been finalized. It should be noted that some of the modifications that were considered essential required further examination. Another complication was that many of the tank’s parts were being produced in factories spread across France and Germany.

      In mid-1955, after the contract had been signed, it was revealed that production and delivery would take longer than expected. “Israel faced a dilemma: whether to wait and insist that the tanks not be sent until the modifications were introduced or receive them as soon as possible regardless of their limitations.”¹³ Israel decided to obtain the tanks before the modifications had been made so that assimilation and training could begin and the tanks could be rendered operable as early as possible. After the improved systems were developed, Israel would install them. The decision to develop crew proficiency before the adaptations had been completed had a profound effect on the tanks’ capability while the army was preparing for war.¹⁴ The incomplete modifications for desert fighting were a factor during the war. A tank company of regulars in the 9th Battalion, 7th Brigade, that was attached to a paratrooper brigade suffered many types of breakdowns. For example, on October 27 “the tank crews had to deal with an unexpected problem: instead of Browning .30 caliber machineguns that fire parallel to the cannon, they received, without warning, a new French Lebel-model machinegun they had never seen before.”¹⁵ Only seven out of thirteen tanks survived the trip when the brigade moved from Ein Husub (Hatzeva) in the Arava (Israel’s southern border with Jordan) to Kunteila in Sinai: “All the rest had their gears burnt out or their filters clogged with dust.”¹⁶ Only three tanks reached the Tamed area in Sinai’s depth because “the three others had gotten stuck due to clogged filters.”¹⁷

      The IDF’s acquisition and assimilation of the AMX-13 highlight the downside of trying to attain a higher degree of readiness for an approaching battle with an available weapon—in this case, the relatively unsuitable AMX-13 tank (excluding the cannon). This consideration overrode the potential benefit of obtaining a better weapon, such as the Sherman tank, in the future. The large number of AMXs that were purchased (40 percent of the IDF’s total order of battle at the start of hostilities) exceeded the amount needed by one and a half times. The AMX-13’s service in the IDF was fairly short-lived. Before the Six-Day War, the army had already begun to transfer them from the armored brigades to regional command armored battalions. The AMX-13’s flaws were blatant in the Six-Day War: its inadequacy in dealing with the enemy’s advanced tanks (T-55s and Stalins), its light armor plating, difficulties in command and control (C2) at the company commander level and higher, and maintenance problems. They were taken out of the order of battle at the first opportunity, and many were sold to foreign countries in 1968–1969.¹⁸

      The Sherman tank’s life expectancy was extended after being converted to the Sherman M-51. The gun barrel was replaced with a 105mm cannon, the gasoline engine was replaced by a Cummins diesel engine, rotation and elevation were upgraded to a hydraulic system, and the tracks were widened for improved maneuverability. When the Six-Day War broke out, 178 M-3s had been already been converted to M-51s, and the engines of 186 M-50s had been replaced.¹⁹ The M-51s with the 105mm cannons also fought admirably in the Yom Kippur War. The Shermans were employed in the mechanized brigades’ tank battalions (three M-51 companies and a platoon of M-50s). The 4th, 9th, and 670th Mechanized Brigades fought on the Golan Heights; the 11th Mechanized Brigade in the northern sector of Suez Canal; and the 875th Mechanized Brigade battled in the canal’s southern sector.²⁰

      The conversion of the Sherman cannons was another example of very complex risk taking. The decision to substitute the short-barreled 75mm M-3 cannon (originally designed for infantry assistance because of its relatively low armor-penetrating capability) with the long-barreled 75mm M-50 cannon (the AMX-13’s cannon, with improved armor-penetrating ability) contributed significantly to the IDF’s readiness. “The idea to mount the M-50 cannon on Sherman tanks, which began in September 1953, was still incomplete after two years.” By June 1956, “the IDF had approximately 70 operable Shermans (without cannons) that were waiting for the tests and checks of the mounted M-50 cannon to be completed.”²¹ Although the M-50 cannon had arrived from France with mounting instructions in late 1955, it was still far from being operational. In mid-March 1956, even after additions and modifications such as smoke canisters and a new telescopic sight, field tests revealed that twenty alterations were still needed. “The tank’s testing in Israel and the changes that had to be made, pushed back the start of the ordnance work by a few months. On August 7 the chief quartermaster estimated that the first twenty tanks with M-50 cannons would be ready only on September 1, 1956 (about six months after the cannons’ arrival in the country).”²² Be that as it may, in the months preceding the Sinai War, the ordnance branch accelerated its pace and succeeded in converting twenty-four Shermans to the M-50 model. A few weeks before hostilities began, fourteen were delivered to Major Moshe Brill, the commander of A Company, 82nd Battalion, 7th Brigade (the brigade that would capture the Ruefa Dam).²³ During the retraining exercise, a serious flaw was discovered: the cannon’s weight caused cracks in the screws connecting the elevation arch to the turret. The problem was fixed before the war.²⁴

      The length of time that passed until the armored battalions were equipped with M-50 cannons proved to be crucial. Even as the IDF was planning offensive operations and was in a state of alert against an Egyptian or Egyptian-Syrian armored attack, the battalions were in short supply of Shermans. A June agreement with France regarding the arrival of forty Super-Shermans (with 76.2mm cannons) starting in late July was key in bridging the quantitative and qualitative gap during the long wait for the M-50s.²⁵ This illustrates the tension that arises when weighing the risks of waiting for advanced weapons with long-term operational durability versus attaining a high level of readiness with technologically inferior weapons.

      The M-10 tank destroyers were an example of a threefold problem: the acquisition of low-cost, secondhand equipment; the need to budget for replacement parts; and a manpower shortage in the ordnance layout. This weapon was purchased from Britain in late 1951, entered service in late 1955 (four years after its purchase),²⁶ and was withdrawn from service in the mid-1960s following the procurement of 100 additional Shermans from Iran.

      Organization of the Armored Units

      The reestablishment of the 7th Brigade as a basic armored formation of regulars contained all the elements of combined-arms warfare (after the brigade had been disbanded in 1954, its units came under the command of the armored corps). This process began before the Czech arms deal was announced and continued until the war broke out. The 7th Brigade’s commander, Colonel Uri Ben Ari, writes that the AMX-13 tanks reached the 9th Battalion on October 24, 1956, six days before the war began.²⁷ The 52nd Battalion, an infantry battalion that had been transferred from the dismantled Givati Brigade in early September, had to be converted into a mechanized infantry battalion. The 61st Motorized Infantry Battalion, made up of reservists, had never trained as a motorized infantry battalion attached to an armored brigade. The reconnaissance unit that was designated to fight from AMX-13 tanks went into battle in jeeps. “According to IDF plans the 7th Brigade would be fit for war only in early 1957!”²⁸

      The establishment of the 27th Armored Brigade (reservists) took five years. The brigade already had armored battalions, but now the brigade headquarters had to be formed, the mechanized infantry and maintenance units had to be trained, and the reconnaissance company had to be converted to the AMX-13. The

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