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for constant supervision in limited fighting inhibits flight leaders’ freedom. They grow accustomed to obeying orders, leading to a diminution of their operational judgment and decision making. Because the orders for RSOs are precisely planned for each mission, they leave squadron leaders no room to introduce changes. Gordon explains:

      In all-out war the situation is very different. Operational activity is much more intense. With hundreds of planes, helicopters and airborne assistance systems aloft simultaneously, the central command post has to instruct planning teams, approve operational plans, and perform other duties. Since its ability to control operations in real time is greatly reduced, it focuses only on vital decisions.

      Given the combination of the central command’s inability to control all the forces and the expendability of such control, the flight leaders suddenly have freedom of action and decision-making that they are unaccustomed to. They are unprepared for responsibility and authority so unlike the patterns of conduct they had grown used to in the long period of limited warfare. Lieutenant Colonel Ben-Nun, the commander of the IAF planning branch for most of the offensive operations in the year before the Yom Kippur War, describes the situation: “In RSO we reviewed every order that the squadrons had to carry out down to the last detail. The squadrons became accustomed to receiving everything spoon-fed and neatly packaged. Everything was elaborated even for the smallest operation. During the [Yom Kippur] war I saw how we had failed to prepare the squadrons to act independently. The shift from RSO to wartime conditions became a cognitive issue.”7

      The challenge lies not only in making the transition from RSOs to a war situation; the biggest challenge is the loss of the ability to act independently, a skill that cannot be acquired on the fly. The need for success in every operation during RSOs exacted its price in wartime. The crisis in trust between squadrons and IAF headquarters stemmed, in part, from the unpreparedness for headquarterssquadron contact in an all-out war.8

      IDF ground forces found themselves in a similar situation. “In peacetime or in periods of relative peace, armies are sidetracked by demands that becloud their true purpose and divert them from developing the ability to fight effectively in wartime.” Veteran military personnel discovered that their accumulated experience was of little value when they were forced to make decisions far weightier than those in peacetime.9 According to Hanan Shai: “In the interwar period, armies conduct RSO whose main task is border defense that often involves the suppression of guerilla forces or paramilitary armies. Tactical, small-size fighting bodies generally conduct these operations in narrow time frames. During the interwar period neither senior nor junior officers acquire operational skills and practical experience in commanding large fighting formations. The political level is chiefly responsible for this phenomenon by placing limitations on the military echelon in order to preclude tactical mistakes developing into strategic problems that might escalate into a major war.”10

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