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its tanks and equipment in 1974.¹¹⁶

       Alert Level

      Raising the alert level is not a factor in force buildup, but to complete the picture, the following should be noted: On May 25, 1973, the GHQ operations branch ordered that steps be taken to prepare for mobilizing the reservists.¹¹⁷ These steps included checking the emergency mobilization procedures and evaluating the regular army headquarters’ level of readiness to call up the reserve units. A plan was issued to hold mobilization drills, verify reserve soldiers’ addresses, and monitor the alert level of all reserve units during June–August 1973. Unit deployment exercises were carried out, reserve storerooms were readied, self-propelled artillery was sent to Sinai, crossing equipment was hastily deployed, and so forth.¹¹⁸

      The Blue-White alert lasted four months (from mid-April to August) and concluded as planned. The cost of the alert was 69 million Israeli lira (in 2019, approximately $66 million),¹¹⁹ and it had a major impact on the IDF’s readiness for the Yom Kippur War.¹²⁰ According to deputy chief of staff Tal, “The IDF entered the Yom Kippur War a stronger army than what was planned for October 1973, even more powerful than the design for 1974–1975.”¹²¹

       The American Airlift

      The American airlift is a different type of issue from that discussed up to this point. Much can be learned from the attempt to introduce brand-new weapons into combat, illustrating what can and cannot be achieved during fighting. After many delays, the American airlift began on October 14, 1973. Most of the equipment was brought over on US Air Force Galaxies and Starlifters, as well as civilian aircraft. Between October 14 and 24, 8,775 tons of ammunition, weapons, spare parts, and other supplies reached the country.¹²² On October 8 the IDF ordered 120 TOW antitank launchers at a cost of $10 million. A few months earlier, Tal had vetoed a request for a small number of TOWs for testing.¹²³ Seventy launchers arrived on October 16, and a team was trained in their operation. The test firings proved successful.¹²⁴ According to an American report, Israel received eighty-one launchers and 2,000 missiles.¹²⁵ The IDF christened the missile Orev (Raven) and mounted it on Israeli-made reconnaissance jeeps. Within twenty-four hours of the jeeps’ and missiles’ arrival at the IDF Repair and Maintenance Center, the first antitank jeep model was produced. Officers and noncommissioned officers recently returned from training in the United States took the jeep and, accompanied by ordnance personnel, test-fired the missiles. Lessons were learned on the spot, and the ordnance branch began manufacturing dozens of replacement parts.¹²⁶ The jeeps were rushed to the southern Golan Heights to reinforce the thin defensive line being held by the aging Sherman tanks.¹²⁷ Nevertheless, not a single missile was fired during the war.

      Another weapon provided by the airlift and rushed to the battlefield was the LAW antitank launcher. Given the difficulties of assimilating even so-called user-friendly weapons in the midst of fighting, the complexities involved in this task were readily apparent. According to an American report, the IDF obtained 16,000 launchers during the war.¹²⁸ “The [890th] battalion received two pallets of LAW rockets replete with English-language instructions attached. We were lucky that Egyptian tanks didn’t show up because no one had a clue what to do with the rockets.”¹²⁹ Two occasions on which the LAWs were fired illustrate the problem. On the night of October 21–22 Israeli naval commandos carried out a fourth attack on the Egyptian port of Hurghada and fired a LAW that had arrived the previous day. Their mission was to sink an Egyptian missile boat. The commandos reached the objective in swift attack boats. According to Ze’ev Almog, commander of the Red Sea sector:

      Since we were given only 20 rockets, we had to use them for both training and combat operations. The weapon’s allocation was decided in this way: ten missiles for training … and ten for the mission. Only one fighter in each attack boat would undergo “sniper” training…. We didn’t know what the rocket’s range would be from inside a fast boat…. Therefore, on the morning of October 21 we practiced firing on a seaborne target. The effective range was calculated at 100 meters max. Then we decided to carry out a nighttime test on a firing range to determine the launching range…. During the operation the first eight rockets missed the target and the last two hit a Komar-class missile boat and destroyed it.¹³⁰

      Captain Shaul Mofaz, commander of the paratrooper reconnaissance company in Operation Kutonet (Nightgown), recounted another occasion when the LAWs were used immediately after their arrival. The night operation took place deep behind Syrian lines on October 12 and was designed to hit Iraqi convoys reinforcing the Syrians on the Golan Heights. He recalled:

      A few hours before setting out, weapons (including LAW rockets) arrived at the Tel Nof Airbase on the American airlift. The Americans are very organized. When they send weapons to foreign countries they include all the instruction paraphernalia. The LAW also came with blue plaster rocket training aids. We were the first IDF unit to receive this weapon. We didn’t exercise with them but some of the soldiers managed to read the operating manual before setting out on the mission. When a tank and the tank carrier overturned, one of the officers gave the order to fire the LAWs. Two rockets were fired and a large white stain spread across the tank. The soldiers were amazed and thought it was a secret weapon that fragmentized tanks or something like that, but in the debriefing it turned out that these were plaster training rockets.¹³¹

      Even though Israel received thousands of LAW launchers, dozens of TOW launchers, and 2,000 missiles, almost none of them were used in the war.

      Another new weapon that arrived was the Chaparral surface-to-air missile. This was an air-to-air Sidewinder missile repurposed as a mobile surface-to-air missile. Two Chaparral systems came in on the airlift, and the American operating instructions were quickly translated. The weapon was test-fired forty hours after its arrival, and eight hours later the force employed it operationally, defending a Hawk battery by ambushing Egyptian helicopters. This took place on October 23, one day before the end of the war. A week earlier, a contingent of fifty-four commanders, soldiers, and technicians had been dispatched to the United States. They completed a nineteen-day crash course on the Chaparral rather than the usual seven-week course. Upon their return they were deployed in the Israeli bulge in Syria.¹³²

      These case studies illustrate what can and cannot be done, as well as the dilemmas and tensions inherent in a hasty force buildup.

       Investment in the Present versus a Solution for the Future

      In some cases, priority was given to acquiring available weapons, even if their effectiveness remained uncertain; in other cases, replenishment was postponed until a more suitable weapon arrived. The large purchase of AMX-13 tanks and rocket launchers was an example of the first choice, while waiting to acquire the Mystère IV and the long-barreled Sherman M-50 tanks represented the second choice. The rule is that hasty procurement in wartime is of limited value, and the equipment usually ends up remaining in service after the war because of insufficient funds to replace it. Upgrading existing weapons is generally less complicated and often provides an unmistakably greater contribution, as was the case with the dieselization of the Shot tank engines (105mm L7 Centurions), which was competed just before the Yom Kippur War.¹³³

      Two cases illustrate the problem of mustering out old weapons before assimilating new ones. First, in the period preceding the Sinai War, replacing the Staghound armored car with the AMX-13 tank forced the IDF to make a volte-face. Second, the difficulty in assimilating and operating new jet fighters pushed the propeller squadrons, which were gradually being replaced, out of service. The rule should be: new takes priority over old, but only after the new has been assimilated. And assimilating new weapons just before or during a war is problematic. Their effectiveness is generally minimal. This was the case with the Mystère aircraft, the AMX-13 tanks, the LAW rockets, the TOW missiles, and so forth. The rule should be: do not introduce new weapons into service immediately before or during a short war. Another lesson is that a balance has to be maintained among all the elements: main weapons systems, ammunition, spare parts, users’ proficiency.

      In the future, increasing the number of main weapons systems (such as tanks and aircraft) will become increasingly difficult due to the greater complexity of producing them. On the

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