LITMIR.BIZ

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West Germany, Poland, and South Korea. Each country solved its own challenge with a unique solution by combining organization (Finland’s reserve system), physical obstacles (South Korea’s Demilitarized Zone), doctrine (American active defense and, later, the air-land battle of the 1980s and 1990s), allied support (the American air defense systems in eastern Europe), and the like.

      Today, the strategic threat from Hamas and Hezbollah rockets nullifies even the pre–Yom Kippur War presumption of a forty-eight-hour early warning. Except for a short period (in Sinai), Israel has always lacked tactical depth. Israel’s wars occur on its borders and in the vicinity of Israeli civilians. Because they usually erupt in a matter of hours to days, Israel’s wars demand a very rapid transition from peacetime deployment to full-scale mobilization and wartime deployment. Israeli military history therefore exemplifies the worst-case scenario: the need for a rapid transition from peace to war. Furthermore, Israel’s experience in making the transition is more complex than that of most armies because of the inherent contradictions between the methods and mindsets required in longterm routine security activities and those required for a rapid escalation to high-intensity warfare. This is complicated by the possibility that the escalation in hostilities might be only a temporary spike within the lower-intensity warfare framework. During the first ten to twelve hours of the Yom Kippur War, for instance, many Israeli commanders thought they were facing raids and artillery bombardments of the kind often encountered in the War of Attrition rather than an invasion. Many Israeli tactical decisions were compromised due to this misunderstanding.

      The Israeli worst-case transition scenario provides valuable lessons for countries such as South Korea, the Baltic States, and Finland, as well as for US Army forces in Europe and other first-reaction forces. Although there are strategic cultural and structural differences between the United States and Israel (such as the fact that 70 percent of IDF ground forces are reserve units), I believe that many Israeli lessons are applicable to the United States.

       Organization of the Book

      The book is arranged according to the four abovementioned challenges. Chapter 1 looks at the challenge of incorporating new equipment into existing units when war is in sight or already in progress. Unlike the material challenges of accelerated research and development, production, and delivery of new machinery or software, the issues here are fast learning and implementing the new asset so that it becomes part of the existing fighting machine. The cases analyzed are the 1956 Sinai War and American aid to Israel during the Yom Kippur War.

      Chapter 2 discusses a major obstacle in a successful transition: prolonged low-intensity or counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.²³ The effect of such operations on the ability to shift rapidly to high-intensity war was a concern during the US Army’s decade in Iraq and Afghanistan. Israel’s experience prior to the Yom Kippur War and the Second Lebanon Wars is presented here.

      Chapter 3 analyzes the situation of an ongoing peacetime conceptual or doctrinal debate that continues during war. Here, the challenge lies in identifying gaps between commanders or forces and bridging them in ways that enable coordinated action yet give commanders enough space to function independently. The chapter opens with a detailed discussion of Israel’s experience in the Yom Kippur War and continues to the Second Lebanon War. The focus is not on whether the concept or doctrine was suited to the military’s needs but on its acceptance throughout the force so that coherent and synchronized action in a multiechelon and joint-force military organization could take place.

      Chapter 4 assesses the cognitive and mental challenge of recognizing a given situation as war and then pushing this understanding up and down the echelons of command to implement a change in the mode of action. The case studies of the Yom Kippur War and the Second Lebanon War show how difficult this seemingly simple task can be.

      Chapter 5 describes the global, persistent nature of the phenomena discussed throughout this book by providing brief US Army historical anecdotes. It examines the current challenges for the US Army’s rapid transition to war in Europe and concludes with specific recommendations for overcoming these challenges. Most of the historical examples are at the tactical level, but in a few cases they reach the strategic and operational echelons.

      The conclusion offers a few broad suggestions for improving military organizations’ ability to successfully transition from peace or LIC or COIN operations to war.

      1

       Hastening Force Buildup before and during War

      Military force design—which includes the elements of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities—entails many levels of risk management. This chapter focuses on two major risks: miscalculating the outbreak date of the next war, and planning for a particular scenario when a different scenario might occur (based on a mistaken assumption).

      Throughout Israel’s history, the likelihood of the eruption of a full-scale confrontation has arisen every few years, causing the Israel Defense Forces to hasten preparations for war; these preparations are termed “force buildup.” This chapter examines three events—the Sinai War, the Six-Day War, and the Yom Kippur War—where the decision to augment the army’s readiness (professional competency, basic organizational suitability, weapons upgrade, and improved stockpile levels) was put to the test, followed by a discussion of what can and cannot be done when war appears on the horizon.

      These three events were chosen because they can be analyzed within the limits of declassified information. They illustrate a range of time factors and types of action taken—for instance, the time interval between a decision to prepare for war (based on the perception that a fundamental change has occurred and war is imminent) and the actual outbreak of hostilities. Preparation for the Sinai War lasted a whole year—from the public announcement of the Egyptian-Czech arms deal in late September 1955 to the outbreak of war on October 29, 1956. Preparation time for the Six-Day War was shorter—roughly three weeks—from the alert on May 15, 1967, to the outbreak of war on June 5. Preparations for the Yom Kippur War continued for half a year—from the announcement of the “Blue-White” alert on April 16, 1973, to the Egyptian-Syrian attack on October 6.¹ In addition, the chapter discusses the airlift that took place in the midst of the Yom Kippur War and the effort to assimilate new weapons in the course of fighting.

      A determination that war is likely to erupt within a few months or a year enhances tensions in certain areas. (Note that this chapter deals with wartime scenarios, when the main force has to be deployed at the onset of hostilities, and not in a limited or pinpoint operation, where such tensions may be more circumscribed.) The main tension is between the heightened readiness for the approaching clash and the future relevancy of the weapons procured (as well as supplies and structural organization) if war does not occur at the expected time. Given that the army receives funding to improve its readiness in the face of impending war and that cutbacks routinely occur after hostilities abate, investment in the immediate time frame—that is, to procure weapons and supplies and undertake relevant training exercises for the expected confrontation—comes at the cost of developing military capabilities for a more distant clash whose nature cannot be known in advance.

      In the case of weapons, the dilemma is whether to increase stocks of existing weapons or wait for newer and better ones to become available. For example, should an army upgrade its tank cannons and procure ammunition to improve its immediate military capability or take a risk and wait to acquire more advanced weapons that are better suited to oppose the new tanks the enemy will presumably receive after the war has ended. It should be remembered that every new weapons system requires a learning period. An additional element in risk management is the balance between the quantity of primary weapons (tanks and planes, for example) and the amount of ammunition and spare parts purchased for training and operational use.

      Another tension

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