Belgians Under the German Eagle - Jean Massart

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secrets from the British Government, and that they had a close military understanding.

      

      Once again: was Belgium, aware of the Germanic peril, to deliver herself bound hand and foot to the invader, who, not content with forgetting his international obligations, was about to run precisely counter to them? It would evidently have been more agreeable to Germany to have found in Belgium a lamb all ready to allow itself to be sacrificed on the altar of Kultur. Unhappily for Kultur, Belgium behaved like an enraged ram, determined to sell its life dearly.

      Whatever aspect of the question of Belgian neutrality we may consider, we always come back to this fact: Germany violated this neutrality on the 4th August, although Belgium had given her no plausible excuse for doing so. Since then the Germans have undertaken a campaign for the purpose of justifying their "injustice," as their Chancellor termed it. But none of the accusations invented after the event can in the slightest degree extenuate this injustice; their only effect has been to render still more execrable the treachery of the perjured protector.

      Neutral Opinion.

      It is pleasant, in this connection, to cite here the opinion of four writers belonging to countries which have not taken part in the war.

      A Dutch writer published in De Amsterdammer an interesting article which was translated into French, but of which the sale in Belgium was immediately prohibited by the Germans.

      In a lecture which has achieved a very great celebrity, Herr Karl Spitteler, a well-known literary man of German-speaking Switzerland, also took the part of Belgium. We know of this lecture only by the slashing which it received in the K.Z. on the 30th December, in the first morning edition.

      Here is a passage which particularly infuriated the German paper:—

      "I consider that to take the documents from the pockets of the gasping victim (Belgium) is, as to the spirit which inspired the act, a gross fault of taste. It would have been quite enough to throttle the victim; to blacken him afterwards is too much. As for Switzerland, if it associated itself with these calumnies against Belgium, it would commit not merely an infamy, but a mistake; for on the day when another Power grudges us our national existence, the same accusations might be employed against us: do not let us forget that malice is now counted among the munitions of war."

      Another Swiss writer, M. Philippe Godet, expresses his opinions with no less energy in the Journal de Genève (8th September, 1914).

      The Falsification of M. de l'Escaille's Letter.

      In the preceding pages we have dealt only with matters relating to Belgium. Do not let our attitude be misunderstood. We have not the presumption to suppose that Belgium has ever occupied the foreground in the negotiations described; on the contrary, we are perfectly well aware of the diplomatic insignificance of our country in the discordant "Concert of Europe" which has ended in the present war. Our sole object is to show that Belgium has not played the unavowable rôle which the Germans attributed to her. As to the origin of this war, and the responsibility which the German rulers seek to foist upon Great Britain, in order that their own country, and, above all, their ally, Austria, may evade it, this is a discussion into which we do not wish to enter, for it lies outside the programme which we have set ourselves. We ought, however, to speak a word as to the placards which the German authorities had posted up in Belgium during the month of September 1914. The first is dated the 16th September; it gives the résumé of a letter written by M. B. de l'Escaille to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

      Ten days later a new placard appeared: this time the complete text of the letter was given, and it was explained how it came to fall into the hands of the Germans.

      Let us leave this last point: it concerns the criminal law, not diplomacy. Let us examine only the summary which was published and the conclusions which the Germans drew from it.

      Was the summary honest? To discover this let us take the essential sentence, printed in heavier type: "They possess even the definite assurance that England will come to the assistance of France"; and let us compare this with the corresponding passage of the text: "To-day they are strongly convinced in St. Petersburg, they even have the assurance, that England will support France." The term "assistance" (secouer) in the summary can apply only to military assistance, while the text speaks only of "support" (soutien), which means diplomatic action. So the second conclusion also is false—"that England did not intervene in the war on account of Belgium, but because she had promised France to give her assistance."

      Let us now look at the first conclusion. It is "that Germany was actuated by pacific intentions, and sought by all means to avoid war." In reality the text, like the summary, states only that Germany sought to avoid a general conflict, which means that she wished to localize the war between Austria and Serbia; in other words, Germany wished Europe to give Austria a free hand to crush Serbia. Nowhere does the text say that Germany did anything to avoid "the war": the only war which was declared on the 30th July, that of Austria against Serbia. In short, this conclusion is falsified.

      There remains the phrase which introduces the two conclusions: "By this report of the diplomatic representative of Belgium at the Court of St. Petersburg it is proved".... Was M. de l'Escaille really the diplomatic representative of Belgium in St. Petersburg? Open an administrative almanack, and you will see that the representative was M. le Comte Conrad de Buisseret-Steenbecque de Blarenghien. As for M. de l'Escaille, he was Secretary of Legation.

      The conclusions concluding here, there is no room for further falsifications.

      It is not our intention to make an exhaustive examination of the diplomatic documents relating to the war; the more so as this examination has been conducted in masterly fashion by MM. Dürckheim and Denis, by M. Waxweiler, and by the author of J'Accuse. It is enough for us to prove that Germany has intentionally falsified documents, since this simple proof disposes of all her attempts to befoul Belgium; for he who has a good argument at his disposal is not so foolish as to spoil it and deprive it of all real value by means of falsifications.

       Table of Contents

      The three Successive Proposals of Wilhelm II to Belgium.

      Under its dry, cold, diplomatic phrasing the reply to the ultimatum (1st Grey Book, No. 22) scarcely conceals the indignation which thrilled the heart of Belgium when Wilhelm II offered her the chance of associating herself with his crime against loyalty. But the German Government did not understand this indignation, neither was it conscious of its own infamy. Otherwise how could it have repeated the same offer a few days later—an offer at once contemptible and full of contempt, as was so well said by M. Jules Destrée before the meeting of the Federation of Advocates, on the 3rd August, 1914. Two remarks on the subject of this fresh proposal (1st Grey Book, No. 60). In the first place the United States Minister in Belgium, who was entrusted with the German interests, refused to transmit it; as for the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, he accepted the mission "without enthusiasm." In the second place, when the Emperor affirmed, on the 9th August, that the fortress of Liége had been taken by assault, he must have known that the fortress was still resisting; for although the city of Liége was occupied by the Germans from the 7th, the forts were intact. Let us remember that the first fort which fell was that of Barchon, on the 8th August, 1914; that of Évegnée fell on the 11th, that of Fléron on the 14th, that of Loncin, commanded by General Leman, fell only at 5 p.m. on the 15th: and several forts were at that time still holding out.

      

      German diplomacy naturally received a fresh indignant refusal (1st Grey Book, No. 23).

      Even then official Germany, dazzled by the brilliance of its Kultur, had not yet grasped the full baseness of its crime, since on the 10th September it posted up in Brussels its new proposal and Belgium's reply.

      Could candour in perfidy

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