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      1.21 In the remainder of this chapter, we'll articulate and critically discuss three non‐skeptical views: infinitism, coherentism, and foundationalism. In outline form, these views maintain the following:

      Infinitism: all justified beliefs are justified because of support from further justifiers. The chain of justifiers justifies beliefs only when it forms an infinite series of non‐repeating justifiers. No belief can be justified without support from a further justifier that belongs to such a series.

      Coherentism: all justified beliefs are justified because they belong to a coherent set of beliefs that support them (i.e. beliefs that are mutually supporting in that they lend deductive, inductive, or abductive support to other members). No belief can be justified without support from a further justified belief.

      Foundationalism: all justified beliefs are justified because of support from further justified beliefs or because they are justified without such support. Any justified belief is either a properly basic belief or it derives its justification from such beliefs.

      1.22 Infinitism tells us that a belief is justified iff it is appropriately supported by an infinite collection of non‐repeating justifiers (i.e. justified beliefs or available supporting reasons). This is tantamount to accepting the Supporting Justified Belief Rule and taking it to its logical conclusion without ceding to the skeptic.

       Master Argument for Epistemic Infinitism

      P1 (Premise 1). There are three possible, non‐skeptical solutions to the regress problem: foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism.

      P2. There are insurmountable difficulties foundationalism and coherentism.

      P3. Infinitism faces no insurmountable difficulties.

      P4. Not having insurmountable difficulties is better than not.

      1.24 Let's suppose for a minute that P2 is correct, and that the above‐noted (and perhaps related) difficulties to foundationalism and coherentism really are insurmountable as the infinitist insists. Even if that were so, the Master Argument for Epistemic Infinitism establishes C only if P3 can be established – viz. only if the problems that face infinitism are not equally insurmountable. Before we turn to examine the problems that face foundationalism and coherentism, let's first see how well infinitism holds up to the objections it faces.

      1.25 The infinitist insists that a given belief is justified iff that belief is supported by an infinite set of non‐repeating justifiers. One standard complaint about this proposal is that it puts justification out of our reach because – given the kind of cognitively limited creatures we are – we simply don't have an infinite set of justifiers available to support our beliefs. If this is right, infinitism doesn't provide us with a non‐skeptical response to the regress problem. Here's the argument in outline – that is, the Argument from Finite Minds:

       Argument from Finite Minds

      P1. You have a finite number of beliefs.

      P2. Nothing could be a justifier that supports your beliefs at any given time unless it is itself a belief.

      C1. You have a finite number of justifiers that support your beliefs at any given time.

      P3. Infinitism tells us that a belief is justified only if supported by an infinite set of non‐repeating justifiers.

      C2. Infinitism implies that none of your beliefs could be justified.

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