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      I.26 In Chapter 8, we return to knowledge, albeit not in a standard way. Up to Chapter 8, when we discuss knowledge, we discuss specifically propositional knowledge. But there are (at least) three very different and interesting ways in which contemporary epistemology has investigated kinds of knowledge beyond standard propositional knowledge. These concern the relationships between (i) knowing how and knowing that, (ii) knowledge and understanding, and (iii) what Ernest Sosa calls animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. The principal aim of this chapter, entitled “Kinds of Knowledge,” is to discuss and critically evaluate some of the motivations for, and criticisms of, each of these distinctions.

      I.28 In Chapter 10, we turn our focus to some puzzles that arise at the intersection of the epistemology and ethics of belief. We take, as a starting point for discussion, W.K. Clifford's famous dictum that “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything upon insufficient evidence” (1877, p. 295). Is what Clifford says true? What kinds of considerations are relevant to determining this? As we'll see, if Clifford's principle is understood as a kind of moral principle, one that tells us that there's always a decisive moral reason to believe only what you have sufficient evidence to believe, it looks like Clifford's principle faces some serious problems. If, however, the evidentialist principle is understood as a kind of purely epistemic principle, one that says that there is something epistemically defective about believing something without sufficient evidence, the principle has more plausibility. This chapter navigates a range of terrain surrounding these issues, and, more generally, delves in questions about how “ought” and “should” apply to beliefs in light of the fact that what we believe is (to some extent) outside of our direct control.

      I.29 By this point in the book, the reader should have a pretty good sense of what epistemology is all about. It would be convenient to end here. But doing so would be cheating. Remember the skeptic we described in Section I.1? We simply registered that the skeptic has some pretty powerful arguments, even if the skeptical conclusion these arguments lead to seems disastrous. The time has finally come – we can put it off no longer – to lock eyes with the skeptic and see whether we can make it out with any of our knowledge intact.

      I.31 Taken together, the chapters cover a lot of ground. But let us not get ahead of ourselves. The “is” in This Is Epistemology should not be read as the “is” of identity (a reading that would mean, rather arrogantly, that epistemology is all and only what we've told you about), but as the “is” of predication (which just means, much more modestly, that all of these things are examples of epistemology). To be sure, there are a lot of topics that count as serious epistemology and which we simply haven't managed to cover here in sufficient detail or at all. Accordingly, we encourage the interested reader to explore both more broadly and more deeply, and we hope that the present text offers a suitable background and guidance for doing so well.

      Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://www.iep.utm.edu.

      Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu.

      Notes

      1 1 For a comprehensive overview of late‐twentieth‐century literature on the analysis of knowledge, see Borges et al. (2017) and, for more advanced discussion, Shope (1983). See also Dutant (2015) and Ichikawa and Steup (2017) for helpful discussion of the analysis of knowledge as a philosophical project.

      2 2 “If and only if” can be abbreviated to “iff.”

      3 3

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