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ship was carrying ammunition which it said was "destined for the destruction of brave German soldiers." This contention our government rightly brushed aside as irrelevant.

       The essence of the case was stated by our government in its note of June 9 as follows:

      "Whatever be the other facts regarding the Lusitania, the principal fact is that a great steamer, primarily and chiefly a conveyance for passengers, and carrying more than a thousand souls who had no part or lot in the conduct of the war, was sunk without so much as a challenge or a warning, and that men, women and children were sent to their death in circumstances unparalleled in modern warfare."

      Three notes were written to Germany regarding the Lusitania sinking. The first dated May 13 advanced the idea that it was impossible to conduct submarine warfare conformably with international law. In the second dated June 9 occurs the statement that "the government of the United States is contending for something much greater than mere rights of property or privileges of commerce. It is contending for nothing less high and sacred than the rights of humanity." In the third note dated July 21, it is asserted that "the events of the past two months have clearly indicated that it is possible and practicable to conduct submarine operations within the so-called war zone in substantial accord with the accepted practices of regulated warfare." The temper of the American people and the president's notes had succeeded in securing a modification of the submarine campaign.

       It required cool statesmanship to prevent a rushing into war over the Lusitania incident and events which had preceded it. There was a well developed movement in favor of it, but the people were not unanimous on the point. It would have lacked that cooperation necessary for effectiveness; besides our country was but poorly prepared for engaging in hostilities. It was our state of unpreparedness continuing for a long time afterwards, which contributed, no doubt, to German arrogance. They thought we would not fight.

       But the United States had become thoroughly awakened and the authorities must have felt that if the conflict was to be unduly prolonged, we must eventually be drawn into it. This is reflected in the modified construction which the president and others began to place on the Monroe Doctrine. The great underlying idea of the doctrine remained vital, but in a message to congress delivered December 7, 1915, the president said:

       "In the day in whose light we now stand there is no claim of guardianship, but a full and honorable association as of partners between ourselves and our neighbors in the interests of America." Speaking before the League to Enforce Peace at Washington, May 27, 1916, he said: "What affects mankind is inevitably our affair, as well as the affair of the nations of Europe and of Asia." In his address to the senate of January 22, 1917, he said: "I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world—that no nation should seek to extend its policy over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own policy, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful." This was a modifying and enlarging of the doctrine, as well as a departure from Washington's warning against becoming entangled with the affairs of Europe.

       Table of Contents

      HUNS SWEEPING WESTWARD.

       TOWARD SHORES OF ATLANTIC—SPREAD RUIN AND DEVASTATION—CAPITALS OF CIVILIZATION ALARMED—ACTIVITIES OF SPIES—APOLOGIES AND LIES—GERMAN ARMS WINNING—GAIN TIME TO FORGE NEW WEAPONS—FEW VICTORIES FOR ALLIES—ROUMANIA CRUSHED—INCIDENT OF U-53.

       The powerful thrusts of the German armies toward the English channel and the Atlantic ocean, the pitiless submarine policy, and the fact that Germany and Austria had allied with them Bulgaria and Turkey, began to spread alarm in the non-belligerent nations of the world.

       That Germany was playing a Machiavellian policy against the United States soon became evident. After each submarine outrage would come an apology, frequently a promise of reparation and an agreement not to repeat the offense, with no intention, however, of keeping faith in any respect. As a mask for their duplicity, the Germans even sent a message of sympathy for the loss of American lives through the sinking of the Lusitania; which but intensified the state of mind in this country.

       Less than three weeks after the Lusitania outrage the American steamship Nebraskan was attacked (May 25) by a submarine. The American steamship Leelanaw was sunk by submarines July 25. The White Star liner Arabic was sunk by a submarine August 19; sixteen victims, two American.

       Our government received August 24 a note from the German ambassador regarding the sinking of the Arabic. It stated that the loss of American lives was contrary to the intention of the German government and was deeply regretted. On September 1 Ambassador von Bernstorff supplemented the note with a letter to Secretary Lansing giving assurance that German submarines would sink no more liners.

       The Allan liner Hesperian was sunk September 4 by a German submarine; 26 lives lost, one American.

       On October 5 the German government sent a communication regretting again and disavowing the sinking of the Arabic, and stating its willingness to pay indemnities.

       Meanwhile depression existed among the Allies and alarm among nations outside the war over the German conquest of Russian Poland. They captured Lublin, July 31; Warsaw, August 4; Ivangorod, August 5; Kovno, August 17; Novogeorgievsk, August 19; Brest-Litovsk, August 25, and Vilna, September 18.

       Activities of spies and plottings within the United States began to divide attention with the war in Europe and the submarine situation. Dr. Constantin Dumba, who was Austro-Hungarian ambassador to the United States, in a letter to the Austrian minister of foreign affairs, dated August 20, recommended "most warmly" to the favorable consideration of the foreign office "proposals with respect to the preparation of disturbances in the Bethlehem steel and munitions factory, as well as in the middle west."

       He felt that "we could, if not entirely prevent the production of war material in Bethlehem and in the middle west, at any rate strongly disorganize it and hold it up for months."

       The letter was intrusted to an American newspaper correspondent named Archibald, who was just setting out for Europe under the protection of an American passport. Archibald's vessel was held up at Falmouth, England, his papers seized and their contents cabled to the United States. On September 8 Secretary Lansing instructed our ambassador at Vienna to demand Dr. Dumba's recall and the demand was soon acceded to by his government.

       On December 4 Captain Karl Boy-Ed, naval attache of the German embassy in Washington, was dismissed by our government for "improper activity in naval affairs." At the same time Captain Franz von Papen, military attache of the embassy, was dismissed for "improper activity in military matters." In an intercepted letter to a friend in Germany he referred to our people as "those idiotic Yankees."

       As a fitting wind-up of the year and as showing what the German promise to protect liners amounted to, the British passenger steamer Persia was sunk in the Mediterranean by a submarine December 30, 1915.

       The opening of 1916 found the president struggling with the grave perplexities of the submarine problem, exchanging notes with the German government, taking fresh hope after each disappointment and endeavoring by every means to avert the impending strife and find a basis for the preservation of an honorable peace.

       It was now evident to most thinking people that the apparent concessions of the Germans were granted merely to provide them time to complete a larger program of submarine construction. This must have been evident to the president; but he appears to have possessed an optimism that rose above his convictions.

       Our government, January 18, put forth a declaration of principles regarding submarine attacks and inquired whether the governments of the allies would subscribe to such an agreement. This was one of the president's "forlorn hope" movements to try

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