LITMIR.BIZ

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batteries; on posting the detachments give instructions to have intrenchments made immediately without resting, especially on the days of the 15th and 16th. Since affairs have a serious aspect, do not lose vigilance and be on the alert at all times. …

      “Concentrate all the forces and have a call to arms in Cavite so that all the troops may be in Pasay on Wednesday night.

“In case the Americans attempt to order you out do not leave your posts, happen what may, but exercise prudence and be prepared leaving them to give the provocation. Answer them that you have no instructions given you with regard to what they ask.”8

      Obviously the maintenance of peace at this time hung by a very slender thread. On September 14 the governor of Cavite telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:—

“Most urgent. I desire to know from you the result of the ultimatum. Advise me if we must prepare our troops for action to-morrow. I await a reply.”9

But war was not to begin at this time. On September 23 Bray wrote to Aguinaldo advising him to maintain a defensive attitude until the result of the negotiations at Paris should become known, giving way to the Americans and not showing his teeth. He could take the offensive later if advisable and should have little difficulty in settling accounts with the American soldiers.10

Bray suggested the possibility of an alliance between the American and the Spanish soldiers if a conflict should arise before the departure of the latter.11

Meanwhile preparations for the attack progressed. During September, Sandico wrote Aguinaldo suggesting the urgent necessity of reorganizing the “masons” and the Katipúnan,12 and that all be furnished with knives, to be kept hidden so that they might be “ready for any event.”

In spite of efforts to keep the Insurgent soldiers in hand, feeling among them ran high, and they wanted to fight.13 On November 30, 1898, General Mascardo telegraphed from San Fernando to Aguinaldo asking if he might begin firing in order to prevent the American troops from disembarking, and Aguinaldo promptly answered in the affirmative.14

On December 5 Malvar telegraphed from Lipa that according to a despatch from Batangas, American divers were working unceasingly and that a subordinate had ordered that they be fired on if they attempted to land. Aguinaldo replied that he did not mind their working at sea, but that they must not be allowed to land under any circumstances.15

      On December 6 Sandico telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:—

“The difficulty of last night at the San Juan picket with the American troops has been adjusted without prejudice. Our preparations ought to continue. Awaiting orders.”16

      San Juan was where the firing commenced on February 4, 1899.

      On December 9 Cailles wired Aguinaldo as follows:—

“Report to you that there are 3000 Americans in front of our position at Singalong. I do not know what they wish; if they enter Pineda I open fire.”17

      By this time the Insurgents had made up their minds that the Americans, who had been bearing their insults in silence, were cowards. Aguinaldo’s indorsement on this telegram reads:—

“Answered: Nevertheless the 3000 American soldiers are few against my Colonel and his 300 soldiers, and I believe you have more than that number. E.A., Dec. 12, 1898.”18

Relative to the insults which were at this time showered upon Americans, Taylor has made the following statement:19—

      “Fortune had been good to Aguinaldo and his associates in the eight months during which the United States had prevented Spain from relieving her beleaguered garrisons in the Philippines, and she might still be kind. The men about Aguinaldo who had risen farthest and fastest could not endure the thought of having to accept subordinate positions in a government not directed by themselves. The halberdiers at the door of the palace of the president saluted them as the halberdiers at the doorway of his lordship the governor-general in Manila had struck the marble steps with their halberds at the coming of the Spanish generals. They swaggered down the streets of Malolos, clashing their swords behind them, and they knew that if they won, the Philippines would be divided into fiefs which they, as dukes and marquises, would hold in feudal tenure from a Malay potentate. They were confident. They held Luzón. They held the people. They had no intention of returning to office stools or to the life of outlaws and hunted men. The United States force in Manila was small and America was far. It was true that they might have to fight for the prize which they had seized, but the military leaders about Aguinaldo were confident of winning in case they fought. They believed the Americans were afraid of them and would be easily beaten. American soldiers had been seized and had been insulted by the followers of Aguinaldo and no resort had been made to force. The Americans had been ordered to avoid bringing on an engagement and had obeyed. It is also probable that many of the insults to which they had been subjected were not appreciated by them. A tall soldier from western America paid no attention to the insults hurled at him in a language which he did not understand. And yet the small excited Filipinos might retire feeling that the American had tamely submitted to insult worse than a blow.”

      By the middle of December, Aguinaldo had placed in position in the vicinity of Manila all of the field guns in his possession.

The Treaty of Paris was signed on December 10. It provided for the termination of Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines. This was what the Insurgents had been waiting for, and thereafter things moved rapidly. It is obvious that an attack was definitely planned for at this time, for on December 21, Commandant F. E. Rey telegraphed Aguinaldo that the second chief of the second zone of Manila had directed him to assist by entering that city as soon as they opened fire against the American troops.20

      On the following day Cailles reported that he had occupied blockhouse No. 12, which was within the American lines, and added the following significant statement:—

“The order of yesterday was, on hearing the first shots from Santa Ana, for my whole force to hurl themselves on the American line of trenches, and to follow the living to Manila. The dead can lie with the dead. Yesterday we were content waiting for the arming of the San Quintin.”21

      San Quintin’s Day was the anniversary of the Sicilian vespers, the massacre of the French in Sicily in 1268. Obviously the Insurgents were planning something similar for Manila.

      For some reason the attack was not made as planned, but there was no intention of abandoning it. Within fifteen days of January 1 some 40,000 Filipinos left Manila. Why? On January 7, Aguinaldo wrote to Señor Benito Legarda at Manila, saying:—

“I beg you to leave Manila with your family and come here to Malolos, but not because I wish to frighten you—I merely wish to warn you for your satisfaction, although it is not yet the day or the week.”22

Many details of the plan of attack have come into our possession. Doctor Manuel Xeres Burgos wrote Aguinaldo during January relative to

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