LITMIR.BIZ

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July 16 General Noriel telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:—

      “An American has come here who says that he is a Colonel of the Army whom we should obey; and that it is your desire. We did not listen to him, awaiting your order.”

      On the back of the telegram is written the following:—

“Reply.—You should not obey. What this American Colonel says is a lie. Be cautious so as not to be deceived. You should require from him proof. Be always vigilant, but upright, also all of the officers and soldiers must be strict and not timid.”54

      Obviously there was no real coöperation between American and Filipino troops at this time. General Anderson ignored General Aguinaldo’s request for information as to places where American troops were to land in Filipino territory and the objects of disembarking them.

      The Americans proceeded with their plans for the attack upon Manila, and it became desirable to occupy some of the Insurgent trenches. On July 29 Arévalo telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:—

“In conference with General Greene I asked for an official letter, a copy of which I send you: ‘Headquarters 2nd Brigade, U. S. Expeditionary Forces, Camp Dewey, near Manila, July 29th, 1898. El Señor Noriel, General de Brigade. Sir: In pursuance of our conversation of yesterday and the message which Captain Arévalo brought to me during the night, I beg to inform you that my troops will occupy the intrenchments between the Camino Real and the beach, leaving camp for that purpose at 8.00 o’clock this morning. I will be obliged if you will give the necessary orders for the withdrawal of your men. Thanking you for your courtesy, I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant, F. V. Greene, Brigadier General, commanding.’ ”55

      This clear direct declaration of intention by General Greene is the actual transaction referred to by Blount as “Jockeying the Insurgents out of their trenches.” He bases his statements concerning the matter on a newspaper report.

      The attitude of the army officers in the matter of obtaining permission to occupy the trenches needed in preparing for the assault on the city could not have been more correct.

      On August 10 General Merritt gave the following emphatic instructions relative to the matter:—

      “No rupture with Insurgents. This is imperative. Can ask Insurgent generals or Aguinaldo for permission to occupy their trenches, but if refused not to use force.”

      On the same day General Anderson wrote to Aguinaldo, asking permission to occupy a trench facing blockhouse No. 14, in order to place artillery to destroy it. The permission was granted on the following day.

During the early part of August, Aguinaldo seems to have avoided conferences with American officers. On the second of the month Mabini wrote him how he had put off Admiral Dewey’s aid with a false statement that he did not know Aguinaldo’s whereabouts.56

The landing of American troops at Parañaque for the assault on Manila led to the concentration of Insurgent troops at the neighbouring town of Bacoor.57

On August 8 Fernando Acevedo58 wrote to General Pío del Pilar that the Americans were going to attack the next day and that—

“It is requisite and necessary before their attack takes place to-morrow, that you to-morrow or to-night annihilate them, sparing none, for the way they have deceived us, and will again without fail, in the contract signed by Sr. Emilio; and convince yourself, my friend, that it is necessary to do this; and when it is done the whole world will wonder and say that we have done well, and will not be able to give out that the people here are fools spending the time sucking their fingers.”59

      Governor-general Forbes in the Wild Man’s Country

      Mr. Forbes has made frequent trips through the wild man’s country in Northern Luzon, and knows it from end to end. Its people know and like him. This photograph shows a crowd of Ifugaos welcoming him on his arrival at Banaue in May, 1913. They are clapping their hands over their heads in true Ifugao fashion.

      Worse yet, information was sent to the Spaniards of the proposed American attack on the 13th instant, as is shown by the following letter:—

      “(Battalion of Cazadores, No. 2. Expeditionary. Office of the Lieutenant-Colonel. Private.)

“Señor Don Artemio Ricarte:60

      “My Dear Sir: I have received to-day your kind letter giving warning of the attack on Manila, and I thank you for your personal interest in me, which, on my part, I reciprocate. I assure you that I am yours, most truly and sincerely,

      “Luis Martinez Alcobendas.

“Singalon, August 10, 1898.”61

      According to Taylor, this was not the first occurrence of this sort. He says:—

“The officers of the United States Army who believed that the insurgents were informing the Spaniards of the American movements were right. Sastrón has printed a letter from Pío del Pilar, dated July 30, to the Spanish officer commanding at Santa Ana, in which Pilar said that Aguinaldo had told him that the Americans would attack the Spanish lines on August 2 and advised that the Spaniards should not give way, but hold their positions. Pilar added, however, that if the Spaniards should fall back on the walled city and surrender Santa Ana to himself, he would hold it with his own men. Aguinaldo’s information was correct, and on August 2 eight American soldiers were killed or wounded by the Spanish fire.”62

      Taylor continues:—

“And yet Aguinaldo claimed to be an ally of the Americans. It is not probable that these were the only two such letters written. Aguinaldo had by this time found out that although he could defeat the scattered Spanish detachments, he could not defeat the Spanish force holding the lines of Manila. He did not want the Americans in the Philippines. They were in his way, and he had already made up his mind that if they did not give him what he wanted, he would drive them out by force. He saw very early that it was extremely improbable that he should obtain from them what he wanted; accordingly all losses both among Spaniards and Americans would, from Aguinaldo’s point of view, inure to his benefit. The best possible thing for him would be to hold his own force intact while they wore each other out. The Spanish losses, small as they were, occurred in front of the American lines, not in front of the Filipinos. There is no reason, accordingly, for believing that the Filipinos suffered heavily. To arrange that the Spaniards should inflict losses upon the Americans, while he saved his own men, showed ingenuity on the part of Aguinaldo; but it was decidedly not the conduct of an ally.”63

      The feeling toward the American troops at this time is further shown by a telegram from General Pío del Pilar, sent from San Pedro Macati on August 10, 1898:—

“Commandant Acebedo writes that the Spaniards are about to surrender because they want to turn over the place; the Americans want them to leave only the batteries and say that they will station themselves in said batteries. It appears that they want to deceive us; they do not want to give us arms, and if they do not give us arms, we shall attack them and drive them out. I await your reply.”64

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