LITMIR.BIZ

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the English, who were advancing from Portsmouth. The galleys had been hauled into very shallow water, where the larger of Lisle's ships could not reach them. D'Annebault's calculation was, that the English admiral would not care to run the risk of passing the galleys, for the purpose of attacking the great ships beyond, lest they should fall upon his rear, and so put him between two fires. According to Lisle's statement to the king of the plan on which he intended to fight, he would not have been deterred from attacking by the dispositions of the French admiral. He had made counter arrangements which were skilful in intention, and might have been effective. His plan was to fall upon the great ships of the French fleet, with the Vanwarde and the Battle, leaving the smaller craft which formed the Wing to stay behind, or to windward, and ward off the French galleys. A shift of the wind from the west to north-east rendered it impossible for him to carry out his intention. The change in the wind had transferred the weather-gage to D'Annebault, and if he had been as eager for battle as according to Martin du Bellay he asserted himself to be, he had now an admirable opportunity of fighting. But D'Annebault again found insuperable difficulties in the way of coming to close quarters. All the use he made of his chance was to fight a tardy, inconclusive battle. Martin du Bellay and Lord Lisle substantially agree, but we may give the preference to our own countryman.

      "After my right hartie commendacions. Theis shalbe tadvertise you, that the Kinges Majesties navie ys arrived twhart of Beauchif; where, for lack of wynde, we be at this present comme to ancker, to stopp this ebbe, and with the nexte fludd, which wooll be aboute foure of the clock in the mornying, we entend (God willing) tapplye towards Dover. I had thought the French fleete wold have been here before me, to have stopped us at this place, for uppon Saturdaye night last, both they and we came to ancker within a leage togethurs; and all the same daye, frome noone untill night, they assailed us with ther gallyes, but ther hole fleete approached us not, untill it was after son settyng; before which tyme ther gallies were repulced, and then both they and we came to ancker, within a leage one of an other: and yarly in the mornyng they were dislodged; for by the tyme yt was daye, they were asfarre unto the wynde of us, as we might escrye them oute of my mayne topp, halyng into the seawarde, the wynde beyng somewhat fresshe; so that, if they had taried, ther gallyes could have doon them letill pleasour. And wheras, the daye before, they came togethurs, like an hole wood, they kepte now, in ther removing, noon order; for some of our small boates, which could lye best by a wynde, (whome I dyd purposely send to se what course they helde, and what order they kept) brought me wourde, that they lay est with the sailes, as though it shuld seame that they mynded to fetche the Narrow Sees before us. Ther was five myles in lenght (as they thought) between ther foremost and ther hyndermost shippes. And seyng that they be not here in this baye (which we have alredy seane) I cannot perceave, howe they can be before us in any part of the Narrow Sees. Wherefore I have thought good to desyer you to send me some of your intelligence, and allso that you wold gyve knowledge to Rye, that all the shippes, which be there with the Kinges Majesties victualles, may comme and mete with me to morowe at the Nasse (Dungeness), as I goe towardes Dover; where, (God willyng) if the wynde wooll suffer me, I wooll be with thole flete to morowe at night. Herof I requier you, with diligence, tadvertise the Kinges Majestie. And if ther armye, or any parte of them, remayne in any parte of the Narrowe Sees, whethur it be uppon ther owne quoast, or uppon oures, I doubt not but I wooll have some knowledge of them, ones ere to morowe night; wherof allso (God willyng) I wooll not faile to signifye unto His Highnes. And thus I byd you right hartilly well to fare. In the Harrye, under Beauchif, this Mondaye, the 17th of August, at 9 of the clock in the night."

      Your assured loving Frende,

       (Signed) John Lisle.

      To this lame and impotent conclusion came the great attempt of Francis I. to punish Henry for the capture of Boulogne. When every allowance is made for the insufficiency of the tools with which the French admiral had to work, it is impossible to acquit him of having shown a remarkable want of spirit. It would appear, if we are to trust Blaise de Montluc, that his countrymen did not expect much. "Our business is rather on the land than on the water, where I do not know that our nation has ever gained any great battles," is the sentence in which he dismisses the expedition. Montluc, for his part, did nothing that was worthy to be written about. But it was perhaps because the French did not expect much, then or at later periods, that their admirals have so commonly shown the timidity of D'Annebault.

      The war contained no further naval operations of any importance. Both fleets were worn out by operations which for the time were lengthy and trying. The Governments, too, were exhausted, and all but bankrupt. Both Francis and Henry VIII. were at the end of their lives; and although peace was not actually made till after the death of both of them, the war was not pushed seriously. Only a very detailed history of the navy could find place for an account of the reigns of Edward VI. and Mary Tudor. Much could not be said, however anxious the historian might be to pass over absolutely nothing. The only achievement of Edward VI.'s Government with regard to the navy was to employ it for the purpose of assisting the Protector Somerset's invasion of Scotland. This effort appears to have exhausted the energies of King Edward's Council, as far as the navy was concerned. In fact, all the members of that body were far too busy intriguing against one another, to attend to the defences of the realm. The resources of the country had been taxed to the utmost during the reign of Henry VIII. A sum of over £3,600,000 was calculated to have been spent on wars during the reign of father and son, and to get the equivalent of that outlay in our generation we must not only multiply the sum spent by 20, but divide the existing wealth of the nation by some much larger figure. During the few years of confusion which make up the reign of Edward VI., the navy was reduced to half the numbers attained by Henry VIII. Seventy-one vessels, of which thirty were of respectable size, was the strength of Henry's navy. Queen Elizabeth never had quite so many ships; and although those of James and Charles I. were on an average larger, they were never more numerous. Mary Tudor inherited the diminished navy of her brother, and she could do little to bring it back to the former standard. Her marriage with the King of Spain established a firm alliance, for the time being, with what was then the most considerable naval power in Europe, while the entire exhaustion of France in the reign of Henry II. made the possession of a powerful fleet less necessary. But though little was demanded of the navy at that period, it was allowed to become too weak to do even that little. When Calais was attacked by the Duke of Guise in the winter of 1559, Mary's navy was so unprepared that it could not be got ready in time to give the least assistance to the garrison. A few of our ships, which had been fitted out too late to be of any service at Calais, did make their appearance on the flank of the French troops, which were defeated on the sands at Gravelines, by the Count of Egmont, and that was about the sum of the service they rendered during Mary's reign. There was indeed something stirring among the seamen of the west of England, which was to have great consequences in the next reign, but it will come to be dealt with more appropriately in our account of the navy of Queen Elizabeth.

CHAPTER II

       REIGN OF ELIZABETH TO THE DEFEAT OF THE ARMADA

       Table of Contents

      Authorities.—Charnock continues to be of value for this reign, and indeed for the history of the navy till the end of the eighteenth century. Derrick's Rise and progress of the Royal Navy gives useful official lists. Mr. Whateley gives the substance of the rules established for the Navy Office by Elizabeth in 1560, at pp. 131–134 of his Samuel Pepys, and the World he lived in. The original is in the S. P. Dom. Elizabeth, vol. xv. The Calendars of State Papers of the reign contain much information as to the navy. More is in the great collection of Hakluyt. The Navy Record Society has published the papers referring to the Armada, while the Spanish side of the story is told in La Armada Invencible of Don Cesareo Duro—so admirably extracted and combined by Mr. Froude in his Spanish Story of the Armada. Drake's first notable cruise to the West Indies is told in the Drake Redivivus.

      When Elizabeth ascended the throne, in 1559, she found the navy in the same state of weakness and confusion as all other parts of the administration. Its downward progress from the high level at which it had been left by Henry VIII. was rapid. In 1548, at the beginning of the reign of Edward VI., it had consisted of 53 vessels of 11,268 tons, carrying 237 brass guns and 1848 of iron. The crews

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