LITMIR.BIZ

      Figure 55. Initial signal links to K2.

      An initial difficulty at K2 was determining where to set up. This was a critical decision because a guiding principle is that once communications have been established, the equipment should not be moved. There were only about 100 people on the ground when the company arrived in theater, and there was little knowledge of what other units would arrive or when. Additionally, available real estate was littered with trash and discarded Russian equipment, and the soil was contaminated with oil. Some difficulties developed among the communicators from different headquarters, and real estate allocators as units began to move into the base. A critical concern was that systems that processed Top Secret information be located near the Secure Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF). Not having the facility established early on led to equipment being moved and communications interrupted contrary to standard procedures.

      The company deployed with one superhigh-frequency satellite hub, a tactical telephone switch, a data services team, one SCAMPI node to provide secure and nonsecure networking plus data services and secure telephones, equipment for secure video teleconferencing (VTC), and three Special Operations Communication Assemblage (SOCA) teams to provide tactical satellite (TACSAT) communications. They also took about 200 personal computers. Within 48 hours, the company had installed communications to support the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC) that had already been established. Real estate allocation difficulties that required some equipment to be moved and minor technical problems resulted in the SCAMPI not being reestablished for about four days. Normally, some of these problems are resolved in a predeployment communications exercise. Under the given conditions, however, being able to troubleshoot problems before hand was not possible. The company also deployed two SOCA teams to embassies and one team to provide communications between a Special Forces detachment at Mazar-e Sharif and its headquarters.

      After approximately 100 days, A Company at K2 was replaced by a conventional Army signal battalion. That, though, did not end the unit’s involvement in the war against terrorism. In March 2002, the second platoon of B Company deployed to Bagram, Afghanistan, to provide communications to the JSOTF being established at that location. Second Lieutenant (2LT) Tom Washington (pseudonym), a former enlisted Special Forces soldier, and his platoon immediately appropriated space in a dirt field near the perimeter and went to work. Within 48 hours, as did A Company, Washington completed the links between the JSOTF and the higher headquarters. In his words, “that was possible only because incredible guys are running these systems.” The next month, soldiers from first platoon, B Company, established communications in Kabul between 1st Battalion, 3rd SFG, and the JSOTF. The platoon also deployed three SOCA teams to support forward operating bases (FOBs) in Khowst, Kandahar, and Shkin.

DAPs Set the Stage for UW in Afghanistan

      LTC Brinks, the JSOAC commander, had been told on 12 October to begin planning air infiltrations into Afghanistan. This order expanded his mission from CSAR support to inserting Special Forces teams into Afghanistan to advise and assist anti-Taliban leaders in conducting UW. Coordinated through diplomatic and military channels, the first ARSOF aviation mission was to insert an eight-man pilot team at night south of Mazar-e-Sharif to establish contact with General Dostum.

      CWO Roger Charles (pseudonym), the MH-60L Direct Action Penetrator (DAP) flight leader, received the mission. Originally deployed to Uzbekistan to provide armed escorts to MH- 47Es performing air rescue of downed aircrews in northern Afghanistan for the air campaign, the DAP would demonstrate what it was designed to do—conduct independent long-range penetrations into hostile environments to insert special reconnaissance (SR) teams. Although the DAP had weapon systems and the 160th SOAR relied heavily on the cover of darkness for protection, CWO Charles’ main concern was the incomplete antiaircraft artillery (AAA) threat picture in Afghanistan. Overhead cover of the helicopter mission by Air Force combat air patrol fighters was not an option. Thus, in an abandoned Soviet concrete building, the JSOAC staff worked feverishly to collect data from alternate sources because the SCAMPI system (secure intelligence reachback) was temporarily down and access was restricted to national intelligence sources.

      CWO Charles’ second concern was weather that potentially was an even greater threat than the enemy. Poor visibility masked terrain, and a 10,000-plus-foot mountain range controlled access to Afghanistan from K2. Sand or dust storms constantly obscured the high desert plains beyond them. Visibility routinely dropped to less than one-eighth of a mile in the plains region. When the dust storms slammed into the mountains, visibility limitations reached as high as 10,000 feet, and the associated air turbulence was lethal.