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Weapon of Choice: The Operations of U.S. Army Special Forces in Afghanistan. Combat Studies Institute
Читать онлайн.Название Weapon of Choice: The Operations of U.S. Army Special Forces in Afghanistan
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isbn 9788027240593
Автор произведения Combat Studies Institute
Жанр Документальная литература
Издательство Bookwire
For most of the 5th SFG staff officers and their commander (COL Mulholland took command of the 5th SFG two months before 9/11), serving as the nucleus of a special operations task force that was evolving into a joint headquarters JSOTF was “a challenge a minute.” Integrating staff from the other services and USAR and ARNG augmentees was a constant process, especially when some services rotated personnel after 45 to 90 days in country. Despite not having had the opportunity to practice group-level operations in the field or having participated in a large-scale UW exercise since Mulholland’s arrival, the 5th SFG staff under the tutelage of several experienced JFCOM officers fought the war well.
The daily pace in the JOC was relentless. Arquette, a parachute infantry officer before joining the Special Forces, worked 18- to 20-hour days the first week. With the arrival of another staff captain, his duties were pared to just the “Day Battle Captain.” This reduced the work shift to only 14 to 15 hours a day—12 hours on duty and an hour of transition with the “Night Battle Captain” before and after each shift change. There were no days off for Arquette or for anyone serving on the CJSOTF-North staff, which is typical during war. On 13 October, just three days after arriving at K2, JSOTF-North issued the mission order to the Special Forces ODA that would initiate the UW campaign in Afghanistan.
Different Intelligence Concerns for Air Planners
Night helicopter infiltrations in the high mountains of northern Afghanistan in winter posed major challenges for the JSOAC, both for air rescue (personnel recovery) during the air campaign and for inserting Special Forces for the anticipated UW campaign. Density altitude had reduced helicopter loads, and the first barrier was the 12,000-foot altitude of the best crossing points in the 18,000-foot mountains between K2 and Afghanistan. Helicopter aerial refuels from MC-130P tankers were required for missions from the north. The issues were maximum loads and getting through the 12,000-foot passes. MH-47Es would dump fuel to increase lift as they climbed for the crossing points on the “Bear.” Of concern was the number of refuels per mission as the escorting MH-60L Black Hawk DAPs needed to refuel more often than the MH-47E Chinooks. The enemy antiaircraft threat was another matter.
Getting a complete threat picture from CENTCOM had been LTC Brinks’ biggest problem. Intelligence had been provided in generalities, detailing the different types of “triple A”—antiaircraft artillery, or AAA—but without locations. The biggest fear was surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). CPT Jason Mills (pseudonym), the 2nd Battalion intelligence officer, and SFC Brandon Carr (pseudonym), his intelligence analyst, had collected everything available from the 160th SOAR headquarters before departing Fort Campbell. Mills also got CWO Erick Jefferson (pseudonym), the 160th SOAR intelligence technician, attached to his section. Based on what they had brought, Mills, Jefferson, and Carr prepared an intelligence picture of the battlefield. Current photo imagery, critical to selecting helicopter landing zones (LZs) and selecting routes, was unavailable. Secure data retrieval from the states was delayed when SCAMPI, the “nickname” for a portable secure compartmented information facility, was down, but once operational, Jefferson and Carr collated reams of raw data, analyzed it, and developed a comprehensive enemy order of battle picture.
JSOTF-North Growing Pains at K2
Another problem 5th SFG faced as the JSOTF was the influx of units ordered into theater without their corresponding headquarters. For example, both CA and PSYOP units arrived and reported to the JSOTF. By doctrine, however, a joint civil-military operations task force would normally command CA units, and a joint PSYOP task force would command PSYOP units. A JTF usually would command both. However, none of these commands had been established in the Afghanistan theater. Although those units were invaluable in conducting the campaign, directing them placed an additional burden on an already overburdened staff.
Within the JSOTF, COL Mulholland soon recognized that he was short the expertise to coordinate fire support and to plan aviation operations. LTC Richards borrowed a captain and staff sergeant from the 10th Mountain Division to plan fire support. He implored the Air Force 16th Special Operations Wing (SOW) to provide someone to assist in planning fixed-wing aviation missions and a planner from the 160th SOAR for rotary-wing operations. The problem of liaison and planning was solved when the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC) collocated with the JSOTF.
The staff was also saddled with base operations functions—sanitation, billeting, feeding, and security. Eventually, about 40 individuals were added to the 5th SFG staff to assist in accomplishing all its assigned missions. Many of those soldiers came from the 20th SFG—an ARNG group.
LTC Walters departed the JSOTF headquarters in mid-November, and LTC Richards left in December. Because of the professionalism and dedication of the 5th SFG soldiers and the assistance of the SOCJFCOM training team, by then, the JSOTF was performing its assigned responsibilities admirably. This is due in no small measure to the professionalism of all involved. Nevertheless, there were areas identified that needed to be resolved. Among those areas was determining whether SFGs should be prepared to become JSOTFs. Second, all levels of command must understand that a JSOTF is not a Special Forces operating base with a “J” for “joint” inserted in front of it. The SFG must be trained, equipped, and organized to perform the mission. The higher headquarters must ensure that the additional personnel required for the group to perform that mission are not only identified but also that those personnel are integrated into training exercises. The group staff must be prepared to accept the additional burdens of functioning as a joint headquarters with all the added responsibilities. Finally, the group must have the equipment—particularly communications equipment—essential to facilitating its increased span of control. These are lessons that would not die after the SOCJFCOM staff left the theater. The same soldiers would soon find themselves providing the same training and advice to other SFGs as they prepared to deploy to Afghanistan to accept the JSOTF mission from 5th SFG.
Figure 53. JSOTF-North commander COL Mulholland with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld.
We Don’t Fail
On 21 September 2001, 10 days after the terrorist attacks on the United States, A Company, 112th Signal Battalion, received a U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) deployment order to provide communications support to the JSOTF being established at K2, Uzbekistan, in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. On 4 October, 37 soldiers deployed to the theater. They arrived on 6 October and reported to the JSOTF J6.
The 112th Signal Battalion was capable of deploying rapidly to establish the long-haul links to communicate from deployed special operations forces (SOF) to headquarters in Europe and the continental United States and to embassies in neighboring countries. Although this was a combat mission, it was a typical mission practiced numerous times on exercises both in the continental United States and abroad. Those exercises also led the company to develop standard communications deployment packages that minimized last-minute predeployment planning.
Figure 54. Antennas, power, and cabling installed first.