LITMIR.BIZ

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Ruling-party regimes, according to some studies, because of their extensive presence within societies and their dominance of the political space, may have a unique ability to initiate difficult policy decisions thanks to their control of the political arena and the means to mobilize public support.¹⁶ However, if they are to have these capabilities, they must first build an effective party organization that allows them to mobilize and control the population, establish effective lines of communication between the leadership and the population, and ensure that the directives coming from the party leadership are implemented by the lower levels of the party machine. The primary goal of any party, however, is its self-preservation. Unless a party can marshal the necessary resources, create effective internal organization, and institutionalize mass support, it will not be able to perform any other functions and, in fact, may not survive at all.¹⁷

An effective party must therefore create mechanisms that allow internal party disputes to be resolved within the party itself and, once a consensus is reached within the party, to enforce that consensus.¹⁸ Conflict within a political party is inevitable. What matters is how that conflict is managed by the party and, most significant, whether conflicts can be managed within the organization without spilling out into the public arena. A party can respond to internal disputes by moving toward greater internal centralization and authoritarianism; conversely, it can begin to fragment and become unable to effectively perpetuate itself as an organization or, if in control of the government, to govern effectively.¹⁹

A ruling party that fails to create an effective internal organization is prone to challenges in maintaining political control for a number of reasons. The jockeying for position within a party torn by internal disputes pushes the various factions to build up personal fiefdoms within the state bureaucracy. These factions are also likely to look for allies outside the regime as a means of bolstering their position: the dynamics of single ruling parties that have not created an effective internal organization come to resemble those in a fragmented or polarized multiparty system, with each faction seeking to acquire allies and build independent bases of power. Although conflicts may often appear as little more than personality clashes, those in the inner circle of the regime who preside over vast bureaucratic or military organizations have resources that can be drawn on to mount effective opposition to other factions.²⁰

The existence of competition within the ruling elite creates a window of opportunity for interest groups to extract more concessions by allying themselves, whether formally or tacitly, with one of the competing regime factions. Conversely, when a party builds into the system incentives that promote loyalty and punish disloyalty among the elite, such a favorable opportunity structure does not exist.²¹ In this context, it makes little sense for those within the party elite to look to social groups as a means of building alliances for promoting their careers. If anything, such attempts can undermine their ability to move up in the power hierarchy.

      The internal management of the ruling party’s disputes therefore is of key importance for the evolution of the corporatist labor institutions’ relationship to the party-state. In cases where party elite conflict is not contained within the party, labor organizations are able to more successfully make demands on the state, since factions within the party are interested in ensuring labor support. Over time, as labor gradually extracts more concessions, corporatist control over organized labor weakens and unions develop the means to act independently of the state. Conversely, when the elite manages to contain disputes, corporatist institutions continue to perform their original functions and labor lacks the ability and resources to act as an autonomous interest group.

      The differences in the ability of unions to become influential players in the first years of reform in the four cases I examine can be traced back to the very different elite dynamics that existed in the four countries in the years prior to the initiation of reforms. These different dynamics affected the resources available to labor organizations as reforms were being considered. While the Czechoslovak and Mexican elites succeeded at constructing mechanisms for ensuring elite cohesion, neither the Polish nor the Egyptian elites were able to devise such mechanisms. In Mexico and Czechoslovakia, the elites constructed political parties that both served to ensure that elite conflicts could be managed constructively and established channels of communication with the public. In Poland and Egypt, by contrast, political parties did little to dampen elite conflict.

In Mexico and Czechoslovakia, while the mechanisms that were devised were quite different, what they did have in common was the incentive structure that rewarded loyalty and punished disloyalty among the elite. Given this incentive structure, those seeking to advance their political careers saw few benefits in making alliances with social groups, while the advantages of being faithful to the party line were unambiguous. In the Mexican case, the task of maintaining elite cohesion was facilitated by a number of factors. One of the most significant of these was the principle of no reelection to the presidency or to most other contested offices. This rule had two main consequences. In the first place, it gave assurance to the various factions within the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) that they could reasonably anticipate having their turn at the helm, thereby encouraging them to work within the system. Second, the possibility of someday returning to an elective office made breaking with the party unattractive because promotion of one’s political career did not depend on the control of a particular district or constituency but rather on the establishment of relationships with higher-ranked party members who controlled the promotion process. In most cases, these incentives were sufficient to ensure loyalty to the PRI. When, however, individuals attempted to break ranks, the reaction from the elite was swift and included expulsion from party ranks.²²

In the Czechoslovak case, the costs of insubordination to the KSČ were even higher, entailing not just removal from the party but also the loss of professional opportunities. It made little sense for those within the ruling elite in Czechoslovakia to look to social groups as means of building alliances for promoting their careers. If anything, such attempts would undermine their ability to move up in the power hierarchy. The pressure to conform to the party line was reinforced by targeting family members as punishment for insubordination.²³

In Poland and Egypt, such incentives remained underdeveloped and were not applied with any consistency. The punishments for disloyalty not only were less onerous but also were applied sporadically and selectively. In both cases, there were good reasons for politically ambitious individuals to believe that the path to promotion could lead through a variety of channels. In both countries, building up one’s own power network and cultivating clients among various constituencies remained a viable path to political advancement. In Egypt, the very establishment of a political party proved problematic because of the deep distrust between various regime factions.²⁴ Here, rather than serving as a means for bringing about elite cohesion, the party and the state were frequently at loggerheads. Furthermore, unlike in the other three cases, the military was never fully subordinated to civilian control and became yet another player in elite power struggles. In fact, by the 1980s in Egypt it seemed that one of the best strategies for moving ahead was to openly break with the ruling National Democratic Party, since successful opposition candidates were regularly offered plum positions within the party and state administration as a way of enticing them back into the fold.²⁵

      Historical Legacies and Change

The relationship between the ruling parties and organized labor in the decades prior to reform

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