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Authoritarian Politics in Modern Societies: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems (New York: Basic Books, 1970).

14. See, for example, Zolberg, Creating Political Order; Leonard Binder, “Political Recruitment and Participation in Egypt,” in Political Parties and Political Development, ed. Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 217–40.

15. See, for example, Henry Bienen, Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967); Gerald A. Heeger, “Bureaucracy, Political Parties, and Political Development,” World Politics 25, no. 4 (1973): 600–607; Leonard B. Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1960).

16. Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 267–306.

17. See Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), especially 401–12.

18. As Haggard and Kaufman point out, “Divisions send mixed signals when policy decisions are taken and provide the opportunity for lower echelons to appeal or even challenge commands.” Political Economy of Democratic Transitions, 271.

19. See, for example, Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchic Tendencies of Modern Democracy (New York: Dover, 1959), 333–41.

20. See, for example, Robert Holt and Terry Roe, “The Political Economy of Reform: Egypt in the 1980s,” in Political and Economic Interactions in Economic Policy Reform: Evidence from Eight Countries, ed. Robert H. Bates and Anne O. Krueger (Cambridge, U.K.: Blackwell, 1993), 179–224.

21. Doug McAdam, “Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions,” in Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, ed. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 23–40.

22. See, for example, Bo Anderson and James D. Cockcroft, “Control and Cooptation in Mexican Politics,” in Latin American Radicalism: A Documentary Report on Left and Nationalist Movements, ed. Irving Louis Horowitz, Josue de Castro, and John Gerassi (New York: Random House, 1969), 366–89; Rogelio Hernandez Rodriguez, “The Partido Revolucionario Institutional,” in Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections, ed. Monica Serrano (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1998), 71–94; Jorge G. Castaneda, Perpetuating Power: How Mexican Presidents Are Chosen (New York: New Press, 2000), xix.

23. See Edward Taborsky, Communism in Czechoslovakia, 1948–1960 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 68–96; Vlad Sobell, “Czechoslovakia: The Legacy of Normalization,” East European Politics and Society 2, no. 1 (1987): 35–68.

24. See two studies by Kirk J. Beattie: Egypt During the Nasser Years: Ideology, Politics, and Civil Society (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), 58–74; Egypt During the Sadat Years (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 189–98.

25. See Robert Springborg, Mubarak’s Egypt: Fragmentation of Political Order (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989), 89–105.

26. See, for example, Geoffrey Garrett and Peter Lange, “Internationalization, Institutions, and Political Change,” International Organization 49, no. 4 (1995): 627–55.

27. David Stark and Laszlo Burszt, Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property Rights in East Central Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 80–105.

28. For a discussion of the “critical junctures” or “punctured equilibrium” model, see, for example, Stephen D. Krasner, “Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics,” Comparative Politics 16, no. 2 (1984): 240–46; Collier and Berins Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, 27–39.

29. For a discussion of the incremental change model, see, for example, Avner Grief, Paul Milgrom, and Barry Weinpast, “Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild,” in Explaining Social Institutions, ed. Jack Knight and Itai Sened (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 27–56; Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 73–106. Kathleen Thelen argues that over the long term such incremental changes can profoundly reshape the institutional landscape. Kathleen Thelen, How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 31–36.

       2 RULING PARTIES, ORGANIZED LABOR, AND TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY

       Poland and Czechoslovakia

      When the Polish and Czechoslovak governments initiated economic reforms following the fall of Communism, they encountered very different labor organizations. Polish unions, as will be examined in Chapter 4, emerged as influential actors and significantly shaped the process of privatization design and implementation. Unions in Czechoslovakia, however, were unable to play such a central role during the reform processes. The source of this difference between the two cases can be located in the state-labor dynamics of the pre-reform period. The contentious encounters between the Polish ruling party and labor resulted in the acquisition by the latter of important resources, in particular, legal prerogatives, financial autonomy, and the long experience of successfully challenging the state. Thanks to these resources, Polish organized labor could not be brushed aside by the government as the latter sought to push through market reforms. Czechoslovak organized labor traveled along a very different trajectory that left it with few resources it could draw upon as it confronted structural adjustment reforms. This chapter will examine how despite similar initial conditions following the Communist takeover in both countries, organized labor entered the new democratic era with such differing resources.

      The Labor Movement in Communist Poland

      In July 1944 on Polish territory controlled by the advancing Soviet army, the Polish Workers Party (PPR) announced the formation of a new government. A bloody and protracted civil war, with the Home Army supported by the Polish government in exile, based in London, followed as the PPR sought to consolidate power. Immediately following the end of World War II it appeared that an agreement hammered out in Yalta between the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain that mandated free elections in Poland would hold. In June 1945 Stanisław Mikołajczyk, the prime minister of Poland’s government in exile

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