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Foreign Relations Committee, he emphasized that the Skyhawk sale was “very restrictive.”²⁸

      A few members of Congress started to press Johnson to sell weapons to Israel in order to contain communism. In September 1966, Rep. Seymour Halpern (R-NY) explained to the House floor that the PLO was amassing weapons for a war against Israel, and they had been “earmarked” by “Chinese Communists” to be “an effective instrument for revolutionary activity in this region.” Halpern submitted to the Record a letter from Congressman Glenn Cunningham (R-NE), which referenced the representatives’ letter from February 1966 that recommended strengthening Israel’s defenses, and further argued that recent developments required a reexamination of the U.S.-Israel relationship.²⁹ Rep. Lester Wolff (D-NY) spoke about tension on the Israel-Syria border and called for Americans to reaffirm their support for Israel, due largely to cultural ties between the United States and Israel, and especially because Israel was the only democracy in the Middle East.³⁰

      The sale of the Skyhawks did not prevent the United States from voting to censure Israel in the U.N. Security Council in November 1966. The censure came in response to Israeli military attacks on Jordan due to an increase in terrorism along the Israel-Jordan border. On November 13, an Israeli raid leveled the Jordanian border settlement of Samu, which resulted in the deaths of fifteen Jordanian soldiers, ten Israeli soldiers, and an Israeli commander; three villagers also died, along with nearly one hundred wounded. Syria had been behind the terrorist attacks, and Israel knew it. But Israel feared to attack Syria since it had just signed a defense pact with Egypt. The move against Jordan alienated King Hussein, who had been secretly collaborating with Israel, and convinced Hussein to move closer to Nasser, which he wanted to avoid.³¹

      As U.S. forces were bogged down in East Asia, the Middle East appeared to be heading to another war. Terrorist border attacks on Israel, many by the Palestinian organization Fatah, with Syrian support, had significantly increased since 1965. The Israeli response was often disproportional, such as at Samu, and Israel proved to be equally responsible for the outbreak of war.³² U.S. officials believed Israel to have a decisive military advantage vis-à-vis its Arab neighbors. In April 1967, McNamara related to Johnson that, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Israel will be militarily unchallengeable by any combination of Arab states at least during the next five years.”³³ Under secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach reiterated this point to President Johnson in a May 1 memo, about five weeks before the outbreak of war.³⁴ Nevertheless, in May, the Johnson administration completed negotiations with Israel for one hundred armored personnel carriers (APCs), military spare parts, and other assistance that totaled $72 million.³⁵ The U.S. assessments were on point as Israel would soon demonstrate in a lightning-quick defeat of Arab militaries.

       The 1967 War and the Congressional Response

      The June 1967 Arab-Israeli War and political aftermath proved to be one of the most significant events in modern Middle East history. Nasser did not want war with Israel. In fact, prior to the 1967 war, Israel was not a central concern of the Arab world; instead, inter-Arab politics, Arab nationalism, anticolonialism, and revolutionary socialism dominated Arab politics.³⁶ Arab states pursued their own national goals, and there was no monolithic or coordinated Arab strategy vis-à-vis Israel. But the Egyptian president made provocative moves against Israel, short of outright aggression, that led to an Israeli first strike and the outbreak of war. In response to a false report from Moscow about Israeli troop movements on the Syrian border, Nasser asked U.N. Secretary General U Thant to remove the U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Sinai Peninsula that had been deployed there in the aftermath of the 1956–1957 Suez Crisis. To the surprise of many, U Thant quickly agreed to Nasser’s request, which removed the stabilizing force that had acted as a buffer between the two states. On May 22, Nasser also ordered a naval blockade against Israeli shipping through the Straits of Tiran, which violated the agreement reached in 1957.

      Perhaps most important for American legislators, some Arab leaders—and Nasser in particular—made inflammatory comments about destroying Israel. Ernest Gruening (D-AK), for example, referenced “repeated threats by Egypt, in which it was joined by some of the Arab countries, that its intention was the liquidation of the tiny nation of Israel.”³⁷ James Scheuer (D-NY) added that Nasser “encourages Arab refugees to believe that they will destroy Israel and he arms them.”³⁸ In all likelihood, Nasser’s rhetoric aimed to generate popular support for his leadership in the Arab world and did not accurately reflect Egyptian goals. Thomas Pelly (R-WA) made a perceptive remark on May 23 when he said, “I do not know if President Nasser is engaging in psychological semantics or if his war threats to Israel are serious, but there is no doubt that his words are like striking a match on a powder keg.”³⁹

      Sincere or not, Nasser’s declarations reminded many of the Holocaust and brought about legislative expressions of support for Israel. Sen. Joseph Montoya (D-NM) wondered, “Are there not some of us here who remember the death camps…. I ask any humane and fairminded man here—have the Jews not paid out enough in the blood and agony of their people?”⁴⁰ Rep. Claude Pepper (D-NY) called Nasser “Little Hitler,” and Halpern warned against a “Munich-type sellout of Israel.”⁴¹

      Many members of Congress spoke of the American commitment to ensure Israel’s survival dating back to Harry Truman’s administration. In separate speeches on May 23, Senators Walter Mondale (D-MN) and Edward “Ted” Kennedy (D-MA) reminded their colleagues of the U.S. commitment to preserve the boundaries of Israel and the adjacent Arab states and to oppose the use of force in the Middle East, in line with the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, a joint declaration of the United States, Britain, and France.⁴² Wayne Morse (D-OR), for his part, added that in the Tripartite Declaration, the three major powers pledged to “come to the assistance of the party against whom aggression had been committed.”⁴³ More often than not, legislators referenced only an American commitment to the territorial integrity of Israel.

      The United States, true to its special relationship with Israel, would not allow Israel to be destroyed. Sen. Joseph Clark (D-PA) spoke “to anybody in the Soviet Union … do not think that the United States of America is going to permit the Arab nations to overrun Israel.”⁴⁴ A few days later, Rep. Jack Brinkley (D-GA) extolled the historical virtues of the Hebrew people and echoed Clark: “We cannot permit Israel to be overrun.”⁴⁵ Sen. Jacob Javits (R-NY) argued that the United States had a “clear obligation and responsibility and a vital national interest in the area and in Israel.” He cited John Foster Dulles’s statement that “it is U.S. policy that the preservation of the State of Israel is a fundamental tenet of U.S. foreign policy.”⁴⁶ Rep. Wayne Hayes (D-OH), aware of the divisive Vietnam War, observed that an Egyptian attack on Israel would turn “a lot of the doves in this country into hawks immediately.”⁴⁷ Hayes returned to the same theme the next day and mentioned that Representatives Sidney Yates (D-IL) and Jonathan Bingham (D-NY)—two doves on Vietnam—had explained to him that one can “be a hawk with Israel and a dove with Vietnam.”⁴⁸ Gruening and Pepper each suggested a mutual defense pact with Israel.⁴⁹ Numerous additional legislators rose in vocal support of an American commitment to ensure Israel’s survival.

      Israel chose war on the morning of June 5. According to William Quandt, who served in the National Security Council for Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter, the Johnson administration changed its “red light” to a “yellow light,” which meant the administration would not protest an Israeli first strike.⁵⁰ In addition to the exit of UNEF and the blockade in the Straits of Tiran, Israel felt hemmed in by a collection of Arab states that called for its destruction. Also, Jordan signed a defense treaty with Egypt on the eve of war in 1967, which heightened Israel’s fears. Within hours of the first morning, the Israeli Air Force had destroyed approximately 90 percent of the Egyptian Air Force. In control of the skies, Israel proceeded to decimate the Arab armies in six days. The war ended with a cease-fire after Moscow threatened military intervention to save its allies, especially the shaky Syrian government, as Israeli forces seemed poised to strike Damascus.

      The outbreak of war intensified legislative voices of support for Israel. On June 5, Rep. William Ryan (D-NY) called on the United States

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