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State Department reiterated Johnson’s position on Khartoum in a telegram to Jordan a few days later.¹²² Lucius Battle, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs, told Adan Pachachi, Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, “that it was difficult indeed for us to encourage the Israelis or anyone else to believe the Arabs wanted a political settlement when statements continued to emanate from Arab countries indicating the war would go on.”¹²³ Battle told Israeli Ambassador Abraham Harman that “reports of growing moderateness after Khartoum have so far not been borne out by any concrete Arab steps.”¹²⁴

      As Arab states searched for some way to secure a political agreement, Israeli flexibility diminished. Arthur Goldberg, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, told President Johnson that there were “some signs of moderation in the Arab camp, and some signs of hardening in the Israeli camp.” Goldberg cited “serious internal problems” in Israel, likely meaning a euphoric public mood following the dramatic victory, which made it “difficult for any Israeli spokesman to be ‘sweetly reasonable.’”¹²⁵ Eugene Rostow noted that “accepted wisdom” held that “the Israeli position is ‘hardening.’”¹²⁶ Battle questioned Harman about the announced establishment of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and on the Syrian border. He advised the Israeli ambassador to “not provide ammunition for those at U.N. who would interpret” the Israeli “position as hardening in direction of territorial acquisition rather than negotiated settlement.”¹²⁷ Secretary of State Rusk, when talking about territorial withdrawal in the Middle East, told Johnson, “In my opinion we are going to have to wrestle with Israel.”¹²⁸

      The Johnson administration could not mesh a commitment to territorial integrity for all states in the Middle East with a policy of protecting Israeli occupation until Arab states made peace. In response to Arab ambassadors’ questions about territorial integrity, National Security Advisor Walt Rostow wrote Johnson, “Our best answer is that we stand by that pledge, but the only way to make good on it is to have a genuine peace.” But even with “an honest peace settlement,” Rostow recognized that pushing “Israel back to 4 June borders … could lead to a tangle with the Israelis.”¹²⁹ King Hussein sent President Johnson a letter in early October, which noted that Khartoum reflected Arab flexibility, and that even Israeli navigation through the Suez Canal was possible if Israel would redress wrongs done to Palestinians since 1948. Hussein expressed his “deep hurt” by what he regarded as a “basic pro-Israel position” of the United States. He lamented the “double standard” applied to Arabs and Israelis regarding territorial integrity.¹³⁰ The Jordanian ambassador, Abdul-Hamid Sharaf, also communicated to Johnson an Arab frustration with an American double standard regarding territorial integrity. According to Harold Saunders’s notes from the meeting, “The Arab governments feel they have a right to expect the Government of the United States to honor that pledge. They have been deeply hurt that we have not.” Johnson responded that “we continue to support strongly the principle of territorial integrity but that the problem of putting that support in practice was a difficult one which we had not yet solved.”¹³¹ Also in the spirit of compromise, Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad admitted to U.S. officials that Egypt’s calls for the destruction of Israel had been a “mistake” and that Egypt did not challenge “Israel’s right to exist.” Rather, the main problem was refugees.¹³²

      The administration’s perception of the U.S.-Israel relationship continued to evolve. According to Saunders’s notes of a conversation with Israeli diplomat Ephraim Evron, Israel wanted new weapons sales connected to a strategic alliance. Evron asked that the Johnson administration treat Israelis “as close friends … rather than treating them like bazaar hagglers.” Evron recommended that the administration not try to exact any conditions for the sale of additional aircraft but to instead tell Israel through an informal channel “that we were doing this at some political cost and would therefore expect something from them in return.” By implication, Evron suggested the United States and Israel develop a strategic alliance in addition to a special relationship. Saunders made an insightful remark: “This strikes once again at the heart of our relationship with Israel. The Israelis always tried to get close to us and to build the kind of relationship we have with the British. We have—at least at the professional level of our government—kept them at arms length, and they have been deeply hurt. Evron and I have discussed this aspect of our relationship before, and it’s no surprise that he sees here a chance for a new start.” Saunders added that before the June war, the argument against more arms deals with Israel had nothing to do with dollars or armored personnel carriers—“the real argument was over what kind of relationship we should have with Israel.” Saunders added, “I’m tempted to take the risk Evron suggests … the real leverage we have is not a specific number of aircraft but our total relationship.”¹³³

      As the administration considered the next step in U.S.-Israel relations, a few legislators challenged Johnson’s arms embargo that held up the delivery of the Skyhawks purchased in 1966. On September 21, Donald Rumsfeld, a Republican representative from Illinois and future Secretary of Defense for Gerald Ford and George W. Bush, cautioned the administration against putting pressure on Israel by threatening to withhold arms. He noted that the Soviets had already resupplied their client states and that France refused to sell more aircraft to Israel. Rumsfeld was worried “that the U.S. position might be based on a desire to exert pressure on the Israelis to withdraw,” which Rumsfeld called “most unwise.” He further argued that it was “imprudent” to put “pressure on Israel by denying her the needed capability to deter further aggression.”¹³⁴ Rep. Charles H. Wilson (D-CA) reminded his colleagues that Congress is “charged with the responsibility for overseeing our foreign policy,” and he blasted the administration for providing disproportionate arms sales to Arab states. He noted with disdain McCloskey’s June 5 statement that the United States was “neutral in thought, word, and deed.” Wilson wanted to “junk our policy of restricting arms sales to Israel” and to immediately approve the delivery of Skyhawks.¹³⁵ Congressman Joel Broyhill (R-VA), similar to Rumsfeld, worried “that the planes are being withheld to obtain bargaining leverage to force Israeli concessions.” In his speech to a Virginia Lodge of B’nai B’rith, Broyhill vowed to “urge, with every bit of persuasion at my command, that these planes be released.”¹³⁶ Representative Halpern called for the delivery of the Skyhawks and complained that “the Department of State is using the Congress as an excuse” for not honoring the sale of Skyhawks to Israel. (He pointed out that congressional concern had been about the financing of arms sales to Arabs and in no way meant “to obstruct the arming of Israel.”)¹³⁷

      Johnson wanted to release the Skyhawks to Israel, but he also wanted to resume arms shipments to moderate Arab states. On October 9, Walt Rostow informed Johnson that Israeli officials were “deeply suspicious—despite our contrary assurances—that our freezing past aid means we’re going to use it as leverage to force them to terms with Arabs. They well remember 1956–57 when we froze their assets here and then forced them back to the armistice lines.” Secretary of Defense McNamara wanted to continue the freeze, not to pressure Israel, but to avoid upsetting legislators on the issue of military credit sales.¹³⁸ However, as noted above, Representative Halpern obviously disagreed with the administration’s position on the matter. By October 12, the administration had determined to resume shipments to Israel and planned for the delivery of the Skyhawks to begin in December; McNamara sent a letter to Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban to that effect.¹³⁹ But the administration also indicated that arms shipments would resume to moderate Arab states. Walt Rostow told Evron “that it would be impossible for the U.S. to have an Israel policy without a Middle East policy.” Evron agreed and added, “If we are to work together, as we must, on issues like Middle East arms supply, we ought to try to work out a more lucid common strategy for the whole region.”¹⁴⁰ Here again, Evron pushed for a stronger strategic relationship between the two countries. But for domestic political reasons, Israeli officials could not formally approve of the U.S. decision to resume arms shipments to Arab states. Therefore, on October 18, McNamara decided with Israeli ambassador Harman that Israel would not respond to McNamara’s letter to Eban, and instead, the two sides informally agreed to the arrangement.¹⁴¹

      Before the administration formally announced its decision

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