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of Houston that denounced the “unprovoked attack” and aimed “to see that those Israel officials or personnel who were responsible for the attacks be punished in keeping with their participation and in keeping with the enormity of their criminal acts.”⁸¹ Israel paid millions of dollars in compensation, but no Israeli was ever blamed or punished.⁸² Rep. Harold Royce (H. R.) Gross (R-IA) wondered, based on reports that the U.S. government had made $27 million available to Israel for food and other supplies, if the United States was subsidizing Israel’s “payment of full compensation for the lives that were destroyed, the suffering of the wounded, and the damage from this wanton attack.”⁸³

      Legislators broadly supported Israeli occupation of Arab lands taken during the war. Representative Pucinski, with the aftermath of the 1956 war in mind, did not want to “again rob Israel of the gains she has won on the hard-fought fields of battle.”⁸⁴ Rep. Robert Sikes (D-FL) went further than Pucinski. Sikes suggested that Israel “simply annex” the West Bank and the Sinai Peninsula “and eliminate future problems.” For Sikes, the move would have biblical implications as Israel “would then control, essentially, the Jewish homeland.” Sikes closed with a contestable point: “Had we and our allies kept hands off in 1956, the situation could have been solved permanently at that time.”⁸⁵ Rep. Donald Clausen (R-CA), who also used a religious allusion, believed “Israel was ‘sinned’ against … and is entitled to retain whatever gains she has made in the interim.”⁸⁶ Rep. Alphonzo Bell (R-CA) supported Israeli occupation and predicted that Israel “will prove herself to be a magnanimous victor, but this magnanimity must be allowed to be voluntary.”⁸⁷ Representatives Ogden Reid (R-NY) and Floyd Hicks (D-WA) stressed the need to not repeat the perceived mistake of 1956–1957.⁸⁸

      Some legislators made the specific connection between Israeli occupation of Arab lands and a diplomatic plan to secure a lasting peace in the region. A poll conducted by the Associated Press revealed that 365 out of 438 responses from legislators “were opposed to withdrawal without peace.”⁸⁹ Rep. Thomas Morris (D-NM) wanted Israel to keep the territories to secure its “right to live in peace with her neighbors.”⁹⁰ Halpern followed, “If the Arabs expect Israel to leave the territory she has won, then Israel is entitled to a treaty of peace, signed by the Arabs.”⁹¹ Rep. James Corman (D-CA) argued, “The Arab world must accept the permanency of the State of Israel,” and therefore he wanted “no attempt” by the United Nations or the United States to force an Israeli withdrawal.⁹² Senator Mondale stressed that “there must be no return to a quasi-permanent supervised military standoff between Israel and the Arab nations…. We must reinforce our historic commitment to the existence and permanence of the State of Israel.”⁹³ Rep. William Widnall (R-NJ) called for U.S. support “of the present lines” until Israel received recognition and peace.⁹⁴ Halpern reiterated his earlier point: “No withdrawal can be expected of Israel without … peace and stability.” He also mocked the State Department’s neutrality statement and wondered, “Is our Government going to heed our voices, the voices of the vast majority of the American people? Or are we going to crawl back into the State Department shells and let the striped-pants boys continue to guide U.S. policy.”⁹⁵ Indeed, Congress stood solidly behind Israel’s occupation of Arab lands until its neighbors offered recognition and peace.

      But Israel wanted land more than it wanted peace. According to Avi Raz, Israel did not genuinely seek peace with its Arab neighbors after the war. The Israeli cabinet developed a June 19 peace plan that would have returned the Golan Heights and Sinai Peninsula in return for peace agreements with Syria and Egypt. But the “generous peace offer” was never communicated to the Arab states. Instead, Israeli officials, particularly Foreign Minister Abba Eban, perpetuated the myth of such an offer to secure U.S. support against a Soviet measure at the United Nations that called for an immediate Israeli withdrawal.⁹⁶ According to Shaiel Ben-Ephraim, in the wake of the war, Israel started to construct settlements in the occupied territories, which Israeli officials claimed were reversible military outposts and not civilian in nature. This deception aimed to provide cover from international pressure during a vulnerable period of civilian settlement construction. The Johnson administration, distracted by the Vietnam War, failed to offer any substantial resistance to the settlement construction and missed an early opportunity to shut down Israel’s efforts to create “facts on the ground.” Israel would continue to build more and more settlements in the occupied territories in the years and decades to follow, which added a major obstacle to peace efforts and fulfillment of a two-state solution.⁹⁷

      Legislators did not demand the return of Arab territory; however, a few voices cautioned against indefinite Israeli occupation. On the second day of the war, Representative Hayes reasoned that “if we are going to maintain the territorial integrity of all the states out there in the Middle East, we will possibly have to get in against Israel.”⁹⁸ After the war, Rep. Jim Wright (D-TX) pointed out that “Israel has every right to demand security, no right to demand spoils.”⁹⁹ Representatives Pucinski and Ray Madden (D-IN) both criticized the Soviet Union for demanding an Israeli withdrawal, given its occupation of Eastern Europe.¹⁰⁰

      Numerous legislators stressed the need to address the grievances of Palestinian refugees. On June 8, Sen. Robert Byrd (D-WV) hoped that “some headway can be made in the Arab refugee problems, which have long been the source of deep irritation.” Senator Javits, known for his pro-Israel orientation, followed by agreeing with his colleague. According to Javits, an acceptable settlement “includes the Palestinian and Arab refugees…. Israel is not going to like this. We know that. There are some things that Israel may have to do which it finds especially distasteful, especially after such an enormous victory at arms. We must, however, bring about an end to this situation.”¹⁰¹ Sen. Edward Brooke (R-MA) called for “Israel and Arab nations” to “be more flexible in their refugee resettlement policies.”¹⁰² According to Sen. Claiborne Pell (D-RI), “The refugee shame must be liquidated once and for all. It is a crime against humanity to incarcerate a million people for 20 years simply as pawns in an international political disagreement.” Pell, however, failed to mention Israel’s role in the ongoing refugee crisis and placed the onus of responsibility squarely on Arab states, saying, “I believe this problem could have been resolved by the Arab nations if they had really desired to do so.”¹⁰³ Several other legislators agreed with the need to address Palestinian grievances, such as Senator Mondale and Representatives Wright, Ryan, and Paul Fino (R-NY).

      Legislators felt far less sympathy for Egypt or Jordan, and some questioned the U.S. policy of trying to remain friendly with Arab states that threatened to destroy Israel. In a lengthy speech on June 26, Senator Church called Johnson’s “arsenal diplomacy” in the Middle East a “failure.” He noted that Jordanian arms from the United States had been used in a war against Israel and questioned the “policy which assumes that we can exercise a restraining influence by judicious distribution of our weapons.” For Church, the June war demonstrated that the “misguided attempt to prevent ‘polarization’ of western arms in Israel against Soviet arms in Arab hands, and still keep on friendly terms with both sides, called for omniscient qualities of judgment which our Defense officials, or indeed any mortals, do not possess.”¹⁰⁴ Senator Gruening picked up where Church left off. He questioned the broader American policy of pressing “our aid on nations whose policies were antagonistic to ours,” which he called “an extremely shortsighted policy…. In all history no nation has ever squandered so much on so many.” He also noted that U.S. arms to Jordan “got there just in time to enable Jordan to embrace Nasser.”¹⁰⁵ Gruening continued his attack on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East the following day in an even longer speech. Comparing the situation to Munich, he said, “The United States sought to appease those nations bent on the destruction of Israel. The policy of appeasement failed.”¹⁰⁶ Johnson’s efforts to balance weapons sales and still protect Israel, or to avoid an arms race in the Middle East altogether, had both foundered, which must have made it easier for the president to support Israeli occupation of Arab lands.

      The Johnson administration determined, in opposition to Eisenhower’s policy in 1957, that Israel did not need to vacate the occupied territories. In 1957, numerous legislators (most notably, then-Senate Majority Leader

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