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administration encouraged a land-for-peace arrangement, whereby Arab states would make peace with Israel in exchange for the return of Arab territories. The move received overwhelming approval from Congress.

      The land-for-peace formula signaled a major transformation of U.S. policy. Rather than pressure Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories, Johnson released his “Five Principles” for peace on June 19: the right to national life, justice for the refugees, free maritime passage, limits on the arms race, and political independence and territorial integrity for all. Despite Johnson’s fifth principle, the administration did not honor its pledge to protect the territorial integrity of Arab states. Rather than preserve existing boundaries in line with the Tripartite Declaration, Johnson decided to support altered boundaries in order to pressure Arab states to make peace with Israel. The reasoning was simple. The armistice agreements of 1949 failed to bring about peace, and so did Eisenhower’s policy of forced Israeli removal. The volatile region seemed combustible, and the situation demanded a new approach that could lead to a lasting peace. Otherwise, another war could lead to superpower confrontation, maybe even nuclear warfare, and perhaps the annihilation of Jews in the Middle East. But by tying land to peace, Johnson also tied an American special commitment to ensure Israel’s survival to support of Israeli occupation of Arab lands until peace could be achieved. From that point, the two became inseparable.

      The war demonstrated that Israel could effectively employ military force against its neighbors, which supported the conclusion that, with ample weaponry, Israel could defend itself until the Arab states agreed to make peace. But additional U.S. military sales to Israel did not happen immediately after the war. President Johnson had ordered an embargo on new U.S. arms shipments to the Middle East once the fighting started. He hoped the Soviets would reciprocate, but Washington again found Moscow uninterested in arms restraint.¹⁰⁷ French President Charles de Gaulle ordered an embargo on weapons sales to Israel after its preemptive strike, which ended the Israel-France weapons arrangement and left Israel without a major supplier of weaponry.

      Congress pushed for more weapons sales to Israel. On August 1, Representative Sikes claimed that “efforts to put a brake on the sale of American military equipment abroad” negatively impacted Israel. Referring to Israel as “the only friend we have left in the Middle East,” Sikes called on the United States to fill the void left by France to challenge “Arab forces” that were “being resupplied rapidly by the Russians.”¹⁰⁸ Senator Tower also argued for selling more weapons to Israel. He wondered, “Mr. President are we to leave Israel to the tender mercies of the dictatorial designs of Nasser over all the Middle East as a pawn of the Soviet Union?” He added that the Soviet Union was “dumping arms back into the United Arab Republic just as fast as they can. Already they have replaced half the equipment the Arab States lost in the Arab-Israel war.”¹⁰⁹

      Congress debated restricting arms sales, especially to Arab states, in order to prevent a global arms race. Legislators considered an amendment to limit the credit resources of the U.S. Export-Import Bank, which could be used by less developed countries to finance arms sales, including certain Arab states, such as Jordan. (The purpose of the credit financing was to assist in economic development, but it was also used for military purchases.) Sen. Daniel Brewster (D-MD) “was shocked to learn that almost 36 percent of all Export-Import loans this year went for the purchase of American armaments.” He also added that credit financing helped Jordan to “wage war on her declared enemy, Israel.”¹¹⁰ Henry “Scoop” Jackson (D-WA), who supported large defense contracts to create jobs for Boeing in his home state, urged rejection of the amendment, which, he said, “would unduly and dangerously tie the hands of the President … in the conduct of foreign policy.” He recognized that the amendment would not deny Israel assistance in the future but that it may be in the “national interest” of both the United States and Israel “that certain assistance be given to certain developing countries in the Middle East.”¹¹¹ Rep. Joshua Eilberg (D-PA) supported an amendment to restrict the training of certain foreign nationals and wondered why the United States trained pilots and military personnel from Arab states that severed relations and aimed to destroy Israel. Representative Ryan sought to eliminate all assistance to Egypt and “other Arab nations which have waged war against Israel.” He supported a different amendment to enable “Congress to end this bankrupt policy which is so detrimental to peace in the Middle East.”¹¹²

      Some legislators wanted to prevent a global arms race but also wanted to provide for Israel’s defense. Gruening called on “the United States to take leadership in the world in stopping the arms race.” Although U.S. officials aimed to use weapons sales to contain communism, Gruening pointed out that U.S. tanks to Jordan, justified by containment, were used against Israel, a noncommunist country.¹¹³ Representative Sikes pushed for more weapons for Israel and warned that limiting arms sales to foreign countries would potentially hurt “the best friend we have in the Middle East.” He believed Israel to be “seriously, almost desperately, in need of aircraft and spares.” He also noted that airpower had been the decisive factor in the recent war and argued in support of more aircraft for Israel.¹¹⁴ Emmanuel Celler (D-NY), in his twenty-third term and the most senior member of the House (Dean of the House), worried that an existing amendment to eliminate a proposed program that would have granted new authority to the president to finance arms sales might “militate against our desire to supply Israel properly with arms…. it would be tragic indeed if Israel could not forfend against her Arab neighbors who are bent upon plunging her into the sea.”¹¹⁵ Representatives Bingham, Ryan, and John Dow (D-NY) all assured Celler that Israel would not be affected. Bingham said, “There are plenty of ways for us to supply Israel with all necessary arms,” and Ryan added that he wanted to eliminate a “new blank check authority” that “may be used to arm Israel’s eternal enemies.” The House passed the amendment.¹¹⁶

      As Congress encouraged a one-sided U.S. policy in the Middle East, the prospect for peace seemed to take a negative turn. On September 1, the heads of thirteen Arab states released the Khartoum Declaration, which famously declared the three “No’s”—no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no negotiations with Israel. The declaration came about six weeks after Arab states refused to accept a joint U.S.-Soviet draft resolution that called for Israel to withdraw “without delay” in return for nonbelligerency. The Arab states, according to Spiegel, “flatly rejected it,” and Quandt explains that “radical Arab objections to provisions calling for an end of war with Israel” led to the rejection.¹¹⁷ Israel also opposed the U.S.-Soviet resolution because it did not call for direct negotiations, did not mention Israel by name, and included only vague arrangements for peace.¹¹⁸ Israel was determined not to withdraw to previous lines without guarantees of peace—precisely what had happened with the Suez Crisis only ten years before. U.S. policy had already evolved to a point that peace with Israel must happen before the return of Arab territories; therefore, the Khartoum Declaration, which denied both formal recognition and a peace treaty, portended even worse U.S.-Arab relations.

      Similar to Nasser’s saber-rattling before the war, the Khartoum Declaration should not be taken at face value. According to Avi Shlaim, the Arab heads of state were prepared to recognize Israel as a state, though short of legal de jure recognition; were willing to negotiate with Israel through a third party, though not directly; and were willing to move to a state of peace short of a formal peace treaty. According to King Hussein of Jordan, Nasser encouraged him to “speak of a comprehensive solution to the problem and a comprehensive peace and go and do anything you can short of signing a peace.” Shlaim notes that Khartoum was a victory for moderate Arabs who wanted a political rather than military solution, and that the meeting marked “a real turning point in Nasser’s attitude to Israel.”¹¹⁹ Israeli leaders intentionally misrepresented Khartoum in order to justify their own hard line.¹²⁰

      According to U.S. documents, U.S. and Israeli officials clearly recognized the apparent moderation of Khartoum but doubted the sincerity of an Arab change of heart. On September 25, Johnson sent a letter to King Faisal of Saudi Arabia that stated, “I agree that the recent Khartoum conference marked notable progress for the forces of Arab moderation.” But Johnson also added that the Arab position “states what the Arabs will not do but, except by indirection, is silent on what the Arabs

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