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in the Middle East.”⁵² Rep. Silvio Conte (R-MA) stated, “The commitments of the United States to uphold and safeguard the national and territorial integrity of Israel are clear. We are the moral and legal ally of Israel in defense against territorial aggressors. We must and do stand ready with unilateral military assistance in behalf of the Israelis.”⁵³ Rep. John Conyers (D-MI), among other legislators, claimed that the United States had a moral and legal obligation to defend Israel.⁵⁴ Bingham encouraged other legislators to follow his lead in giving blood to support Israel.⁵⁵ Regarding an Israeli first strike, which started the war, Javits assured the Senate and the American people, “Israel’s Prime Minister has declared that his nation has no territorial ambitions. He did not have to make that declaration. We all know that.”⁵⁶ This would become a debatable point in years to come.

      President Johnson felt heavy domestic pressure to back Israel. As Hixson has argued, the Israel lobby undertook intensive efforts to elicit U.S. support from the legislative and executive branches for Israel against Nasser.⁵⁷ Prior to the war, hoping to persuade the Johnson administration to support an Israeli first strike, the Israeli government instructed its ambassador in Washington to “create a public atmosphere that will constitute pressure on the [Johnson] administration … without it being explicitly clear that we are behind this public campaign.”⁵⁸ The effort aimed to get sympathetic Americans to write letters, editorials, telegrams, and public statements to “strengthen our friends within the administration.” The pressure was so bothersome that the White House requested that the Israelis shut it down, although the Israeli ambassador reported back, “Of course we are continuing it.”⁵⁹

      To the dismay of Israeli officials and Israel’s supporters in the United States, the Johnson administration tried to maintain an evenhanded position. On the first day of the war, State Department spokesman Robert McCloskey communicated to the press, “We have tried to steer an even-handed course…. Our position is neutral in thought, word and deed.”⁶⁰ McCloskey’s statement drew the ire of many Jewish Americans.⁶¹ Later that day, Special Assistant to the President Joseph Califano phoned Secretary of State Rusk to say that McCloskey’s statement was “killing us with the Jews in this country” and asked Rusk to issue a more pro-Israel statement. Rusk released a statement that blandly reaffirmed Johnson’s position of independence and territorial integrity in the Middle East.⁶² Two days later, American Jewish Zionists communicated their “sharp disillusion and dismay” to the White House.⁶³ David Ginsburg, the long-time advocate for American Jewish Zionists, pressured U.S. officials to not force an Israeli withdrawal, which Eisenhower had done during the Suez Crisis. He wrote in a memo to Vice President Hubert Humphrey, “Here I’ll add a word of my own: what was done particularly in 1956 and 1957 but since then as well, from the viewpoint of U.S. interests alone, was appalling.” Ginsburg also warned the White House, “What the Administration is saying and doing now is being watched carefully not only by the Jewish community, but by others who should be and have been close to the Administration and whose support—and advice—we need, have had, and should have again.”⁶⁴

      Legislators took aim at McCloskey’s statement of neutrality and denounced it on the floors of the House and the Senate. Rep. William Scott (R-VA) stated, “The people of this country are not neutral in thought and word. Everything I hear, every expression of opinion from people in all walks of life, shows a deep concern for the preservation of the State of Israel.”⁶⁵ Senator Clark remarked, “Morally and legally we are an ally of Israel. Their cause is our cause. We are not neutral in thought, word, or deed. I am distressed by our Government’s ambiguous declaration of neutrality.”⁶⁶ Rep. Louis Wyman (R-NH) derided the Johnson administration for “flubbing the ball just at the wrong time” and for giving “the impression to the world that we are pussy footing…. We cannot possibly be neutral in the situation of Nasser versus Israel.”⁶⁷ Representative Ryan called the neutrality declaration “grotesque” and insisted that “the United States has never been ‘neutral in thought, word, and deed’ on the matter of Israel’s right to exist.”⁶⁸ For Rep. Margaret Heckler (R-MA), “Historically, we have had a close and special relationship with the State of Israel from the time of its inception. Consequently, I rise to protest against the administration’s declaration of ‘neutrality’ in this great crisis.”⁶⁹

      Several legislators used a familial analogy, of an American mother to an Israeli child, to describe U.S.-Israel relations. Rep. Jacob Gilbert (D-NY), for one, regarded Israel as “the child of Western humanitarianism and U. N. diplomacy.”⁷⁰ According Rep. Joseph Addabbo (D-NY), “Since its inception in 1948, Israel has been a stepchild of the United States…. If necessary, this country must defend Israel’s territorial integrity.”⁷¹ Benjamin Blackburn (R-GA) claimed that the United States “served as midwife during the birth of Israel as a free and independent nation” and, therefore, “now has a moral responsibility to protect her rights as such.”⁷² Not long after the war, Sen. Frank Church (D-ID) similarly stated that “the United States was the midwife at the birth of Israel, and the Arab countries have been determined, ever since, to kill the child.”⁷³

      Some State Department officials stressed the need to continue an even-handed position and not appear biased by Israeli sympathies. Benjamin Read, the executive secretary for Rusk, informed Bundy that it was in “our national interest” to maintain “reasonably friendly relations with both Israel and the Arab states” in order to “preserve some continuing role in the development of petroleum and other resources.” Read argued that “we must avoid full commitment to either side or to any party…. Our influence is greatest if we serve as a balance, not a partisan.”⁷⁴ Zbigniew Brzezinski, a member of the State Department’s policy planning staff and future National Security Advisor for Jimmy Carter, recommended that the best path would probably be “publicly defining a U.S. position that is reasonable, fair and constructive, even if initially not satisfactory to any of the belligerents.” The United States had to keep in mind “the long-range interests of the region” and not become “identified with one side alone.” Brzezinski realized, “Some Israeli resentment of the above posture is to be expected, but that is unavoidable unless the United States wishes to become fully identified with it.”⁷⁵

      The war severely strained U.S.-Arab relations. During the course of the war several Arab countries—including Egypt, Syria, and Iraq—broke diplomatic relations with the United States, and Arab oil-producing states unsheathed the “oil weapon” against the United States and Britain. Although the uncoordinated attempt failed to influence either American or British policy, the effort provided the groundwork for a future oil embargo, with much greater impact, in 1973. According to an intelligence memorandum, “the course of the present Arab-Israeli crisis has already done considerable damage to the U.S. position in the Arab world. Most Arabs believe the U.S. is the staunch ally of Israel and can in effect control its actions.”⁷⁶ Even further, “the damage to the U.S. position in the area already appears serious.”⁷⁷

      Not even an Israeli attack on the USS Liberty, an American spy ship in the Mediterranean, lessened support for Israel. On June 8, Israeli aircraft struck the Liberty with rockets and napalm, followed by boat-launched torpedoes, which killed 34 crewmembers and wounded 171. Israeli officials insisted the attack was a result of mistaken identity, believing the ship to be Egyptian. But Liberty crewmen had notified Israeli forces that they were Americans, and Israel Defense Forces (IDF) headquarters had identified the Liberty only several hours before. Many Americans never accepted the Israeli explanation and felt the attack was a deliberate attempt to prevent American monitoring of a potential Israeli attack on Syria or Israeli executions of Egyptian captives, or to keep the Liberty from jamming Israeli communications.⁷⁸

      Little was said on the House and Senate floors about the controversial attack. Rep. Roman Pucinski (D-IL) and Sen. Robert Kennedy (D-NY) both called the attack on the Liberty a “tragic mistake,” and Pucinski and Senator Javits noted that Israel had already apologized for the attack.⁷⁹ Javits excused the apparent mishap: “I have heard Senator after Senator say that while they were terribly dismayed and saddened by this accident, they understood how it could take place under the terrible stress

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