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with Ulster. He did not think that policy would be successful’.27 At the same meeting, he also declared:

      as far as dual nationality was concerned, they never recognised it, but that fact would not prevent the British government from establishing it. For his part, if the Republic were recognised, he would be in favour of giving each county power to vote itself out of the Republic if it so wished. Otherwise they would be compelled to use force.28

      The one ‘certain result’ of the county option would have been the gain of counties Tyrone and Fermanagh to the south at the expense of the north, something the Earl of Midleton ‘believed that the Sinn Féin leadership was especially covetous of’ and that there would be ‘no more trouble’ if they were transferred.29 During the impasse between de Valera’s talks with Lloyd George in July and the negotiations in October, Sinn Féin established a committee to ‘collect, compile and arrange … statements of fact and argument bearing on the position of Ulster’. It had the remit to address the ‘challenge which Ulster posed to the Sinn Féin cabinet’ and ‘devise a policy tolerable both to their own supporters and to the British government and which could also be imposed on the Ulster unionists’.30 The suggestion made by some northern Sinn Féin members to set up an advisory body of experts on the north to support the negotiation team in London was not taken up, however.31

      Much has been written about the Anglo-Irish negotiations from October to December 1921. That the Sinn Féin plenipotentiaries had a number of disadvantages in comparison to the British delegation was clear. Chief amongst these was the vast experience of the British parliamentarians over the Sinn Féin negotiators. The Sinn Féin negotiation team consisted of Griffith, Collins, Robert Barton, Éamonn Duggan and George Gavan Duffy. The British team consisting of people like Lloyd George, Winston Churchill and Lord Birkenhead was accustomed to stringent debate and opposition in Westminster, unlike the Irish delegates, who were part of what was essentially a talking shop – the Dáil. Lloyd George claimed the Irish delegates ‘are simple; they have none of the skill of the old nationalists; these men are not accustomed to finessing’.32 Most of the British parliamentarians had no respect for the Irish, with Bonar Law declaring ‘the Irish were an inferior race’.33

      During the negotiations, the two primary issues discussed were Ulster and the crown. Were the talks to fail, ‘the British were determined that the break should come on the issue of sovereignty, while the Irish were intent that it should be Ulster’.34 The Irish were successful in reopening the Ulster question and rekindling matters that the unionists thought were settled. Lloyd George admitted they had a weaker case on Ulster, stating ‘while British soldiers might die for the throne and empire, I do not know who will die for Tyrone and Fermanagh’.35 The Irish delegation began with the position that ‘the unimpaired unity of Ireland is a condition precedent to the conclusion of a Treaty of Association between Ireland and the nations of the British Commonwealth’.36 On 17 October, the Sinn Féin proposals on Ulster contained concessions that weakened their hand from the outset; their proposals were in line with de Valera’s utterances in the preceding weeks. According to John McColgan:

      The Unionists were offered the option of joining with the South or of maintaining local autonomy (over an area to be determined by plebiscite) subject to overriding authority from Dublin. Thus, instead of demanding complete Irish unity at the start, Sinn Féin opened negotiations giving away ground on Ulster. This approach probably prejudiced their chances of forcing the break on Ulster.37

      It has also been argued that by this move, ‘Sinn Fein had … implicitly accepted partition by arguing that the state of Northern Ireland should be subservient to Dublin rather than London.’38 During the negotiations, Lloyd George had to expend as much energy in soothing unionist (both Ulster and Conservative) fears as he did in negotiating with Sinn Féin. Although Craig and Bonar Law were not ‘the elephants in the room’, they were ‘the elephants outside the door’.39 Lloyd George told Griffith, ‘we could not coerce Ulster. There was the same strain in the argument of de Valera as I have [heard] here this morning, that Ulster would come in if we let her alone … It is a mistake to assume that the population of Ulster for the time being is opposed to partition. It is not.’40 Nevertheless, once the Irish delegation stated that their allegiance to crown and empire was contingent on Ireland’s ‘essential unity’, Lloyd George and others within the British government appeared open to changing Northern Ireland’s status if Sinn Féin would accept allegiance to the crown.41 Austen Chamberlain, one of the British delegates, explained to his wife that ‘the six counties was a compromise, and, like all compromises, is illogical and indefensible’.42 After the negotiations had concluded, correspondence was published between Lloyd George and Craig, where the former said in November that ‘two dominions in Ireland was impractical and indefensible’.43 He ‘decried the idea of a partition that would involve “cutting the natural circuits of commercial activity”, and said that “when such frontiers are established they harden into permanence”’.44 Lloyd George unsuccessfully tried to squeeze Craig into accepting an all-Ireland parliament. Craig did not budge; instead, he ‘proposed that Northern Ireland should become a dominion “based on ‘equality of status’ with the South”, a proposal that came “as a shock to those accustomed to receive their passionate assurances of union”’ and demonstrated that unionists were somewhat flexible in their relationship with the union.45

      Craig had become increasingly wary of Lloyd George since the latter’s five suggestions in July of local autonomy for the north within a Dublin parliament. He was aware of Lloyd George’s cunning and duplicity and also of Northern Ireland’s vulnerability. Ulster unionists noticed a cooling of their relationship with senior figures within the Conservative Party. John Andrews, northern labour minister, condemned the attempted ‘disgraceful betrayal of Ulster’ by members of the British government.46 Lloyd George’s overtures in July prompted the northern cabinet to agree

      that everything in the situation pointed to the desirability of Northern Ireland consolidating its position as quickly as possible, and it was decided to carry on with the establishment of the new Parliament rapidly. The Prime Minister undertook to write to the Chief Secretary in regard to the early appointment of the Civil Service Committee, which had been suspended pending the establishment of some form of Government in Southern Ireland.47

      Under the Government of Ireland Act, a civil service committee was set up to allocate civil service staff to the northern and southern jurisdictions. The committee could only function once both governments were established and had nominated their representatives to the committee.48 With no southern government in operation, Craig protested that the north was being ‘left in mid-air’ and suggested setting up a government in Southern Ireland ruled by the Lord Lieutenant or as a crown colony, or, alternatively, scrapping the idea of a civil service committee altogether.49 As the year progressed, he pressed harder for the transfer of services to Northern Ireland. Craig had appeared open to cooperating with Sinn Féin earlier in 1921, particularly through the Council of Ireland. He talked of a future of competition and rivalry between Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland and of using the Council of Ireland to address all-Ireland problems. At a lunch in Belfast in February 1921, he spoke of his ‘hope not only for a brilliant prospect for Ulster, but a brilliant future for Ireland’.50 That same month, Craig stated, ‘The rights of the minority must be sacred to the majority … it will only be by broad views, tolerant ideas and a real desire for liberty of conscience that we can make an ideal of the Parliament and the executive.’51 One of the first actions of the Northern government was to select its twenty members to sit on the Council of Ireland, led by Craig (see Chapter Four). In declining to meet de Valera at a conference, he pointed out that they could instead meet at the council once it convened.52 Craig also appeared receptive to an all-Ireland council of finance, suggested by Arthur Griffith during the treaty negotiations.53 This openness changed, however, once he spoke to Churchill and Birkenhead. The return of Bonar Law, ‘an Orangeman and a fanatic’, back to the political scene after an absence due to ill-health also added to Craig’s resolve.54 Griffith noticed that by mid-November, Craig had ‘become more intractable as a result of the people he had met here in London’.55

      Craig refused to concede any ground to Lloyd George and instead won a major concession from him. On 5 November, Lloyd George agreed

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