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become a frontier between two mutually antagonistic states’.82 From 1922, with a new government established in the south, the effects of partition became more apparent. Both Irish governments were ‘forced to devote much attention to relations with each other and to the question of the boundary between their two states’.83

      CHAPTER SIX

      Politics

      From its birth, Northern Ireland faced significant political challenges. In the eyes of many on the island, including one-third of the population within its own territory, it lacked legitimacy. Although signing the treaty meant that Sinn Féin had formally accepted partition, the inclusion of Article 12, gave hope to nationalists, who believed that much of the northern territory would be transferred to the Free State, leaving the remainder as an unviable rump. One of the objectives of the treaty, at least on the British side, was to normalise relations between both Irish jurisdictions. In many ways, the treaty led to the opposite. The shadow of the Boundary Commission hung over Northern Ireland. Nationalists felt they could continue to ignore and obstruct the northern jurisdiction, particularly in areas of nationalist majorities. The commission merely added to the vulnerability and paranoia of unionists. Craig stated as much to Churchill in May 1922:

      The Boundary Commission has been at the root of all evil. If you picture Loyalists on the borderland being asked by us to hang on with their teeth for the safety of the Province, you can also picture their unspoken cry to us, ‘if we sacrifice our lives and our property for the sake of the Province, are you going to assent to a Commission which may subsequently by a stroke of the pen, take away the very area you now ask us to defend?’1

      The prospect of some levels of cooperation in 1921 evaporated, replaced by a siege mentality to protect the north’s interests from the south and from those disloyal elements within its territory. The focus of the following chapter, security, was the primary concern of the northern government. Almost all political decisions arose from the need to secure and strengthen its borders and defeat its opponents through military and political means. The northern government was able to take whatever measures it saw fit. In the northern House of Commons, there was no opposition, with the Sinn Féin and UIL MPs abstaining from parliament. As the House of Commons elected members of the senate, only unionist senators were present.2 Other than providing financial support, the British government mainly adopted a laissez faire approach, allowing the devolved northern government to manage its own affairs unimpeded.

      The make-up of the cabinet of the first northern government was also a significant factor in determining how the southern and internal opposition were dealt with. All cabinet members were drawn from the upper layers of Protestant Ulster society. James Craig, son of a millionaire, was a man of independent means. Lord Londonderry and Edward Archdale owned large estates of land. John Andrews was chairman of his family’s linen company and a director of two other companies. Hugh Pollock was managing director of a company of flour importers whilst Richard Dawson-Bates was a prosperous solicitor.3 They all had close links to the Orange Order, a trend that was to continue for many decades. By 1968, everyone who served in the cabinet had been a member.4 In 1921, the average age of the cabinet was fifty-four, and owing to Craig’s reluctance to make changes, the average age had increased to sixty-two by 1938. At the outbreak of the Second World War, only twelve people had served in the northern cabinet from 1921 to 1939.5

      Cabinet ministers tended to be ‘dogged, reliable and conservative, rather than imaginative and innovative’.6 James Lichfield, a senior civil servant seconded to Northern Ireland, believed ‘the only Cabinet Minister of real value was Craig himself’. Pollock and Londonderry, though deeply conservative in relation to social and financial matters, were more open-minded and outward-looking than their colleagues. Archdale, Andrews and Dawson-Bates all showed a reluctance to treat Catholics equally. All aspired to have the minimum number of Catholics, if any, working in their departments.7 After Dawson-Bates heard ‘with a great deal of surprise, that a Roman Catholic Telephonist has been appointed’, he refused to use the telephone for important business until he succeeded in getting the employee transferred.8 His ‘paranoia knew no bounds’.9 He was in favour of a ban on Catholics entering the northern civil service.10

      The original cabinet consisted only of men. In the history of the northern parliament (1921 to 1972), Dehra Parker became the first and only female cabinet member in 1949, when she was appointed Minister for Health and Local Government.11 In 1918, Irish women who were over the age of thirty with certain property rights were granted the vote. In 1922, ‘the Free State had extended the franchise to all those over twenty-one, while women in the North, along with their British counterparts, had to wait until 1928’.12 The northern cabinet unanimously decided not to extend the franchise to women over twenty-one in 1924.13 Shortly after the northern government was established, the executive committee of the Ulster Women’s Unionist Council sent a letter to Craig, asking for ‘the inclusion of women in the different departments of the Northern Parliament’. A resolution was passed

      to bring before the Government the importance of the services women can and are anxious to render to their country, especially in such matters as Education, Care of Children, Local Government, Agriculture and Labour. We ask, therefore, that our desire to be included in the above named Departments be seriously considered, either as Advisory Committees, or Women to consult with Ministers and Officials, or as Women Officials.14

      Craig replied that they could ‘rest fully assured that when opportunity presents itself, the fullest co-operation and assistance will be requisitioned from your Council’. He was unable to make many female appointments to the civil service at that time, as services had not yet been transferred. However, he promised that ‘when the Services are transferred we will not be neglectful of the claims of the remainder on our list to such appointments as may be available’.15

      Women on the nationalist side, although supporting their political representatives, had fewer opportunities to participate; this was exacerbated by the policy of abstentionism. Cumann na mBan, the Irish republican women’s paramilitary wing, suffered low morale in the north, being outlawed by the northern government in 1922. The Ladies’ Auxiliary of the Ancient Order of Hibernians was probably the most popular female nationalist organisation in the north during the inter-war years.16 For the six counties, between 1898 and 1940, female representation on local councils was, on average, around 1.4 per cent. Within local government, they were able to exercise more influence as poor law guardians than anywhere else. Instead of dealing with gender issues, women activists tended to focus on support for, or opposition to, the northern jurisdiction. In a sectarian society, gender was ‘relegated to the margins of discourse and policy’, in many ways illustrated by Dehra Parker.17 Her ‘political leitmotif was unionism: in thirty-five years in parliament she never voted against the government, and in the early years of Stormont, she consistently voted for measures that would strengthen the majority at the expense of the nationalist minority’.18 She was one of the first to call for the abolition of PR in local elections, condemning the tyranny with which nationalist councils ‘ground the minority under their heel … We have had to sit there and listen to our King being insulted, to our Government being derided. We have been told that killing was no murder unless committed by the foreign invader.’19

      The local elections of 1920 had been deeply embarrassing for the unionists, who lost many local authorities and seats to nationalists and the labour movement (see Chapter Two). Most nationalist-controlled local authorities within Northern Ireland chose a policy of non-recognition of the new jurisdiction, some more vociferously than others. On the day of King George V’s state opening of the Belfast parliament on 22 June 1921, Thomas Corrigan, secretary of Fermanagh County Council, pulled down a Union Jack flag from Enniskillen courthouse.20 A delegation from Fermanagh County Council who met the Dáil cabinet in August informed them that ‘Fermanagh, by a large majority … resolved that it would not submit to the partition parliament in Ulster’.21 Tyrone County Council dithered on non-recognition and ‘shuffled pragmatically between the Dáil and Belfast’.22 Derry City renounced the Belfast parliament on 25 August 1921 but did not ‘declare definitive allegiance to the Dáil’.23 Both Tyrone and Fermanagh declared allegiance to the Dáil on 28 November. Five days later, Tyrone County Council justified its actions

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