LITMIR.BIZ

      CHAPTER FIVE

      The Treaty

      Sinn Féin secured a clear mandate from three provinces of Ireland at the 1918 and 1921 general elections. In Ulster, it did not achieve such a mandate and battled with the Irish Parliamentary Party/United Irish League for hegemony within the nationalist community, with both of them significantly below the level of political support for Ulster unionism in the province. With the electoral destruction of the Irish Parliamentary Party in 1918, Sinn Féin became the effective voice of Irish nationalism. At this juncture, the partition of Ireland was being enforced, yet Sinn Féin had no coherent policy on the issue. Other than the counter-productive Belfast Boycott, the party was devoid of any clear strategy to end partition or deal with it. With the birth of the northern jurisdiction and the truce of July 1921, it had to finally confront the issue head-on.

      In the preceding years, Sinn Féin leaders tended to over emphasise the blame attributed to Britain for causing partition and to downplay the real hostility of Ulster unionists to being governed by a Dublin parliament. There seemed a genuine, albeit wholly naïve belief that if Britain withdrew from Ireland, Ulster unionists would be open to a united Ireland. De Valera felt that the troubles in Ulster were ‘due to British guile and nothing else’.1 Sinn Féin founder Arthur Griffith claimed the division of Ireland was ‘unnatural’, maintaining that if the Ulster unionists did not have the backing of the British government, ‘we could settle the Ulster question’.2 Likewise, another Sinn Féin leader, Michael Collins, maintained that ‘the tendency of sentiment in the North East, when not interfered with … was national, and in favour of freedom and unity’.3 Whilst not holding a monopoly on threatening rhetoric, some of the comments made by Sinn Féin representatives were not conducive to creating a favourable impression amongst the unionist community. De Valera often described Ulster unionists as a ‘foreign garrison’ and ‘not Irish people’. If they rejected Sinn Féin solutions, ‘they would have to go under’, and if they stood ‘in our way to freedom we will clear you out of it’.4 Griffith stated that Ulster unionists ‘must make up their minds either to throw in their lot with the Irish nation or stand out as the English garrison. If they did the latter the Irish nation must deal with them.’5 Cahir Healy, writing as Sinn Féin MP for Fermanagh and Tyrone in 1925, attacked the party’s policy towards the north in the years since 1916:

      The truth is that none of the Irish leaders understood the northern situation or the northern mind. Griffith, the sanest and best informed of them all, nursed a delusion for years – that the (solution) of the problem lay in London. Not even de Valera’s non-recognition of it nor the rather jumpy efforts which, with Collins, passed for statecraft, could possibly bring us one day nearer peace.6

      De Valera modified his views, becoming open to accommodating unionists in a federal Ireland externally associated within the British Commonwealth.7 He moved from a stance of ‘Ulster must be coerced if she stood in the way’ to one of ruling out the use of force against Ulster by 1921.8

      This more conciliatory approach was evident in his willingness to meet Craig in May 1921. Alfred Cope from Dublin Castle ‘arranged a “theatrically clandestine” but essentially pointless meeting on 5 May between de Valera and James Craig’.9 Craig courageously agreed to ‘be conducted by a number of IRA men to meet de Valera. The party changed cars before arriving at a house on Howth Road protected by a number of guards disguised as workmen.’10 Craig wanted an agreement on the border; de Valera wanted an agreement on Irish unity. Both were as unrealistic as the other. Craig claimed that de Valera spent the time ‘harping on the grievances of … the last 700 years … After half an hour he had reached the era of Brian Boru. After another half hour he had advanced to the period of some king a century or two later. By this time I was getting tired.’11 Although no agreement was reached, they both expressed an openness to meet again, but this never happened. The meeting also showed that Craig was open to negotiating with Sinn Féin. The meeting was supported by his party, the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, Ulster farmers and ‘the trading community is also pleased as there looks to be a hope that by some understanding the boycott can be lifted’.12

      Just days after King George V’s speech at the state opening of the northern parliament, Lloyd George invited de Valera, ‘the chosen leader of the great majority in Southern Ireland’, and Craig, ‘Premier of Northern Ireland’, to negotiations, without preconditions – another step towards a truce. Equally, it could be construed as recognition of partition by de Valera if he accepted.13 De Valera turned down the invitation, as it denied ‘Ireland’s essential unity’ and instead sought a conference in Dublin with ‘certain representatives of the political minority in this country’, including Craig, the Earl of Midleton (William St John Fremantle Brodrick), Sir Maurice E. Dockrell, Sir Robert H. Woods and Andrew Jameson. He also believed if he went to a conference in London with Craig, ‘they would be like two bad boys and would start fighting themselves at once and the Government would exploit their differences’.14 In his letter to invitees, de Valera stated:

      The reply which I, as spokesman for the Irish Nation, shall make to Mr. Lloyd George will affect the lives and fortunes of the political minority in this island, no less than those of the majority.

      Before sending the reply, therefore, I would like to confer with you and to learn from you at first hand the views of a certain section of our people of whom you are representative.15

      All accepted de Valera’s invitation, except Craig, who replied to his ‘namesake in Dublin Senate’ that he had ‘already accepted the Prime Minister’s invitation to London Conference’.16 For ‘sheer impertinence it could hardly be beaten’ claimed Craig’s wife.17

      Craig was not involved in the talks between de Valera and Lloyd George following the truce in July. He informed Cope: ‘I’m going to sit on Ulster like a rock, we are content with what we have got – let the Prime Minister and Sinn Fein settle this and if possible leave us out.’18 He wanted to make Northern Ireland ‘a new impregnable Pale’.19 Craig believed that ‘no coercion of Ulster’ was among Lloyd George’s non-negotiable commitments. On 18 July, however, Lloyd George put forward ‘five suggestions to Craig and his ministers as to how they might accommodate de Valera’s requirement of Irish unity with local autonomy for the north devolved from Dublin’.20 Craig and his colleagues emphatically rejected them and Lloyd George backed down. Two days later, Lloyd George made his proposal to de Valera of offering Southern Ireland a dominion settlement. De Valera rejected the proposals, instead demanding ‘that Ulster should become a part of the Irish Dominion. Failing this, he demanded, as his only alternative, complete independence for Southern Ireland.’21 Lloyd George suggested that Craig meet with de Valera again, as another meeting was the only way to make ‘him realise that Ulster is a fact which he must recognise, not a figment bolstered up by the British Government as a counter to Sinn Fein. He does not understand this. Till he understands it, I fear that a settlement will always be unattainable.’22 Craig replied that he would only meet de Valera if he ‘accepted the principle of Ulster’s independent rights, and that he gave a written statement to that effect’.23 This stance was repeated when de Valera invited him to attend a conference in Castlebellingham in County Louth in late July.24

      De Valera remained adamant that ‘we cannot admit the right of the British government to mutilate our country, either in its own interest, or at the call of any section of our population’.25 Importantly, he also stated, ‘we do not contemplate the use of force. If your Government stands aside, we can effect a complete reconciliation. We agree with you “that no common action

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