Birth of the Border - Cormac Moore

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But if they could realistically hope to win a quarter or so of the seats, ‘the arguments are altogether in favour of vigorously contesting … the representatives elected will become members of Dáil Éireann’. Failing to contest would also be taken as an acceptance of partition and would, according to de Valera, drive supporters into the Nationalist Party camp – ‘a result which might later have a dangerous reactionary effect, by contagion, on the South’.3

      Sinn Féin sought cooperation with the United Irish League (UIL), led by Joseph Devlin. Sinn Féin and the UIL signed an agreement on 17 March on the basis of ‘accepting the principle of self-determination for Ireland, and abstaining from the Northern Parliament’. Both parties agreed to form an anti-partition ticket. They also agreed ‘that each party would advise its supporters to give their lower preference to the candidates of the other party’.4 All nationalists fought the election in Northern Ireland from an anti-partitionist stance, claiming partition would mean ‘national suicide’.5 According to Donal Hall:

      considerable effort, funded in a large part by Sinn Féin in Dublin, was put into [the] advertising and circulation of anti-partition pamphlets. The economic difficulties which Northern Ireland would face were emphasised, particularly the danger of the destruction of its commercial and industrial industries by the loss of their market in the south and west of Ireland. Farmers were warned that their prosperity was in danger because the urban industrial vote exceeded their political strength in the region.6

      Sinn Féin’s ‘campaign, while vast in scale, was also marked by its crudity and lack of reference to Unionist sensibilities’.7 Sinn Féin formed an internal sub-committee to run the propaganda campaign for the election in the north, with Sinn Féin and the Dáil contributing £1,000 each towards it. Membership of the sub-committee consisted of de Valera, Hanna Sheehy-Skeffington, Jenny Wyse-Power, Erskine Childers and Seán MacEntee. The sub-committee published a newspaper they called the Unionist and distributed it to unionist strongholds.8 Unionists were warned by legitimate unionist newspapers, such as the Belfast Newsletter, that ‘the periodical is on the side of the enemy, and that the title has been adopted with the intention of deceiving Unionist electors’.9 The same newspaper also claimed Sinn Féin had signed a treaty with the Bolsheviks, ‘binding for ten years’, where the Bolsheviks would ‘provide the rebels with arms and to give their leaders permission to study military and naval problems in Russia’.10 Éamonn Donnelly, Sinn Féin organiser for Ulster, claimed the only effect their literature and leaflets would have on the unionist community would be ‘to bring them out to vote against us in great numbers’.11 Despite Sinn Féin’s wholehearted election campaign, it had to overcome considerable intimidation. It was an illegal organisation and of the nineteen candidates, eight were either in jail or interned, and seven were on the run. Its ‘candidates, organisers, and supporters were attacked; raids on the houses of Sinn Féin election organisers were carried out; and speakers and election agents were arrested’.12 Éamonn Donnelly accused opponents of ‘wholesale terrorism’ on the day of the election, 24 May 1921.13

      Chastened by the results of local elections in 1920, unionists were determined to maximise their vote for the 1921 general election. Like the local elections, the PR system of voting was used for the general election – the first time it was used in a general election in Britain or Ireland. All unionist candidates were greatly assisted by the Ulster Women’s Unionist Council, which coordinated canvassing events with the men’s association, provided funding, held classes and showed films explaining the novel PR voting system.14 On the issue of women being selected as candidates, the president of the Ulster Women’s Unionist Council, the Duchess of Abercorn, ‘expressed the opinion that the time was not ripe for this, and the essential thing in the first Parliament was to preserve the safety of the Unionist cause, that much organisation and construction work would be necessary for which perhaps women had not the necessary experience, and except in the case of outstanding qualifications, men candidates were preferable’.15

      Many members disagreed with her, believing women candidates were necessary to address issues such as ‘Poor Law reform, which will necessitate re-organisation of the system of Medical Relief, some form of provision for necessitous widows with children, and drastic reform of the laws affecting the unmarried mother and her child’.16 Two female unionist candidates did run – Dehra Chichester (she became Dehra Parker after 1928) and Julia McMordie – and both were elected.17 In fact, all forty unionist candidates were elected to the northern parliament.

      Held on Empire Day, 24 May, the general election, with a turnout of 89 per cent, was an astounding victory for Ulster unionists, who won all but twelve of the fifty-two seats. Sinn Féin won just six seats, with the UIL winning the other six. It was a bitter blow for Sinn Féin; de Valera had predicted that at least seventeen, if not half the seats, would be won by nationalists.18 Indicative of the lack of penetration of Sinn Féin in the north were the profiles of the six people elected under its banner: de Valera, Michael Collins, Arthur Griffith, Eoin MacNeill, Seán Milroy and Seán O’Mahony. Most of them were high-profile figures in the south, with O’Mahony the only one not also elected to a Southern Ireland constituency. The UIL result showed its dependence on Devlin, who won two of its six seats, in Antrim and West Belfast. The unionist victory prompted Carson to say to Bonar Law, the Conservative Party leader, that ‘It would take a very brave man … to take away Ulster’s parliament’.19 Winston Churchill similarly claimed, ‘From that moment the position of Ulster became unassailable.’20 The breakdown of the results showed the truly sectarian nature of the electorate. Ernest Clark sent John Anderson, the Under Secretary of Ireland in Dublin Castle, a letter with a table (see Table 1) showing ‘that the percentage of votes cast for the Unionists and the other party respectively was almost identical with the percentage of Protestants and Roman Catholics in the various constituencies’.21

      The elected nationalists decided to abstain from taking their seats in the new Northern Ireland parliament, thus granting unionists a monopoly on proceedings.22 For the Southern Ireland parliament, not one seat was contested. Sinn Féin secured 124 seats – every seat except for the four seats in Dublin University.23 Sinn Féin used the occasion to elect a second Dáil.24 Outside of Northern Ireland, the Government of Ireland Act was effectively ignored. Commenting on its one and only meeting, the Irish Times remarked, ‘The formal opening of the Southern Parliament in Dublin on June 28 was a subdued spectacle. Fifteen senators and four Commoners – the members for Trinity College – attended.’25

      The northern parliament held its first official sitting on 7 June in Belfast’s City Hall, where the state opening was also held later in the month. Such was the makeshift nature of the new entity that a temporary home had to be found at the Presbyterian church in Ireland’s Assembly College from September 1921, with a permanent parliament in Stormont not opened until 1932.26 In October, the northern government decided not to install electric lighting in the temporary parliament, as it was not an ‘absolutely necessary’ expense.27 At the first meeting, Hugh O’Neill, was elected the speaker of the house.28 Four days later, twenty-four people were elected to the upper house, the senate. The senate consisted of twenty-six members, the other two were ‘the Lord Mayor of Belfast and Mayor of Londonderry – sitting ex officio’.29 Whilst the senators in the north were elected from the northern House of Commons, the southern senate had to include different minority groups. Patrick Buckland claims that ‘Ulster unionists justified this difference … by arguing that the circumstances of the minorities differed: the southern minority would be virtually unrepresented in the southern House of Commons, whereas northern nationalists and Catholics would have considerable representation in the northern House of Commons’.30 Joseph Devlin claimed this arrangement was ‘the most dishonest’ transaction he had heard in his life.31 James Craig, the Prime Minister, and his cabinet also took up office in early June. The cabinet consisted of Hugh Pollock as Minister of Finance, Richard Dawson-Bates as Minister of Home Affairs, Lord Londonderry as Minister of Education, John Andrews as Minister of Labour and Edward Archdale as Minister of Agriculture and Minister of Commerce.32 At the cabinet’s first meeting on 15 June, Northern Ireland’s twenty representatives for the Council of Ireland were selected – thirteen from the House of Commons and seven from the senate.33 That meeting was primarily concerned with arranging the state opening of the northern parliament by King George V a week later.

Table 1. 1921 Northern Ireland

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