LITMIR.BIZ

Скачать книгу

that proposition also.

      But when I describe something and you describe another thing, or I say something and you say nothing—is there any contradiction? How can he who speaks contradict him who speaks not?

      Here Ctesippus was silent; and I in my astonishment said: What do you mean, Dionysodorus? I have often heard, and have been amazed to hear, this thesis of yours, which is maintained and employed by the disciples of Protagoras, and others before them, and which to me appears to be quite wonderful, and suicidal as well as destructive, and I think that I am most likely to hear the truth about it from you. The dictum is that there is no such thing as falsehood; a man must either say what is true or say nothing. Is not that your position?

      He assented.

      But if he cannot speak falsely, may he not think falsely?

      No, he cannot, he said.

      Then there is no such thing as false opinion?

      No, he said.

      Then there is no such thing as ignorance, or men who are ignorant; for is not ignorance, if there be such a thing, a mistake of fact?

      Certainly, he said.

      And that is impossible?

      Impossible, he replied.

      Are you saying this as a paradox, Dionysodorus; or do you seriously maintain no man to be ignorant?

      Refute me, he said.

      But how can I refute you, if, as you say, to tell a falsehood is impossible?

      Very true, said Euthydemus.

      Neither did I tell you just now to refute me, said Dionysodorus; for how can I tell you to do that which is not?

      O Euthydemus, I said, I have but a dull conception of these subtleties and excellent devices of wisdom; I am afraid that I hardly understand them, and you must forgive me therefore if I ask a very stupid question: if there be no falsehood or false opinion or ignorance, there can be no such thing as erroneous action, for a man cannot fail of acting as he is acting—that is what you mean?

      Yes, he replied.

      And now, I said, I will ask my stupid question: If there is no such thing as error in deed, word, or thought, then what, in the name of goodness, do you come hither to teach? And were you not just now saying that you could teach virtue best of all men, to any one who was willing to learn?

      And are you such an old fool, Socrates, rejoined Dionysodorus, that you bring up now what I said at first—and if I had said anything last year, I suppose that you would bring that up too—but are non-plussed at the words which I have just uttered?

      Why, I said, they are not easy to answer; for they are the words of wise men: and indeed I know not what to make of this word 'nonplussed,' which you used last: what do you mean by it, Dionysodorus? You must mean that I cannot refute your argument. Tell me if the words have any other sense.

      No, he replied, they mean what you say. And now answer.

      What, before you, Dionysodorus? I said.

      Answer, said he.

      And is that fair?

      Yes, quite fair, he said.

      Upon what principle? I said. I can only suppose that you are a very wise man who comes to us in the character of a great logician, and who knows when to answer and when not to answer—and now you will not open your mouth at all, because you know that you ought not.

      You prate, he said, instead of answering. But if, my good sir, you admit that I am wise, answer as I tell you.

      I suppose that I must obey, for you are master. Put the question.

      Are the things which have sense alive or lifeless?

      They are alive.

      And do you know of any word which is alive?

      I cannot say that I do.

      Then why did you ask me what sense my words had?

      Why, because I was stupid and made a mistake. And yet, perhaps, I was right after all in saying that words have a sense;—what do you say, wise man? If I was not in error, even you will not refute me, and all your wisdom will be non-plussed; but if I did fall into error, then again you are wrong in saying that there is no error,—and this remark was made by you not quite a year ago. I am inclined to think, however, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, that this argument lies where it was and is not very likely to advance: even your skill in the subtleties of logic, which is really amazing, has not found out the way of throwing another and not falling yourself, now any more than of old.

      Ctesippus said: Men of Chios, Thurii, or however and whatever you call yourselves, I wonder at you, for you seem to have no objection to talking nonsense.

      Fearing that there would be high words, I again endeavoured to soothe Ctesippus, and said to him: To you, Ctesippus, I must repeat what I said before to Cleinias—that you do not understand the ways of these philosophers from abroad. They are not serious, but, like the Egyptian wizard, Proteus, they take different forms and deceive us by their enchantments: and let us, like Menelaus, refuse to let them go until they show themselves to us in earnest. When they begin to be in earnest their full beauty will appear: let us then beg and entreat and beseech them to shine forth. And I think that I had better once more exhibit the form in which I pray to behold them; it might be a guide to them. I will go on therefore where I left off, as well as I can, in the hope that I may touch their hearts and move them to pity, and that when they see me deeply serious and interested, they also may be serious. You, Cleinias, I said, shall remind me at what point we left off. Did we not agree that philosophy should be studied? and was not that our conclusion?

      Yes, he replied.

      And philosophy is the acquisition of knowledge?

      Yes, he said.

      And what knowledge ought we to acquire? May we not answer with absolute truth—A knowledge which will do us good?

      Certainly, he said.

      And should we be any the better if we went about having a knowledge of the places where most gold was hidden in the earth?

      Perhaps we should, he said.

      But have we not already proved, I said, that we should be none the better off, even if without trouble and digging all the gold which there is in the earth were ours? And if we knew how to convert stones into gold, the knowledge would be of no value to us, unless we also knew how to use the gold? Do you not remember? I said.

      I quite remember, he said.

      Nor would any other knowledge, whether of money-making, or of medicine, or of any other art which knows only how to make a thing, and not to use it when made, be of any good to us. Am I not right?

      He agreed.

      And if there were a knowledge which was able to make men immortal, without giving them the knowledge of the way to use the immortality, neither would there be any use in that, if we may argue from the analogy of the previous instances?

      To all this he agreed.

      Then, my dear boy, I said, the knowledge which we want is one that uses as well as makes?

      True, he said.

      And our desire is not to be skilful lyre-makers, or artists of that sort— far otherwise; for with them the art which makes is one, and the art which uses is another. Although they have to do with the same, they are divided: for the art which makes and the art which plays on the lyre differ widely from one another. Am I not right?

      He agreed.

      And clearly we do not want the art of the flute-maker; this is only another of the same sort?

      He assented.

      But suppose, I said, that we were to learn the art of making speeches— would that be the art which would make us happy?

      I should say, no,

Скачать книгу