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if you were engaged in war, in whose company would you rather take the risk—in company with a wise general, or with a foolish one?

      With a wise one.

      And if you were ill, whom would you rather have as a companion in a dangerous illness—a wise physician, or an ignorant one?

      A wise one.

      You think, I said, that to act with a wise man is more fortunate than to act with an ignorant one?

      He assented.

      Then wisdom always makes men fortunate: for by wisdom no man would ever err, and therefore he must act rightly and succeed, or his wisdom would be wisdom no longer.

      We contrived at last, somehow or other, to agree in a general conclusion, that he who had wisdom had no need of fortune. I then recalled to his mind the previous state of the question. You remember, I said, our making the admission that we should be happy and fortunate if many good things were present with us?

      He assented.

      And should we be happy by reason of the presence of good things, if they profited us not, or if they profited us?

      If they profited us, he said.

      And would they profit us, if we only had them and did not use them? For example, if we had a great deal of food and did not eat, or a great deal of drink and did not drink, should we be profited?

      Certainly not, he said.

      Or would an artisan, who had all the implements necessary for his work, and did not use them, be any the better for the possession of them? For example, would a carpenter be any the better for having all his tools and plenty of wood, if he never worked?

      Certainly not, he said.

      And if a person had wealth and all the goods of which we were just now speaking, and did not use them, would he be happy because he possessed them?

      No indeed, Socrates.

      Then, I said, a man who would be happy must not only have the good things, but he must also use them; there is no advantage in merely having them?

      True.

      Well, Cleinias, but if you have the use as well as the possession of good things, is that sufficient to confer happiness?

      Yes, in my opinion.

      And may a person use them either rightly or wrongly?

      He must use them rightly.

      That is quite true, I said. And the wrong use of a thing is far worse than the non-use; for the one is an evil, and the other is neither a good nor an evil. You admit that?

      He assented.

      Now in the working and use of wood, is not that which gives the right use simply the knowledge of the carpenter?

      Nothing else, he said.

      And surely, in the manufacture of vessels, knowledge is that which gives the right way of making them?

      He agreed.

      And in the use of the goods of which we spoke at first—wealth and health and beauty, is not knowledge that which directs us to the right use of them, and regulates our practice about them?

      He assented.

      Then in every possession and every use of a thing, knowledge is that which gives a man not only good-fortune but success?

      He again assented.

      And tell me, I said, O tell me, what do possessions profit a man, if he have neither good sense nor wisdom? Would a man be better off, having and doing many things without wisdom, or a few things with wisdom? Look at the matter thus: If he did fewer things would he not make fewer mistakes? if he made fewer mistakes would he not have fewer misfortunes? and if he had fewer misfortunes would he not be less miserable?

      Certainly, he said.

      And who would do least—a poor man or a rich man?

      A poor man.

      A weak man or a strong man?

      A weak man.

      A noble man or a mean man?

      A mean man.

      And a coward would do less than a courageous and temperate man?

      Yes.

      And an indolent man less than an active man?

      He assented.

      And a slow man less than a quick; and one who had dull perceptions of seeing and hearing less than one who had keen ones?

      All this was mutually allowed by us.

      Then, I said, Cleinias, the sum of the matter appears to be that the goods of which we spoke before are not to be regarded as goods in themselves, but the degree of good and evil in them depends on whether they are or are not under the guidance of knowledge: under the guidance of ignorance, they are greater evils than their opposites, inasmuch as they are more able to minister to the evil principle which rules them; and when under the guidance of wisdom and prudence, they are greater goods: but in themselves they are nothing?

      That, he replied, is obvious.

      What then is the result of what has been said? Is not this the result— that other things are indifferent, and that wisdom is the only good, and ignorance the only evil?

      He assented.

      Let us consider a further point, I said: Seeing that all men desire happiness, and happiness, as has been shown, is gained by a use, and a right use, of the things of life, and the right use of them, and good-fortune in the use of them, is given by knowledge,—the inference is that everybody ought by all means to try and make himself as wise as he can?

      Yes, he said.

      And when a man thinks that he ought to obtain this treasure, far more than money, from a father or a guardian or a friend or a suitor, whether citizen or stranger—the eager desire and prayer to them that they would impart wisdom to you, is not at all dishonourable, Cleinias; nor is any one to be blamed for doing any honourable service or ministration to any man, whether a lover or not, if his aim is to get wisdom. Do you agree? I said.

      Yes, he said, I quite agree, and think that you are right.

      Yes, I said, Cleinias, if only wisdom can be taught, and does not come to man spontaneously; for this is a point which has still to be considered, and is not yet agreed upon by you and me—

      But I think, Socrates, that wisdom can be taught, he said.

      Best of men, I said, I am delighted to hear you say so; and I am also grateful to you for having saved me from a long and tiresome investigation as to whether wisdom can be taught or not. But now, as you think that wisdom can be taught, and that wisdom only can make a man happy and fortunate, will you not acknowledge that all of us ought to love wisdom, and you individually will try to love her?

      Certainly, Socrates, he said; I will do my best.

      I was pleased at hearing this; and I turned to Dionysodorus and Euthydemus and said: That is an example, clumsy and tedious I admit, of the sort of exhortations which I would have you give; and I hope that one of you will set forth what I have been saying in a more artistic style: or at least take up the enquiry where I left off, and proceed to show the youth whether he should have all knowledge; or whether there is one sort of knowledge only which will make him good and happy, and what that is. For, as I was saying at first, the improvement of this young man in virtue and wisdom is a matter which we have very much at heart.

      Thus I spoke, Crito, and was all attention to what was coming. I wanted to see how they would approach the question, and where they would start in their exhortation to the young man that he should practise wisdom and virtue. Dionysodorus, who was the elder, spoke first. Everybody's eyes were directed towards him, perceiving that something wonderful might shortly be expected. And certainly they were not far wrong; for the man, Crito, began a remarkable discourse well

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