Lord Lyons (Vol. 1&2) - Thomas Wodehouse Legh Newton

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not fear that; he only wished me to tell him privately and confidentially. I said that on that understanding, I would tell him that the term was seven days. He then said that much time would be lost if I did not let him have a copy of your despatch 'unofficially and informally'; that so much depended upon the wording of it, that it was impossible to come to a decision without reading it. I told him that the only difficulty I had about giving it to him at once officially was that the seven days would at once begin to run. He said that was very true, but I might let him have it on the understanding that no one but himself and the President should know that I had done so. I was very glad to let him have it on these terms. It will give time for the Packet (which is indeed already due) to arrive with M. Thouvenel's Despatch to M. Mercier, and in the meantime give Mr. Seward who is now on the peace side of the Cabinet time to work with the President before the affair comes before the Cabinet itself. I sent the Despatch to him in an envelope marked 'Private and Confidential.' Almost immediately afterwards he came here. He told me he was pleased to find that the Despatch was courteous and friendly, and not dictatorial or menacing. There was however one question more which he must ask me, without an answer to which he could not act, but at the same time he must have the answer only in strict confidence between himself and me. I had told him in confidence that I was to wait seven days for an answer on the subject of the redress we required. Supposing he was within the seven days to send me a refusal, or a proposal to discuss the question? I told him that my instructions were positive and left me no discretion. If the answer was not satisfactory, and particularly if it did not include the immediate surrender of the Prisoners, I could not accept it.

      I was not sorry to tell him this in the way I did. I avoided all menace which could be an obstacle to the U.S. yielding, while I did the only thing which will make them yield if they ever do, let them know that we were really in earnest.

      I don't think it likely they will give in, but I do not think it impossible they may do so, particularly if the next news from England brings note of warlike preparations, and determination on the part of the Government and people.

      Mr. Seward has taken up all my time, which is my excuse for this scrawl. I shall be able to write to you to-morrow.

      The second interview took place on the 21st, and the following letter explains the reasons for allowing Mr. Seward an additional two days—a happy expedient, which probably contributed in great measure to the ultimate solution of the difficulty—and also graphically depicts the general uncertainty and alarm which prevailed.

      * * * * *

      Lord Lyons to Lord Russell.

       Washington, Dec. 23, 1861.

      I have followed, I think to the letter, in my communications with Mr. Seward on the Trent affair, the plan laid down in your private letter of the 1st. The packet is unfortunately so late that M. Mercier will not receive the promised instruction from M. Thouvenel until to-morrow, but I could not have again put off communicating your despatch to Mr. Seward without an appearance of vacillation which would have been fatal. No time was practically lost by my consenting to the delay from Saturday to Monday, for whether the seven days expired on Saturday next or Monday next, I should have been equally unable to announce the result to you sooner than by the packet which will sail from New York on Wednesday, the 1st January.

      I feel little or no doubt that I shall have an answer of some kind before the seven days are over. What it will be depends very much upon the news which will be brought by the packet to-morrow. If it convinces the people here that it is surrender or war, without any hope of a diversion in their favour by France, our terms will perhaps be complied with. If there is any hope left that there will be only a rupture of Diplomatic Relations, or that we shall accept the mediation of France, no concession will be made. There is no doubt that both government and people are very much frightened, but still I do not think anything but the first shot will convince the bulk of the population that England will really go to war.

      M. Mercier went of his own accord to Mr. Seward the day before yesterday and expressed strongly his own conviction that the choice lay only between a compliance with the demands of England and war. He begged Mr. Seward to dismiss all idea of assistance from France, and not to be led away by the vulgar notion that the Emperor would gladly see England embroiled with the United States in order to pursue his own plans in Europe without opposition. He said that if he could be of use, by making these sentiments known to Senators and other influential people, he was quite ready to do so. Mr. Seward asked him whether he had received special instructions from his Government on the subject. M. Mercier said no, but that he expected some immediately, and that he had no doubt whatever what they would be. Mr. Seward did not accept his offer to prepare influential men here for giving way, but merely said, 'Let us wait and see what your instructions really turn out to be.'

      It is announced that General Scott is more than halfway across the Atlantic on his way here, I suppose in the hope of appearing again on the stage as the Grand Pacificator. If he gives the sanction of his name to a compliance with our terms he will certainly render the compliance easier to the Government and less unpalatable to the people. But I cannot foresee any circumstances, under which I should be justified in departing from your instructions. Unless I receive an announcement that the prisoners will be surrendered to us, and at least not a refusal to make an apology before noon on this day week, no other course will be open to me than to demand my passports and those of all the members of the Legation and go away at once. In case of a non-compliance, or of the time elapsing without any answer, it will probably be desirable for me to take myself, the Secretary of Legation, and the greater part of the Attachés off at once, leaving, if necessary, one or two of the junior attachés to pack up the archives and follow as quickly as possible. It is a case in which, above all others, delay will be dangerous. I am so convinced that unless we give our friends here a good lesson this time, we shall have the same trouble with them again very soon, under less advantageous circumstances, that even my regard for them leads me to think it all important that they should receive the lesson. Surrender or war will have a very good effect upon them, but anything less will make them more self-confident than ever, and lead them on to their ruin.

      I do not think there is any danger of the Government's deliberately taking any step to precipitate hostilities upon my departure. On the contrary, if they let me go, it will be in the hope that the interruption of diplomatic relations will be all they have to fear from us. But they have so little control over their officers, that I think we must be prepared for acts of violence from subordinates, if they have the chance of performing them, in cases where no immediate danger is incurred. I shall suggest to the Governors and Naval Officers to take reasonable precautions against such acts. A filibustering expedition of the Irish on the frontiers of Canada, to damage the canals, or something of that sort, may also be on the cards.

      It is generally believed that the Government will insist on an immediate advance of the Grand Army of the Potomac, in the hope of covering a surrender to England with (to use President Lincoln's phraseology) a 'sugar coating' of glory, in another quarter if possible.

      You will perhaps be surprised to find Mr. Seward on the side of peace. He does not like the look of the spirit he has called up. Ten months of office have dispelled many of his illusions. I presume that he no longer believes in the existence of a Union Party in the South, in the return of the South to the arms of the North in case of a foreign war; in his power to frighten the nations of Europe by great words; in the ease with which the U.S. could crush rebellion with one hand and chastise Europe with the other; in the notion that the relations with England in particular are safe playthings to be used for the amusement of the American people. He sees himself in a very painful dilemma. But he knows his countrymen well enough to believe that if he can convince them that there is a real danger of war, they may forgive him for the humiliation of yielding to England, while it would be fatal to him to be the author of a disastrous foreign war. How he will act eventually, I cannot say. It will be hard for him to face present unpopularity, and if the President and Cabinet throw the whole burden on his shoulders, he may refuse to bear it. I hope that without embarrassing him with official threats, I have made him aware himself of the extreme danger of refusing our terms.

      Since I have been writing this letter, M. Mercier has come in and related to me more in detail the conversation he had with

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