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charge of about two hundred private letters. The messenger was arrested by the United States authorities, and imprisoned. The letters, of course, were seized, but so also was the Foreign Office bag, addressed to Lord Russell, and a Foreign Office bag has always been considered as one of the most sacred objects upon earth. The United States Government, professing that a most serious offence had been committed, and taking advantage of an error in the passport of the messenger, sent the bag over to London by special messenger, and demanded the recall of the unfortunate Consul Bunch. The opportunity, in short, was too good to be lost. When the bag was eventually opened, in Downing Street, it was found to contain nothing but despatches and a few letters from British governesses and servants who had been permitted to make use of it in consequence of the discontinuance of the post. In fact, it was an essentially trivial matter, but the tension between the two countries was so great that Lord Russell thought that it might possibly lead to a rupture of official relations, and sent the following instructions:—

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      Lord Russell to Lord Lyons.

       Abergeldie Castle, Sept. 13, 1861.

      It is not very probable, but it is possible that the complaint against Bunch may be a preliminary to the breaking off of official intercourse between the two countries.

      Your name has been kept out of the correspondence on both sides, but if the Envoys are to be withdrawn, you will be sent away from Washington.

      In that case I wish you to express in the most dignified and guarded terms that the course taken by the Washington Government must be the result of a misconception on their part, and that you shall retire to Canada in the persuasion that the misunderstanding will soon cease, and the former friendly relations be restored.

      It is very desirable to obtain an explanation from Consul Bunch, and you may authorize Admiral Milne, after due notice, to Mr. Seward, to send a gunboat to Charleston for the purpose.

      Consul Bunch, in spite of his troubles, remained for over a year in Charleston after this incident. Eventually the American Government revoked his exequatur, and he made a semi-state return to England in a man-of-war.

      In the late autumn, Mr. Seward began to show signs of returning to his earlier manner, and it was plain enough that he had only been seeking to gain time by his moderation. He now maintained that any communication between a Foreign Government and the Confederate Government was an offence against the United States, and it became more and more necessary for England and France to come to some distinct agreement as to what the nature and extent of those communications should be. Mr. Seward's contention was obviously absurd. South Carolina had seceded nearly a year previously. State after State had followed its example; the United States Government had not made the slightest progress in restoring its authority, and exercised no power or influence in any portion of the new Confederation. On the other hand, there was a de facto government in that Confederation which was obeyed without question and exercised the functions of government with perfect regularity. It was clear that a government which was without the means of protecting British subjects had no right to prevent us from holding necessary and informal communications with the only power to which British subjects could look for protection and redress of grievances. Cases of British subjects being compulsorily enlisted, of British goods being seized on board vessels captured by Southern privateers, and instances of a similar nature were of constant occurrence. It was preposterous that under these conditions British Consuls should be expected to refrain from communication with the Confederate authorities. Fortunately, although the British interests involved were infinitely the more important, French interests were affected too, and upon this, as upon most other difficult questions, Lord Lyons received the hearty and loyal support of his French colleague, M. Mercier.

      On November 8, an incident of the gravest nature occurred, which seemed likely to render futile all the laborious efforts which had been made to keep the peace between England and the United States.

      The English mail steamer Trent, one day out from Havannah, was met by the American warship San Jacinto and stopped by a shell fired across her bows. She was then boarded by a party of marines, and the officer in command of the party demanded a list of the passengers. The production of the list having been refused, the officer stated that he knew the Confederate delegates to Europe, Messrs. Mason and Slidell, to be on board, and insisted upon their surrender. Whilst the discussion was in progress, Mr. Slidell made his appearance and disclosed his identity. Thereupon, in defiance of the protests of the captain of the Trent and of the Government mail agent, Mr. Slidell and Mr. Mason, together with their secretaries, were seized and carried off by force to the San Jacinto, and taken as prisoners to New York.

      The news arrived in England on November 27, and, naturally, caused the greatest excitement and indignation. It was felt that the limits of concession had been reached, that a stand must now be made if we ever intended to maintain our national rights, and, as a proof that they were in earnest, the Government decided upon the immediate despatch of 8000 men to Canada.

      The first private letter from Lord Lyons was written on November 19.

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      Lord Lyons to Lord Russell.

       Washington, Nov. 19, 1861.

      I have written so much officially on this unfortunate affair of Mason and Slidell that I have hardly left myself time to thank you for your kind private letter of the 2nd.

      I am told confidently that orders were given at Washington which led to the capture on board the Trent, and that they were signed by Mr. Seward without the knowledge of the President. I do not vouch for the truth of this. I am afraid he is not sorry to have a question with us like this, in which it is difficult for France to take a part.

      Lord Lyons had made up his mind from the first that, as it was impossible for him to form a correct opinion as to what had actually occurred, the only thing to do was to maintain an attitude of complete reserve. In the absence of authentic information, he felt that on the one hand it would be unsafe to ask for a reparation which might be inadequate; on the other hand he was reluctant to make a demand which might be unnecessarily great. Consequently, he resolved to take no steps until he received instructions from home, refused to say a word on the subject either officially or unofficially, and instructed the Consuls to maintain silence.

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      Lord Lyons to Lord Russell.

       Washington, Nov. 22, 1861.

      I have all along been expecting some such blow as the capture on board the Trent. Turn out how it may, it must I fear produce an effect on public opinion in both countries which will go far to disconcert all my peaceful plans and hopes. I am so worn out with the never-ending labour of keeping things smooth, under the discouragement of the doubt whether by so doing I am not after all only leading these people to believe that they may go all lengths with us with impunity that I am sometimes half tempted to wish that the worst may have come already. However I do not allow this feeling to influence my conduct, and I have done nothing which can in the least interfere with any course which you may take concerning the affair of the Trent.

      If the effect on the people and Government of this country were the only thing to be considered, it would be a case for an extreme measure one way or the other. If the capture be unjustifiable we should ask for the immediate release of the prisoners, promptly, imperatively, with a determination to act at once, if the demand were refused. If, on the other hand, the capture be justifiable, we should at once say so and declare that we have no complaint to make on the subject. Even so, we should not escape the evil of encouraging the Americans in the belief that we shall bear anything from them. For they have made up their minds that they have insulted us, although the fear of the consequences prevents their giving vent to their exultation. They would not however consider it so manifest a proof of yielding on our part if we at once declared that we had nothing to complain of, as if we did complain without obtaining full reparation. Of course, however, I am well aware that public opinion in this country is not the only thing to be thought of in this question. While maintaining entire reserve on the question itself, I have avoided any demonstration

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