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in a return to reckless conduct and language towards Europe in general, and an attempt to obtain the support of France against England.

      On the other side, however, were now ranged the President, Mr. Seward, and the more moderate men. Mr. Seward had now, strange to say, become a kind of guarantee for peace, for after the concessions he had made, a foreign war would have been fatal to his reputation, and it was only fair to assume that his conversion to a more moderate course was genuine. Still there was danger to England from both sides. If the party of violence should show itself reckless enough to risk anything, the moderate party might conceivably provoke a foreign war either as an excuse for giving up the contest with the South, or to divert popular irritation after having abandoned the contest as hopeless.

      Meanwhile, Mr. Seward's demeanour towards England had changed so much that, early in 1862, his friendliness had become actually embarrassing. Quite a considerable force, according to British standards, amounting to something like 12,000 men, had been already despatched, or were under orders to proceed to Canada, and Mr. Seward now made the surprising offer that these troops and stores should be landed at Portland, a port in the United States, and sent overland to Canada. However well meant the invitation, it would manifestly have been most imprudent to accept it. It must have been plain to the densest understanding that these troops and stores were only being sent to Canada in order that we might be prepared, if unhappily a rupture should take place between England and the United States. Therefore, if troops and stores so conveyed were eventually used against the United States, there would have been a violent outcry of treachery against us throughout the country. The danger, too, of some unpleasant incident occurring during the landing or during the passage of the trains with which it would be impossible to deal, was so obvious, that the invitation was declined with thanks. Too much love is sometimes almost more inconvenient in diplomacy than hatred.

      Mr. Seward's anxiety, at this time, however, to show himself a friend to England continued, and he took particular care to point out, in proof of his new attitude, that up till the last moment (December 26) he had been the only person in the Government who was in favour of the surrender of Slidell and Mason, and that President Lincoln had been opposed to surrender and was in favour of arbitration only. In fact, Mr. Seward appeared to be seized with the desire of overwhelming not only England, but France as well, with demonstrations of friendship and confidence, and it is perhaps not uncharitable to assume that two reasons were contributory causes to this agreeable change of tactics. One of these was that the appearance of a good understanding with these two Powers would exercise a beneficial influence upon the money market; the other was the fear of one or both of them recognizing the South and breaking up the blockade. Probably Mr. Seward's fears of French interference were increased by a visit paid by M. Mercier, in the spring, to Richmond, the Confederate Headquarters. M. Mercier, whether instructed from home or not, was bent upon this visit, which the United States Government could not prevent, but which they could hardly be expected to view with favour, and after the manner of French diplomatists of the period, he was probably unable to resist the temptation of trying to effect a striking coup, although there was not the slightest reason to suspect him of any disloyalty to his English colleague. Lord Lyons wisely declined to accompany him, and prophesied that he would end by getting into trouble, which proved to be the case, for the journey naturally gave rise to all sorts of comments. As will be seen from the following letter, both M. Mercier and Mr. Seward drew incorrect conclusions from the information derived during this visit; the former being convinced that the subjugation of the South was an impossibility, and the latter confidently believing that the end of the war was close at hand.

      * * * * *

      Lord Lyons to Lord Russell.

       Washington, April 23, 1862.

      M. Mercier came back from Richmond yesterday. He went soon after his arrival to see Mr. Seward and came afterwards to me. He is persuaded that the confidence and the resolution of the Confederates are increased rather than diminished by recent events. If they are worsted anywhere they will still not surrender. They will destroy their stores of cotton and tobacco, and all other property which they cannot remove. They will retire into the interior of their country and defy the North to follow them. They will endure any privations and sufferings rather than be again united to the North. Their unanimity and devotion to the cause are wonderful. They are not carrying on a war in the usual manner for dominion as the North is: they consider themselves to be fighting for their homes and their liberty, and are making and are ready to make any sacrifices.

      Such is the impression which M. Mercier says was made upon him by what he saw and heard.

      I asked him whether he had obtained any specific information as to the extent of the naval and military resources of the Confederates. He said that they admitted that they were in want of arms and ammunition, and said that but for this they could keep a very much larger army in the field. They had no difficulty about men. On the contrary, they had more than they could arm. They had another 'Merrimac' nearly ready at Norfolk: they had an iron-plated vessel on the James River: they had iron-plated vessels nearly ready at New Orleans. If they lost New Orleans and all the seaboard, they would be as far from being subdued as ever.

      I inquired of M. Mercier whether he had entered upon any particular matter of business with the members of the Confederate Government. He said he had avoided the appearance of having come to transact business: that the French tobacco would be spared if the rest was burnt, provided it could be distinguished and separated from that belonging to private persons.

      I asked M. Mercier if anything had passed on the subject of the position of the Consuls. He said that if the idea of calling upon them to take out exequaturs from the Confederate Government had ever been entertained, it was now abandoned; there appeared to be a very good disposition towards foreigners in general; less good perhaps towards the English as a nation than others, perhaps because more had been expected from that country than from any other, and the disappointment had consequently been greater. On the other hand, the Confederate leaders professed to have abandoned all expectation of succour from Europe: indeed, they declared that all they desired was such an interruption of the blockade as would enable them to get arms.

      M. Mercier said that he was more than ever convinced that the restoration of the old Union was impossible; that he believed the war would, if the Powers of Europe exercised no influence upon it, last for years; that he thought that in the end the independence of the South must be recognized, and that the governments of Europe should be on the watch for a favourable opportunity of doing this in such a manner as to end the war. The present opportunity would, however, he thought, be peculiarly unfavourable.

      I did not express any opinion as to the policy to be eventually pursued by France or England, but I entirely agreed with M. Mercier that there was nothing to do at the present moment but watch events.

      This morning Mr. Seward spoke to me about M. Mercier's journey. He said that M. Mercier had, probably without being altogether aware of it himself, obtained very valuable information for the U.S. Government. He himself was quite convinced from M. Mercier's account of what had passed, that the Confederates were about to make a last effort: that they had their last armies in the field; and that their last resources were brought into action. Their talking of retiring into the interior was idle. If the U.S. were undisputed masters of the border states, including Tennessee, and of the sea coast, there would be no occasion for any further fighting. Anybody who liked to retire into the interior was welcome to do so and stay there till he was tired. Mr. Seward went on to say that he had had some difficulty in preventing M. Mercier's journey making an unfavourable impression upon the public. With this view he had caused it to be mentioned in the papers that M. Mercier had had a long interview with him on his return from Richmond; he had in the evening taken M. Mercier to the President, which also he should put in the newspapers: to-night he was to dine with M. Mercier to meet the captain of the French ship of war which had brought M. Mercier back: to-morrow the President would pay a visit to that ship.

      I suppose the truth lies somewhere between M. Mercier's views of the prospects of the South and Mr. Seward's. Mr. Seward was of course anxious to weaken any impression M. Mercier's language may have made upon me.

      The Slave Trade Treaty has met with much more general approval than I expected. It

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