Submarines, Mines and Torpedoes in the War - Charles W. Domville-Fife

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waters of the Heligoland Bight and succeeded in getting within reconnoitering distance of the German submerged harbour defences, behind which lurk their big ships.

      With what degree of success this new opening or submarine phase in naval warfare has been attended is shown by the sinking, during the first few weeks of the war, of the British cruiser Amphion, a vessel of 3,440 tons displacement, completed in 1912, and carrying ten 4-inch guns, with a loss of 131 men, by contact with a German mine; the destruction of the German submarine U.15 by the British cruiser Birmingham; the sinking of an Austrian torpedo-boat by a mine off Pola; the torpedoing of H.M.S. Pathfinder, a fleet scout of about 3,000 tons displacement, completed in 1905–6, by a German submarine; the destruction of the Wilson liner Runo by a mine; the sinking of the German cruiser Hela, a vessel of 2,000 tons displacement, built in 1896, by the British submarine E 9, and the torpedoing of the British armoured cruisers Aboukir, Hogue and Cressy—vessels of 12,000 tons displacement, carrying two 9.2-inch and twelve 6-inch guns besides twelve 12-pounder quick-firing guns and two torpedo tubes—by German submarines concealed behind a trawler engaged in laying mines, over which the Dutch flag had been hoisted as a blind.

      This is in addition to the lamentable destruction of much life and property belonging to neutral powers caused by the laying of German floating mines on the trade-routes.

      To the Allies this submarine phase did not come unexpected. The British Naval yards in conjunction with the big shipbuilding and engineering firms, such as Messrs. Vickers Ltd., Barrow-in-Furness; Messrs. Armstrong, Whitworth and Co. Ltd., Newcastle-on-Tyne; the Whitehead Torpedo Company Ltd., Weymouth; Messrs. Siebe, Gorman and Co. Ltd., London; and Messrs. Scotts’ Shipbuilding and Engineering Co. Ltd., as well as many other firms and individual submarine experts had been engaged for many years in solving one after another the problems continually arising in the practical application of all forms of submarine warfare. The first British naval submarines were launched in 1901–2 from Messrs. Vickers’ works at Barrow, and the subsequent growth of our submarine flotillas has been rapid both in number of vessels and in size and armament. The British submarine fleet now numbers 82 vessels. The original boats from which the British type has since been evolved were built from the designs of Mr. John P. Holland, an American inventor.

      To France belongs the honour of being the first naval power to adopt the submarine torpedo-boat as a vessel of war; and the first vessel, the Gymnôte, was launched in 1888, but it was not until 1893 that the Republic commenced the construction of her now powerful submarine flotilla, numbering 92 vessels.

      The first Russian submarine was launched at Kronstadt in 1902, and since that date the Russian flotilla has steadily increased until it now numbers 37 vessels.

      Japan commenced the construction of what is now a powerful and up-to-date flotilla of seventeen vessels by the acquisition of a British-Holland boat in 1904.

      Turning to Germany we find at first a great reluctance on the part of the Ministry of Marine to provide for the construction of submarines, but in 1905–6 this initial hesitation was overcome and the two vessels U.1 and U.2 were launched. Since then the belief in a powerful submarine flotilla steadily grew until at the moment when war was declared Germany possessed no less than 30 to 36 submarines of a very efficient type. The Austro-Hungarian Navy did not adopt submarines as units of the Fleet until 1909, and now possess only six small vessels.

      From this brief resumé of the growth of the submarine fleets of the six great naval Powers at war, it will be seen that in point of numbers as well as in priority, bringing with it practical experience, Great Britain and France have a very appreciable superiority. It must, however, be left for succeeding chapters to describe in detail the steady growth and present size and capabilities of the submarine fleets at war.

      The lessons taught by the Russo-Japanese war were not lost on the British Admiralty, and special methods had been prepared to deal with submarine attack in its various forms. Having in mind the destruction caused to both Russian and Japanese warships by submarine mines—especially those of the “offensive contact” type, which are moored to the bottom, float just under the surface and explode immediately on contact; and in the Russo-Japanese War were responsible for the sinking of the Japanese battleships Hatsuse and Yashima as well as the Russian battleship Petropavlovsk and the cruiser Boyarin—the British Admiralty foresaw the danger to which both warships and merchantmen would be exposed in time of war if the seas strewn with these mines could not be quickly cleared, and a new type of auxiliary came into being. This was the mine-sweeper, and eight vessels of the old torpedo-gunboat type were fitted out for the work. In addition to these, however, the Admiralty purchased a considerable number of steam fishing trawlers, and fitted them with mine-sweeping appliances, and made arrangements for a large fleet of similar vessels to be placed at the disposal of the navy in the event of war. In order to man this new mine-sweeping fleet with experienced sailors on the outbreak of war, a new section of the Royal Naval Reserve was created in 1911. This is known as the “Trawler Section,” and consists of 142 skippers and 1,136 men taken from the fishing fleet.

      Realizing the value of the submarine mine in certain cases, the British Admiralty went further and created a small mine-laying fleet from seven old second-class cruisers, which had their aft-decks cleared and provided with rails for a large number of mines to be run down and slid over the stern into the water as the vessels steamed along, thus quickly laying a mine-field. But as the laying of mines, speaking generally, is a defensive mode of warfare and the policy of the British Navy—owing to its supremacy—is attack and not defence, the mine-laying fleet is of second importance to the sweeping fleet, the work of which, although much augmented by additional small steamers pressed into service, was, during the first few weeks of the war, of a nature more arduous and dangerous than will ever be realised. Hundreds of German mines were swept up, and hundreds more were exploded by being dragged into contact with each other during the progress of sweeping operations.

      What the clearance of these vast fields of floating and anchored mines in the North Sea meant to the British Navy, engaged in blockading the German Fleet, and to the Mercantile Marine not only of England, France, Russia and Belgium, but also to that of the neutral countries, it is perhaps a little difficult to realize until one remembers that several hundred British and French warships were patrolling the North Sea and Channel, and, at the opening of hostilities, there were hundreds of merchantmen homeward bound whose course lay across this mine-infested sea. Many of these vessels had on board not only valuable cargoes of food, raw material for manufacture and gold and silver bullion, but also officers and men returning from various parts of the world to rejoin their regiments. Again, the Expeditionary Force had to be transported across the Channel to France. This could not be attempted until a guarantee had been given by the Navy that the seas were clear of hostile warships, submarines and mines. The fleet blockading the Frisian coast had to be supplied with coal and fresh food; and last but by no means least it was of vital importance to the Allied Armies in the Field that the whole coast-line from Bordeaux to Antwerp, forming the rear and left-flank, should be accessible to friendly shipping. It is not difficult to realize what would have been the effect had thousands of these deadly German contact mines been allowed to float unhindered in these narrow seas, for, notwithstanding the magnificent effort made by thousands of seamen in hundreds of mine-sweepers assisted by seaplanes, many vessels—some belonging to neutral powers and others to the enemy themselves—were destroyed before the seas could be effectively swept clear, the hostile mine-layers destroyed or chased into port and there blockaded with their cowardly fleet.

      The torpedo has long been recognised as one of the most effective of naval arms. It is carried by every modern warship afloat, but it is essentially the arm of the submarine and of the small and fast surface vessel. For a torpedo attack to be successful it is absolutely necessary for the vessel carrying the weapon to get within about 1,000 yards of the object of attack. The difficulty of accomplishing this manœuvre with an enemy on the alert is easily apparent, but if the attacking vessel can creep up to within torpedo range unobserved her chances of sinking the enemy are decidedly good, and it is the quality possessed by the submarine of making herself invisible

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