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On the contrary, understanding the process of disintegration is a most valuable method for a philosophy of history that seeks to detect historical truth by examining its demise. Although not explicitly stated in the letter, Benjamin’s theories of truth and allegory – as presented in Origin of the German Trauerspiel are most decisive here: both Adorno and Scholem were familiar with it (Adorno, in fact, held seminars on the book in the early 1930s in Frankfurt), and it arguably shaped their views on the concept of historical truth. For Adorno, such disintegration of experience and truth is the process that generates myth. When truth and experience can no longer be recognized or communicated in their immediacy, they tend to be translated into myth. These are the historical origins of myth and of mythical thinking. These are, at the same time, the very mystical truths and experiences that the Enlightenment sought to annihilate, but failed to do so, since it could revert back to myth only by creating ever newer mythologies. Adorno describes this process here as “the transformation of spiritualism into myth.” This, in a nutshell, is the argument that will be unfolded in the Dialectic of Enlightenment’s diagnosis, namely that “Myth is already enlightenment, and enlightenment reverts to mythology.”33

      It is fair to suggest that, while Adorno has never truly delved into the depths of Kabbalistic mysticism – or, for that matter, of any theological doctrine as such – he was indeed interested in its content and familiar with its ideas to the extent that he could reappropriate them for his own philosophical purposes. As noted above, having read Scholem’s Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism, Adorno acknowledged the significance and productive potential of Lurianic Kabbalah. Initially developed by Rabbi Isaac Luria (1534–1572) in the community of Safed, located in the Galilee region of Palestine, and further articulated by his disciples (Luria himself produced no written texts; his teachings were transcribed by his disciples), Lurianic Kabbalah is a mystical theory of redemption. It provides a cosmogonic theory of the world’s creation, as formed by an omnipotent God and shattered by His very omnipotence. Such shattering is deemed a crisis of destruction, which places the potential of mending and restitution in the hands of human beings. Metaphysical redemption depends, accordingly, on human agency. Luria calls it “Tikkun,” mending. Although it is impossible to assert with absolute evidence, there is good reason to consider Adorno’s final aphorism of Minima Moralia to be a response to such Lurianic metaphysics of shattering and restitution:

      The only philosophy which can be responsibly practiced in face of despair is the attempt to contemplate all things as they would present themselves from the standpoint of redemption. Knowledge has no light but that shed on the world by redemption: all else is reconstruction, mere technique. Perspectives must be fashioned that displace and estrange the world, reveal it to be, with its rifts and crevices, as indigent and distorted as it will appear one day in the messianic light.35

      Beyond the use of theological, soteriological, and arguably Kabbalistic terminology, it seems that Adorno’s very argument on the scope of redemption provides a response – which requires human agency and action – to what he perceives as “damaged life”: the destruction of natural, individual life by late capitalism and its ideology. Viewed from this perspective, the subject of Adorno’s book of aphorisms largely resonates with the destruction of divine powers in the mystical story of the world’s creation in Luria’s Kabbalistic metaphysics. In both cases – and this point is crucial to Adorno as much as it is crucial for Luria – metaphysical, theological redemption depends on ethics: on human, moral action.

      In most cases, Adorno and Scholem maintained an amicable, gentle tone in their replies to each other, often suppressing and concealing dissensions and disagreements. But such dissensions and disagreements belong to the overall conversation, both on personal and on scholarly matters. Scholem, in particular, did not spare his critique of Adorno’s writings, especially when they touched upon two matters about which he had profound views: Marxism and Zionism. The latter was particularly important to Scholem.

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