This Is Epistemology - J. Adam Carter

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to indirect realists, IOAs that have all the properties they appear to have. They are present in cases of veridical perception as well as cases of illusion and hallucination. They are distinct from all OMOs and cannot be observed by anyone who isn't the subject of the experience in which they appear. They are for that reason believed by some to be creatures of mystery. The standard objections to indirect realism focus on sense data. Some would argue that they generate epistemological problems where none should be found. Some would argue that they are spooky to believe in.

      2.40 We've already seen a glimpse of the epistemological problems that are supposed to arise for the indirect realist. If the indirect realist wants to account for the possibility of perceptual justification and knowledge, she needs to address the argument above which seems to show that indirect realism is incompatible with liberal foundationalism. Indirect realists have two options here. First, they might reply that this argument fails because experience gives us all the evidence we need to believe in OMOs even if we're never directly aware of them. Second, they might try to show that we have additional evidence that secures our right to believe in the OMOs that the indirect realists claim we're never directly aware of.

      2.42 One way to develop the second line of response is to consider the possibility of acquiring evidence that connects IOAs to OMOs that goes beyond the evidence provided by a single experience. The indirect realist might grant that we have better evidence to believe things about IOAs than OMOs but still insist that over time we get good enough evidence to believe that OMOs resemble IOAs in certain salient ways. They might try to model justification and knowledge concerning OMOs on familiar examples of scientific inference from the observed to the unobserved. Here's Frank Jackson (1977):

      Consider a familiar example, the Molecular theory of gases. The Molecular theory of gases explained the various experimentally observed properties of gases … and enabled the prediction of new properties which were subsequently experimentally verified. On this basis and prior to the direct observation of molecules, it became universally accepted that gases are made up of sub‐microscopic particles (molecules). And similar remarks apply to the whole development of the atomic theory in all its forms.

      (1977, p. 143)

      The lesson that Jackson wants us to draw from these cases is that we should be open to the idea that we can learn about that which we cannot directly observe by observing distinct things directly. This includes knowledge of the sub‐microscopic and of the external world.

      2.43 Although these points suggest that we shouldn't dismiss indirect realism too swiftly, problems nonetheless remain for the view. Let's briefly consider two related ones that bring out some perplexities of the view that may have thus far flown under the radar. And on this score, let's think again about Price's cricket ball. According to the indirect realist, when you see the ball there are two distinct objects of awareness:

      IOA: the immediate object of awareness is sense data, something distinct from every perceptible material object and something that has all the properties it appears to have.

      On this approach, if the experience of the OMO is veridical, a subject will be aware of two things that are white and round, a sense data and a cricket ball.

      2.44 The first odd feature of indirect realism we want to bring out is that the view implies that there are two distinct round and white things. One of these is located where the cricket ball is. (Why? Because one of these things, the OMO, is the cricket ball.) What about the IOA? Where is it? Well, the Argument from Hallucination tells us that it could continue to exist and continue to be just as round and just as white if, say, neuroscientists destroyed the cricket ball but stimulated your brain in such a way that your conscious experience continued just as it would when seeing the ball under normal conditions. In this case of hallucination, there would be no white and round thing left where the cricket ball was. At least, we cannot find anything round and white there. So, where could it be? One natural thought at this juncture is to say the white and round IOA is “in the head” of the person having the experience. However, this answer begins to look less viable on further inspection. Just suppose that the neuroscientists take the suggestion seriously, cut the person open, and discover there is nothing white and round there, either. Of course, you press back and say that what you meant was that the white and round IOA is “in the mind” of the perceiver, not literally in the head. In taking this line, though, consider what you'd be committed to: you'd be committed to the idea that there could exist white things and round things that exist in the world even if we destroy every white material object and every round material object. This seems quite weird, doesn't it? How could there be round things that exist if there are no round material objects?

      2.45 The second oddity has to do with location. We sometimes suffer from perceptual illusions where things are closer than they appear. How do indirect realists account for this? Easily! They offer the account just sketched and say that the experience is illusory because the location of the IOA differs from the location of the OMO. (Remember that this is generally how they account for illusion. The Phenomenal Principle tells us that whenever it appears there is something F, the subject is aware of something that is F. The indirect realists say that this bearer of F‐ness is sense data and that it is distinct from every OMO.) Thus, as W.H.F. Barnes (1944) notes, indirect realists cannot plausibly deny that sense data have the properties they appear to have:

      The problem here is that the indirect realists cannot plausibly claim that sense data have the spatial properties we attribute to them.

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