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of semiosis is open-ended. In my opinion, this implies that a dialogue process could lead the involved parties to undergo a change in their self-understanding as denominations. If this is indeed the case, regardless of whether the resulting situation was one of greater commonality or of estrangement, their relationship would nonetheless be altered. Secondly, and perhaps more conspicuously, is the fact that Körtner sees a contradiction between a programme of unity, on the one hand, and a skill to discover and understand family resemblances, on the other hand. In doing so, he denies the possibility that the discovery of family resemblances in itself is a programme of unity. The hermeneutics he approves of may very well be found to encourage substantial steps towards the unity of the Church. Additionally, the phrase “programme of unity” is misleading. Nobody engaged in ecumenical processes that aim at a broader consensus is willing to pursue a programme installed by a higher faculty. Instead, those committed to consensus claim that union is at hand in Christ Himself and, consequently, that Church union is His work.

      There is still another, a fourth consideration, factor (d), which is derived from denominational studies and thus cannot be found in philosophical or sociological conceptions of identity. It is the fact that denominations tend to display themselves ad extra as homogenous formations. Ad intra, however, they allow a comparably broad range of self-interpretation. This may partly be due to strategic ideas or to differing styles in the organisation of Church leadership. However, this is primarily due to the fact that the identity of a denomination is a highly complex phenomenon and thus a matter of permanent debate. This can easily be seen in denominations that do not have an an overarching hierarchy, as is the case for example with the Baptists and Mennonites. Their self-understanding implies the autonomy of every single congregation. Therefore, the question of Baptist (and, respectively, of Mennonite) identity is under permanent debate. This includes the existence of factions as well as a considerable amount of distress. The search for identity ad intra may be inspiring and stimulating at times, but it can also be quite gruelling. This being said, there isn’t a single member of one of these denominations that would request for a governing body of their Church to be given the right to determine their denominational identity. Despite the differing terms and conditions of the various institutions of Church leadership, this holds true for the vast majority of Christian Churches. Currently the Anglican Communion finds this to be distressing, whereas others explicitly make hermeneutic use of what can be called “differentiations within a denomination.”¹¹

      Any ecumenical hermeneutics, regardless of whether they are inclined towards consensus or towards diversity, must take this fact into account. In accordance with Körtner’s terms, which are in turn drawn from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s concept of family resemblance in language games, one may say that it is true that denominations differ from one another and that steps toward Church unity cannot be enacted. Instead, they must be discovered through the process of understanding. But in doing so one should see that a denomination’s identity is a multitude of interpretations relating to one another just like language games do in family resemblance. Therefore, the key presupposition held by distinctive ecumenics that denominational identities are stable and well-defined is fundamentally debatable.

      Thus the tradition of ecumenics aiming at consensus still has some sustainable reasons. Nevertheless, even those who endorse it see the danger of one-sidedness. They affirm that a consensus need not, and indeed cannot, be the principal goal of ecumenical deliberations. (see Chapter 5 for an examination of the model of differentiated consensus). In general, however, doctrinal consensus is not the primary goal in ecumenics (hereafter, I use “doctrine” to refer to official formulations of the faith such as dogmas, confessions, and other expressions which are viewed as vital for a denomination’s identity; “theology” is a more individual form of expression that aims at the intellectual clarification of an issue and that is normally carried out by single theologians—although undertaken with a sense of ecclesial responsibility).¹² Actually, the aim is to gain good reasons to acknowledge that the Church’s Lord is present among partner denomination’s believers. It is, of course, desirable to acquire an understanding of another denomination’s doctrines and theology, but not merely for its own sake. Such understanding is rather helpful in exploring the central issue of Christ’s presence within the partner denomination. Insofar as this doctrinal understanding facilitates the discernment of the presence of Christ among the denomination’s members, the fundamental aim of ecumenical hermeneutics is achieved. Likewise, a denomination’s doubt concerning the worship and ecclesial practice of a partner denomination fosters ongoing labour to promote mutual acceptance. Consensus is a means to that end, but never the end itself. Acceptance stands in contrast with uniformity. Among other reasons, this is why Protestant theologies reject the idea of simply returning to Rome, that Roman Catholic officials speak of as well as practice through the ordination of former Anglican priests into the Catholic priesthood.

       The Book’s Main Task: The Ecumenical Exchange of Gifts¹³

      This overview of the current state of ecumenical hermeneutics does not attempt to be anything more than an introduction. A comprehensive analysis of this material is simply not possible given the scope of this work. Additionally, the at times distracting multitude of problems in ecumenism calls into question the notion that there might simply be one ecumenical method and style. This is why even the more detailed exposition in the concluding chapter is more or less an outline. However, I want to introduce one key concept which is fiercely discussed in theology today, but scarcely addressed specifically in ecumenical theology, namely, the notion of gift. It was in anthropology and social science that theories of gift were first developed. They concentrated on the question how groups and societies are held together by means of the mutual exchange of gifts. Among other things, giving responds to needs, it increases the social status of the giver, and it installs a cycle of giving and receiving. All these things, in turn, serve to strengthen social cohesion and solidarity. Moreover, this line of inquiry has raised a host of open questions concerning the nature of a gift. For example, how can a true gift be distinguished from a hidden form of payment or an exchange of goods? Furthermore, can a gift truly be free if it merely consists in the act of giving? In the case of this latter question, the sceptics seem be the prevailing voice. Every giver has some personal interest which she hands over in the act of handing over the gift itself. The question is, if we argue that it is a quality of the gift itself to be free, how does this fact fit in with the idea that no gift is given without some degree of personal interest on the giver’s side.

      This is also one of the key issues with regard to theological reflections on gift. Theology makes ample use of this word and concept. One thinks, for example, of the gift of creation (sometimes labelled as “givenness”), the gifts of the Holy Spirit, the gift of justification by grace alone, the gift of a flourishing life, and so on. What unifies all these modes of speech is the fact that they depict God’s gift to humanity and the fact that the gifts themselves are free. Once more, consider the following ideas. The gift of creation is unprecedented and precisely for this reason it provokes wonder and amazement. The gift of God’s grace is unconditional—a conviction which both Augustine and Luther went to enormous lengths to preserve. Nobody is worthy of themselves to receive the gifts of the Holy Spirit, but He generously spreads them among believers as well as those who might not even be able to recognise them for what they are. However, if there are “no free gifts,”¹⁴ then basic claims such as these are in need of close inspection and even reinterpretation.

      The Finnish systematic theologian Risto Saarinen contributed another important idea to the concept of gift. In order to further clarify the task of ecumenical hermeneutics, we turn briefly to his work. According to Saarinen, theological conceptions of gift are normally receiver-oriented. By contrast, he proposes a giver-oriented perspective. Indeed, from the receiver’s point of view, since the gift of creation is primarily the receiver herself, it is therefore free. The same applies to the unconditional giving of grace via justification, as well as the other examples mentioned above. If we focus on the giver of the gift, things will change. In this case, while the gift of justification is indeed unconditional for the person to whom it is given, it nonetheless comes along with intentions of the giver. Indeed, God wants something by granting this free gift.¹⁵ The gift does not leave the recipient unaltered. This reception of

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