The American Eloquence - Various Author

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it appears that by the treaty we have promised full compensation to England for every possible claim they may have against us, that we have abandoned every claim of a doubtful nature, and that we have consented to receive the posts, our claim to which was not disputed, under new conditions and restrictions never before contemplated; that after having obtained by those concessions an adjustment of past differences, we have entered into a new agreement, unconnected with those objects, which have heretofore been subjects of discussion between the two nations; and that by this treaty of commerce and navigation, we have obtained no commercial advantage which we did not enjoy before, we have obtained no security against future aggressions, no security in favor of the freedom of our navigation, and we have parted with every pledge we had in our hands, with every power of restriction, with every weapon of self-defence which is calculated to give us any security.

      From the review I have taken of the treaty, and the opinions I have expressed, it is hardly necessary for me to add, that I look upon the instrument as highly injurious to the interests of the United States, and that I earnestly wish it never had been made; but whether in its present stage the House ought to refuse to carry it into effect, and what will be the probable consequences of a refusal, is a question which requires the most serious attention, and which I will now attempt to investigate.

      Should the treaty be finally defeated, either new negotiations will be more successful or Great Britain will refuse to make a new arrangement, and leave things in the situation in which they now are, or war will be the consequence. I will, in the course of my observations, make some remarks on the last supposition. I do not think that the first will be very probable at present, and I am of opinion that, under the present circumstances, and until some change takes place in our own or in the relative political situation of the European nations, it is to be apprehended that, in such a case, new negotiations will either be rejected or prove unsuccessful. Such an event might have perhaps followed a rejection of the treaty even by the Senate or by the President. After the negotiator employed by the United States had once affixed his signature it must have become very problematical, unless he had exceeded his powers, whether a refusal to sanction the contract he had made would not eventually defeat, at least for a time, the prospect of a new treaty. I conceive that the hopes of obtaining better conditions by a new negotiation are much less in the present stage of the business than they were when the treaty was in its inchoate form before the Executive; and in order to form a just idea of the consequences of a rejection at present, I will contemplate them upon this supposition, which appears to me most probable, to wit, that no new treaty will take place for a certain period of time.

      In mentioning my objections to the treaty itself, I have already stated the advantages which in my opinion would result to the United States from the non-existence of that instrument; I will not repeat, but proceed at once to examine what losses may accrue that can be set off against those advantages.

      The further detention of the posts, the national stain that will result from receiving no reparation for the spoliations on our trade, and the uncertainty of a final adjustment of our differences with Great Britain, are the three evils which strike me as resulting from a rejection of the treaty; and when to those considerations I add that of the present situation of this country, of the agitation of the public mind, and of the advantages that will arise from union of sentiments, however injurious and unequal I conceive the treaty to be, however repugnant it may be to my feelings, and perhaps to my prejudices, I feel induced to vote for it, and will not give my assent to any proposition which will imply its rejection. But the conduct of Great Britain since the treaty was signed, the impressment of our seamen, and their uninterrupted spoliations on our trade, especially by seizing our vessels laden with provisions, a proceeding which they may perhaps justify by one of the articles of the treaty, are such circumstances as may induce us to pause awhile, in order to examine whether it is proper, immediately and without having obtained any explanation thereon, to adopt the resolution on the table, and to pass, at present, all the laws necessary to carry the treaty into effect.

      Whatever evils may follow a rejection of the treaty, they will not attend a postponement. To suspend our proceedings will not throw us into a situation which will require new negotiations, new arrangements on the points already settled and well understood by both parties. It will be merely a delay, until an explanation of the late conduct of the British towards us may be obtained, or until that conduct may be altered. If, on the contrary, we consent to carry the treaty into effect, under the present circumstances, what will be our situation in future? It is by committing the most wanton and the most unprovoked aggressions on our trade; it is by seizing a large amount of our property as a pledge for our good behavior, that Great Britain has forced the nation into the present treaty. If by threatening new hostilities, or rather by continuing her aggressions, even after the treaty is made, she can force us also to carry it into effect, our acquiescence will be tantamount to a declaration that we mean to submit in proportion to the insults that are offered to us; and this disposition being once known, what security have we against new insults, new aggressions, new spoliations, which probably will lay the foundation of some additional sacrifices on ours? It has been said, and said with truth, that to put up with the indignities we have received without obtaining any reparation, which will probably be the effect of defeating the treaty, is highly dishonorable to the nation.

      In my opinion it is still more so not only tamely to submit to a continuation of these national insults, but while they thus continue uninterrupted, to carry into effect the instrument we have consented to accept as a reparation for former ones. When the general conduct of Great Britain towards us from the beginning of the present war is considered; when the means by which she has produced the treaty are reflected on, a final compliance on our part while she still persists in that conduct, whilst the chastening rod of that nation is still held over us, is in my opinion a dereliction of national interest, of national honor, of national independence.

      But it is said, that war must be the consequence of our delaying to carry the treaty into effect. Do the gentlemen mean, that if we reject the treaty, if we do not accept the reparation there given to us, in order to obtain redress, we have no alternative left but war? If we must go to war in order to obtain reparation for insults and spoliations on our trade, we must do it, even if we carry the present treaty into effect; for this treaty gives us no reparation for the aggressions committed since it was ratified, has not produced a discontinuance of those acts of hostility, and gives us no security that they shall be discontinued. But the arguments of those gentlemen, who suppose that America must go to war, apply to a final rejection of the treaty, and not to a delay. I do not propose to refuse the reparation offered by the treaty, and to put up with the aggressions committed; I have agreed that that reparation, such as it is, is a valuable article of the treaty; I have agreed, that under the present circumstances, a greater evil will follow a total rejection of, than an acquiescence in, the treaty. The only measure which has been mentioned, in preference to the one now under discussion, is a suspension, a postponement, whilst the present spoliations continue, in hopes to obtain for them a similar reparation, and assurances that they shall cease.

      But is it meant to insinuate that it is the final intention of those who pretend to wish only for a postponement, to involve this country in a war? There has been no period during the present European war, at which it would not have been equally weak and wicked to adopt such measures as must involve America in the contest, unless forced into it for the sake of self-defence; but, at this time, to think of it would fall but little short of madness. The whole American nation would rise in opposition to the idea; and it might at least have been recollected, that war can not be declared, except by Congress, and that two of the branches of government are sufficient to check the other in any supposed attempt of this kind.

      If there is no necessity imposed upon America to go to war, if there is no apprehension she will, by her own conduct, involve herself in one, the danger must arise from Great Britain, and the threat is, that she will make war against us if we do not comply. Gentlemen first tell us that we have made the best possible bargain with that nation; that she has conceded everything, without receiving a single iota in return, and yet they would persuade us, that she will make war against us in order to force us to accept that contract so advantageous to us, and so injurious to herself. It will not be contended that a delay, until an amicable explanation is obtained, could afford even a pretence to Great Britain for going to war; and we

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