LITMIR.BIZ

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      6th.—The Emperor was somewhat unwell, and employed himself in writing in his chamber. He dictated to me the portraits of the Generals of the army of Italy—Massena, Augereau, Serrurier, &c. Massena was endowed with extraordinary courage and firmness, which seemed to increase in excess of danger. When conquered, he was always as ready to fight the battle again as though he had been the conqueror. Augereau, on the contrary, seemed to be tired and disheartened by victory, of which he always had enough. His person, his manners, and his language, gave him the air of a bravo. This, however, says the narration, he was far from being, when he once found himself sated with honours and riches, which he had bestowed upon himself on every occasion that offered, and by every means in his power. Serrurier, who retained the manners and severity of an old major of infantry, was an honest and trustworthy man; but an unfortunate general, &c.

      Among the various subjects of the day’s conversation, I note down what the Emperor said respecting the armies of the Ancients. He asked whether the accounts of the great armies mentioned in history were to be credited. He was of opinion that those statements were false and absurd. He placed no faith in the descriptions of the innumerable armies of the Carthaginians in Sicily. “Such a multitude of troops,” he observed, “would have been useless in so inconsiderable an enterprise; and if Carthage could have assembled such a force, a still greater one would have been raised in Hannibal’s expedition, which was of much greater importance, but in which not more than forty or fifty thousand men were employed.” He did not believe the accounts of the millions of men composing the forces of Darius and Xerxes, which might have covered all Greece, and which would doubtless have been subdivided into a multitude of partial armies. He even doubted the whole of that brilliant period of Greek history; and he regarded the famous Persian war only as a series of those undecided actions, in which each party claims the victory. Xerxes returned triumphant, after taking, burning, and destroying Athens; and the Greeks exulted in their victory, because they had not surrendered at Salamis. “With regard to the pompous accounts of the conquests of the Greeks, and the defeat of their numberless enemies, it must be recollected,” observed the Emperor, “that the Greeks, who wrote them, were a vain and hyperbolical people; and that no Persian chronicle has ever been produced to set our judgment right by contrary statements.”

      But the Emperor attached credit to Roman history, if not in its details, at least in its results; because these were facts as clear as day-light. He also believed the descriptions of the armies of Gengiskan and Tamerlane, however numerous they are said to have been; because they were followed by gregarious nations, who, on their part, were joined by other wandering tribes as they advanced; “and it is not impossible,” observed the Emperor, “that Europe may one day end thus. The revolution produced by the Huns, the cause of which is unknown, because the tract is lost in the desert, may at a future period be renewed."

      The situation of Russia is admirably calculated to assist her in bringing about such a catastrophe. She may collect at will numberless auxiliaries, and scatter them over Europe. The wandering tribes of the north will be the better disposed and the more impatient to engage in such enterprises, in proportion as their imaginations have been fired, and their avarice excited, by the successes of those of their countrymen who lately visited us.

      The conversation next turned on conquests and conquerors; and the Emperor observed that, to be a successful conqueror, it was necessary to be ferocious, and that, if he had been such, he might have conquered the world. I presumed to dissent from this opinion, which was doubtless expressed in a moment of vexation. I represented that he, Napoleon, was precisely a proof of the contrary; that he had not been ferocious, and yet had conquered the world; and that, with the manners of modern times, ferocity would certainly never have raised him to so high a point. I added that, at the present day, terror could never subject us to the control of an individual man; and that dominion was to be secured only by good laws, joined to greatness of character, and that degree of energy, which is proof against every trial, in him who is charged with the execution of the laws. These, I affirmed, were precisely the causes of Napoleon’s success, and of the submission and obedience of the people over whom he ruled.

      The Convention was ferocious, and inspired terror: it was submitted to, but could not be endured. Had the power been vested in an individual, his overthrow would soon have been accomplished. But the Convention was a hydra, yet how many attempts were hazarded for its destruction!—how many dangers did it escape as if by miracle! It was reduced to the necessity of burying itself amidst its triumphs.

      For a conqueror to be ferocious, with success, he must of necessity command troops who are themselves ferocious, and he must wield dominion over unenlightened people. In this respect Russia possesses an immense superiority over the rest of Europe. She has the rare advantage of possessing a civilized government, and barbarous subjects. There, information directs and commands, while ignorance executes and destroys. A Turkish Sultan could not long govern any enlightened European nation; the empire of knowledge would be too strong for his power.

      Speaking on another subject, the Emperor observed that, if the French people had less energy than the Romans, they at least evinced greater decorum. We should not have killed ourselves, as the Romans did under the first Emperors; but at the same time we should have afforded no examples of the turpitude and servility that marked the later periods of the Roman empire. “Even in our most corrupt days,” said he, “our baseness was not without certain restrictions: courtiers, whom the sovereign could have prevailed on to do any thing in his own palace, would have refused to bend the knee to him at his levee."

      I have already mentioned that we had with us scarcely any document relative to French affairs during the Emperor’s time. The books that had been brought among his effects were merely a few classics which he carried about with him in all his campaigns. I received from Major Hudson, resident in the island, a political compendium from 1793 to 1807, entitled “The Annual Register,” which contains the succession of political events during each year, together with some of the most important official documents. In our destitute circumstances this was a valuable acquisition.

      IDEAS.—PLANS.—POLITICAL SUGGESTIONS, &C.

      7th.—The Emperor breakfasted alone, and was engaged during the day in dictating to the Grand Marshal and M. de Montholon.

      In the evening, as the Emperor and I were walking together in the lower path, which had now become the favourite resort, I informed him that a person of consequence, whose ideas and statements might become the channel of mediation between ourselves and the ruling world, and influence our future destiny, had, with sufficiently significant forms and preambles, invited us to tell him conscientiously what we believed to be the Emperor’s notions on certain political subjects:—whether he had granted his last constitution with the intention of maintaining it;—whether he had sincerely abandoned his former plans as to the great empire;—whether he would consent to leave England in the enjoyment of her maritime supremacy, without envying her the tranquil possession of India;—whether he would be willing to renounce the Colonies, and to purchase colonial goods from the English alone, at the regular market price;—whether he would not form an alliance with the Americans, in case of their rupture with England;—whether he would consent to the existence of a great kingdom in Germany, for that branch of the English royal family which must immediately forfeit the throne of Great Britain on the accession of the Princess Charlotte of Wales, or, in default of Germany, whether he would consent to the establishment of that dominion in Portugal, in case England should conclude arrangements to that effect with the Court of Brazil.

      These questions did not rest on vague ideas or idle opinions: the individual supported them on positive facts. “We want,” said he, “a long and lasting peace on the Continent—we want the tranquil enjoyment of our present advantages, to help us out of the critical circumstances in which we are now involved, and to relieve us from the enormous debt with which we are burthened. The present state of France and of Europe,” added he, “cannot bring about these results. The victory of Waterloo has ruined you; but it was far from saving us; every sensible man in England, every one who escapes the momentary influence of passion, either does think, or will think, as I

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