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Complete Works. Henry Cabot Lodge
Читать онлайн.Название Complete Works
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isbn 4064066394066
Автор произведения Henry Cabot Lodge
Жанр Документальная литература
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Hard as it is to breathe a word against such a man as Lawrence, a very Bayard of the seas, who was admired as much for his dauntless bravery as he was loved for his gentleness and uprightness, it must be confessed that he acted rashly. And after he had sailed, it was, as Lord Howard Douglass has pointed out, a tactical error, however chivalric to neglect the chance of luffing across the Shannon's stern to rake her; exactly as it was a tactical error of his equally chivalrous antagonist to have let him have such an opportunity. Hull would not have committed either error, and would, for the matter of that, have been an overmatch for either commander. But it must always be remembered that Lawrence's encounters with the English had not been such as to give him a high opinion of them. The only foe he had fought had been inferior in strength, it is true, but had hardly made any effective resistance. Another sloop, of equal, if not superior force, had tamely submitted to blockade for several days, and had absolutely refused to fight. And there can be no doubt that the Chesapeake, unprepared though she was, would have been an overmatch for the Guerrière, Macedonian, or Java. Altogether it is hard to blame Lawrence for going out, and in every other respect his actions never have been, nor will be, mentioned, by either friend or foe, without the warmest respect. But that is no reason for insisting that he was ruined purely by an adverse fate. We will do far better to recollect that as much can be learned from reverses as from victories. Instead of flattering ourselves by saying the defeat was due to chance, let us try to find out what the real cause was, and then take care that it does not have an opportunity to act again. A little less rashness would have saved Lawrence's life and his frigate, while a little more audacity on one occasion would have made Commodore Chauncy famous for ever. And whether a lesson is to be learned or not, a historian should remember that his profession is not that of a panegyrist. The facts of the case unquestionably are that Captain Broke, in fair fight, within sight of the enemy's harbor, proved conqueror over a nominally equal and in reality slightly superior force; and that this is the only single-ship action of the war in which the victor was weaker in force than his opponent. So much can be gathered by reading only the American accounts. Moreover accident had little or nothing to do with the gaining of the victory. The explanation is perfectly easy; Lawrence and Broke were probably exactly equal in almost every thing that goes to make up a first-class commander, but one had trained his crew for seven years, and the other was new to the ship, to the officers, and to the men, and the last to each other. The Chesapeake's crew must have been of fine material, or they would not have fought so well as they did.
So much for the American accounts. On the other hand, the capture of the Chesapeake was, and is, held by many British historians to "conclusively prove" a good many different things; such as, that if the odds were anything like equal, a British frigate could always whip an American, that in a hand-to-hand conflict such would invariably be the case, etc.; and as this was the only single-ship action of the war in which the victor was the inferior in force, most British writers insist that it reflected more honor on them than all the frigate actions of 1812 put together did on the Americans.
These assertions can be best appreciated by reference to a victory won by the French in the year of the Battle of the Nile. On the 14th of December, 1798, after two hours' conflict, the French 24-gun corvette Bayonnaise captured, by boarding, the English 32-gun frigate Ambuscade. According to James the Ambuscade threw at a broadside 262 pounds of shot, and was manned by 190 men, while the Bayonnaise threw 150 pounds, and had on board supernumeraries and passenger soldiers enough to make in all 250 men. According to the French historian Rouvier 182 the broadside force was 246 pounds against 80 pounds; according to Troude 183 it was 270 pounds against 112. M. Léon Guérin, in his voluminous but exceedingly prejudiced and one-sided work, 184 makes the difference even greater. At any rate the English vessel was vastly the superior in force, and was captured by boarding, after a long and bloody conflict in which she lost 46, and her antagonist over 50, men. During all the wars waged with the Republic and the Empire, no English vessel captured a French one as much superior to itself as the Ambuscade was to the Bayonnaise, precisely as in the war of 1812 no American vessel captured a British opponent as much superior to itself as the Chesapeake was to the Shannon. Yet no sensible man can help acknowledging, in spite of these and a few other isolated instances, that at that time the French were inferior to the English, and the latter to the Americans.
It is amusing to compare the French histories of the English with the English histories of the Americans, and to notice the similarity of the arguments they use to detract from their opponents' fame. Of course I do not allude to such writers as Lord Howard Douglass or Admiral de la Gravière, but to men like William James and Léon Guérin, or even O. Troude. James is always recounting how American ships ran away from British ones, and Guérin tells as many anecdotes of British ships who fled from French foes. James reproaches the Americans for adopting a "Parthian" mode of warfare, instead of "bringing to in a bold and becoming manner." Precisely the same reproaches are used by the French writers, who assert that the English would not fight "fairly," but acquired an advantage by manoeuvring. James lays great stress on the American long guns; so does Lieutenant Rouvier on the British carronades. James always tells how the Americans avoided the British ships, when the crews of the latter demanded to be led aboard; Troude says the British always kept at long shot, while the French sailors "demandérent, à grands cris, l'abordage." James says the Americans "hesitated to grapple" with their foes "unless they possessed a twofold superiority"; Guérin that the English "never dared attack" except when they possessed "une supériorité énorme." The British sneer at the "mighty dollar"; the French at the "eternal guinea." The former consider Decatur's name as "sunk" to the level of Porter's or Bainbridge's; the latter assert that the "presumptuous Nelson" was inferior to any of the French admirals of the time preceding the Republic. Says James: "The Americans only fight well when they have the superiority of force on their side"; and Lieutenant Rouvier: "Never have the English vanquished us with an undoubted inferiority of force."
On June 12, 1813, the small cutter Surveyor, of 6 12-pound carronades, was lying in York River, in the Chesapeake, under the command of Mr. William S. Travis; her crew consisted of but 15 men. 185 At nightfall she was attacked by the boats of the Narcissus frigate, containing about 50 men, under the command of Lieutenant John Creerie. 186 None of the carronades could be used; but Mr. Travis made every preparation that he could for defence. The Americans waited till the British were within pistol shot before they opened their fire; the latter dashed gallantly on, however, and at once carried the cutter. But though brief, the struggle was bloody; 5 of the Americans were wounded, and of the British 3 were killed and 7 wounded. Lieutenant Creerie considered his opponents to have shown so much bravery that he returned Mr. Travis his sword, with a letter as complimentary to him as it was creditable to the writer. 187
As has been already mentioned, the Americans possessed a large force of gun-boats at the beginning of the war. Some of these were fairly sea-worthy vessels, of 90 tons burden, sloop—or schooner-rigged, and armed with one or two long, heavy guns, and sometime with several light carronades to repel boarders. 188 Gun-boats of this kind, together with the few small cutters owned by the government, were serviceable enough. They were employed all along the shores of Georgia and the Carolinas, and in Long Island Sound, in protecting the coasting trade by convoying parties of small vessels from one port to another, and preventing them from being molested by the boats of any of the British frigates. They also acted as checks upon the latter in their descents upon the towns and plantations, occasionally capturing their boats and tenders, and forcing them to be very cautious in their operations.