The Republic of Ragusa: An Episode of the Turkish Conquest - Luigi Villari

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the dignity after six months, which had been the usual period during the intervals of independence, he continued in office illegally for two years; he tyrannised over the people, subjected his enemies to arbitrary arrest, exile, and confiscation, and kept a bodyguard of mercenaries.106 The citizens tired of this misgovernment, and were willing to call in the Venetians once more. A conspiracy was set on foot to bring about the tyrant’s downfall, under the leadership of his own son-in-law, Pirro Benessa. What increased the discontent among the Ragusans was the fact that since the rupture with Venice that Republic had ceased to protect them against piracy, and their maritime trade suffered in consequence. Giuda’s arbitrary proceedings had also caused trouble with the other Dalmatian towns. A group of nobles met to discuss the matter, and although some, including Vito and Michele Bobali, opposed any suggestion that Venetian aid should be resorted to, their objections were overruled, and it was decided to send a deputation to Venice, headed by Pirro Benessa himself. On its arrival it was well received, and the Government sent a squadron of six galleys down the Adriatic, ostensibly to escort the Patriarch of Constantinople. It weighed anchor at Ragusa, where Benessa landed and visited the tyrant, advising him to come and pay his respects to the Patriarch and the Venetian admiral. Not suspecting treachery Giuda agreed, and went on board the principal galley. He was instantly seized and loaded with chains, and the fleet sailed away. When he found himself thus outwitted, in a fit of rage and despair he committed suicide by beating his head against the sides of the vessel. In exchange for this deliverance the Ragusans agreed to readmit the Venetian counts.

      How far this story is authentic we cannot decide, but in its main features it is probably true. It may be that Damiano Giuda was a patriot, whose object was to consolidate Ragusa as a free city, independent of all Venetian tutelage, but that he felt that the community was still too weak to stand alone unless ruled by a strong personal government. Or he may have been, as most historians make him out, merely an ambitious citizen, like those who made themselves masters of the various Italian city-republics. Be that as it may, the important point is the subsequent connection between Ragusa and Venice. There is a letter addressed to one Velcinno,107 Podestà of Spalato, which alludes to “Zellovellus ragusiensis comes,” and to the story of Damiano Giuda. This Velcinno is probably the same as Buysinus, who was podestà from 1221 to 1223. This would indicate that the episode was over not later than 1223, and that Zellovellus had come as Venetian count. We know that Damiano tyrannised for two years, so he must have entered office at least as early as 1221. But as he had been elected by the people and not appointed by the Doge, Ragusa must at that time have been independent of Venice. Now there are documents of 1224 and 1226 in which the Ragusans are reprimanded for having failed to send hostages to Venice and otherwise fulfil their promises. The final treaty of submission regulating Venetian suzerainty over Ragusa is dated 1232. Pisani concludes from this that the Zellovello letter is a forgery; that Ragusa shook off Venetian supremacy between 1224 and 1226, remained free and independent until 1230, when Giuda became tyrant; and that the submission of 1232 was the price which the Ragusans paid for being freed from him.108 Professor Gelcich, however, holds to the authenticity of the Zellovello letter,109 but does not allude to the documents of 1224 and 1226 regarding the hostages and the prohibition to the Ragusans against trading with Alexandria.110 It is, I think, probable that these documents refer to a later rebellion against Venetian authority. Venice had helped the Ragusans to shake off domestic tyranny, say, about 1223, exacting in exchange certain promises of allegiance and a number of hostages. These stipulations were not fulfilled; hence the protests referred to in the documents of 1224 and 1226. Venice, however, did not press her claims, and Ragusa remained more or less independent.111 Finally, on finding that the city could not yet stand alone, or fearing that Venice was preparing to re-establish her authority by force of arms, the citizens made a voluntary submission in 1232. This view is corroborated by the fact that in the treaty of 1232 no mention is made either of Damiano Giuda or of Pirro Benessa, who headed the conspiracy against him and the deputation to Venice. The negotiations were carried on between the Venetian Government and two Ragusan nobles, Binzola Bodazza112 and Gervasio Naimerio.

      TORRE MENZE

      The treaty of 1232 fixes the terms of Ragusa’s dependence. “We, the envoys of Ragusa,” it begins, “seeing that it appears to us of great advantage that our country should be subject to Venetian domination, beg that you should grant us a Venetian count according to our desires.” Ragusa was always to have Venetian counts in future, who were to be chosen by the Doge with the majority of his councillors. “The count shall swear fealty to the Doge and to his successors, and thus will all future counts to all future Doges for ever. Also all the men of the county (of Ragusa) above thirteen years of age shall swear fealty to the lord Doge and his successors, and they shall renew their oath every ten years. They shall also swear fealty to the count and all his successors for ever, ‘salva fidelitate domini ducis ad honorem Venecie et salutem Ragusii.’ ” Should the Doge ever visit Ragusa he was to be honourably lodged in the Archbishop’s palace.

      It was further agreed that the Ragusans should always choose a Venetian for their archbishop, namely, a man born at any place between Grado and Cavarzere, and that he should be subject to the authority of the Patriarch of Grado, if the Pope permitted it.113 He, too, must swear allegiance to the Doge and his successors, whose praises the clergy must solemnly sing in the cathedral at Christmas, at Easter, and on the feast of San Biagio.

      The treaty specifies the mutual obligations of the two cities in naval matters. When the Venetian fleet puts to sea for war beyond Brindisi and Durazzo, for every thirty Venetian galleys Ragusa must provide one, and the Ragusan ships are to remain in commission as long as those of Venice. Ragusa may levy the same tolls on all foreign ships as are levied at Venice, and the proceeds are to be divided in equal parts between the Count, the Archbishop, and the Commune. The friends of the Venetians are to be the friends of the Ragusans, and the enemies of the Venetians their enemies. They must not have any dealings with the Almissans, the Narentans, and other pirates. Whenever Venice sends a fleet against the pirates, Ragusa must provide at least one good ship with fifty men. As regards tribute, “the Ragusans must give 12 ipperperi to the Doge and 100 gold ipperperi of the right weight to the Venetian commonwealth on the feast of San Biagio. At the same time the Commune must give 400 ipperperi to the Count, as well as all the other usual revenues and honours, save the salt revenue. The Ragusans must send twelve hostages, belonging to as many noble families, to Venice; of these, half are to be changed every six months.” The Ragusans must pay 5 per cent. on all goods which they bring to Venice from the Eastern Empire, 20 per cent. on those from Egypt, Tunis, and Barbary; 2½ per cent. on those from Sicily. Merchandise from Slavonia was free of duty. Ragusa could only send four ships of seventy miliari114 to Venice each year on these terms; all further traffic was subject to higher duties; the Ragusans could not trade with foreigners in Venice, nor with countries where the Venetians could not trade.

      The document ends with renewed oaths of allegiance to Venice on behalf of the Ragusans.115 “Esadastes” admits that Ragusa really did submit to Venice in 1232, but declares this treaty to be a forgery, having only seen it in Nani’s De Duobus Imperatoris Rasciæ Nummis, where it is incomplete. He bases his contention, first, on the fact that the provision as to the archbishops being Venetians was not always complied with. This, however, proves nothing, as there is no reason why Venice should not sometimes have allowed the Ragusans to choose some foreigner if no suitable Venetian were forthcoming. He adds that the Ragusan envoys had no authority to surrender the city without consulting the Grand Council, and as Damiano Giuda was then ruling, it could not be summoned. This is merely an ingenious quibble, and, if we admit that nine years had elapsed since the expulsion of the tyrant, the argument has no value at all. Then he changes his line, and insists that Ragusa merely contracted a fœdus or fidelitas, i.e. a treaty of friendship, with Venice, and not a deditio or true submission, and that in agreeing to have Venetian counts Ragusa did nothing more than what Florence and other Italian cities did when they chose foreigners for the position of podestà, without thereby prejudicing their liberty. It is easy to see that there is a considerable difference between the action of the Italian Republics, who chose their rulers now from one town and now from

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