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had been enthusiastic in their passion for voting on every question whatsoever, accepted a rule

       Monthly Circular, April 1868.

       Quarterly Report, November 1854 ; Rules of 1857.

      ' Rules of the Associated Blacksmiths' Society (Glasgow, 1892), and many others.

       Monthly Report, October 1889.

      ' Monthly Circular, April 1866.

      26 Trade Union Structure

      wtrfch confined the work of revision to a specially elected committee.

      Thus we see that half a century of practical experience [of the Initiative and the Referendum has led, not to its extension, but to an ever stricter limitation of its application. iThe attempt to secure the participation of every member in /the management of his society was found to lead to in- stability in legislation, dangerous unsoundness of finance, and "general weakness of administration. The result was the early abandonment of the Initiative, either by express rule or through the persistent influence of the executive. This produced a further shifting of the balance of power in Trade Union con- stit>itions. When the ri^ht qf jputtin^ guestions to the-A tote "Ca me practically to be confins djto theexecutive, the(Referen- ,(m m ceased to provide the members with any effectiv e control. If the executive could choose the issues to be submitted, the occasion on which the question sh9irid-bft.gHjt, and the form in judiich it should be couched, the^eferendum/far from supplying any counterpoise to the exectrttvej^ was soon found to be an immense addition to its power. Any change which the executive desired could be stated in the most plausible terms and supported by convincing arguments, which almost invariably secured its adoption by a large majority. Any executive resolution could, when occasion required, thus be given the powerful moral backing of a plebiscitar^vofe.* The reliance of Trade Union democrats on the^ Referendum resulted, in fact, in the virtual exclusion of the generafbody of members from all real share in the government. And

      ' Mr. Lecky points out (Democracy and Liberty, vol. i. pp. 12, 31, 32) how, in France, " successive Governments soon learned how easily a plebiscite vote could be secured and directed by a strong executive, and how useful it might become to screen or justify usurpation. The Constitution of 1795, which founded the power of the Directors ; the Constitution of 1799, which placed the executive^ power in the hands of three Consuls elected for ten years ; the Constitution of i!o2, which made Buonaparte Consul for life, and again remodelled the electoral system ; the Empire, which was established in 1804, and the additional Act of the Con- stitution promulgated by Napoleon in 1815, were all submitted to a direct popular vote." The government of Napoleon III., from 1852 to 1870, was ratified by four separate plebiscites. See also Laferri^re, Constitutions de la France depuis fj8g ; Jules Clire, Histoire du Souffrage Universel.

      Primitive Democracy 27

      when we remember the practical subordination of the" executive committee to its salaried permanent officer, we shall easily understand that the ultimate effect of such a Referendum as we have described was a further strengthen- i ng of th e^ in fluence of the general secretary. who^raf?e3~tHe^ propositions, wrote the arguments in support of them, and edited the official circular which formed the only means of communication with the members. ,

      We see, therefore, that almost every influence in the' Trade Union organisation has tended to magnify and con-i solidate the power of the general secretary. |lf democracy could furnish no other expedient of popular control than the- mass meeting, the annual election of public officers, the Initiative and the Referendum, Trade Union history makes it quite clear that the mere pressure of a dnnnigtrative needs w ould inevitably result in ^ the genera^ body of citizens losin g all ef fective control over th e government.^ It would not Se difficult to point to influential Irade Unions at the present day which, possessing only a single permanent official, have not progressed beyond the stage of what is virtually a personal dictatorship. But it so happens that the very development of the union and its business which tends, as we have seen, to increase the influence of the general secretary, calls into existence a new check upon his personal authority. If we examine the constitution of a bank or joint stock company, or any other organisation not formed by the working clas^Ke shall find it almost invariably the rule that the chief exe^R^e officers are appointed, not by the members at large, but by the governing committee, and that these officejp are allowed a free hand, if not absolute power, in the choice and dismissal of their- subordinates. Any other plan, it is contended, would seriously detract from the efficient working of the organisation. Had the Trade Unions j,adopted this course, the^^ne^jJ^-^cretary would have been absolutely supreme. But working-class organisations in England have, almost v#lhout exception, tenaciously clung to the direct elec^n of all officers by the general

      28 Trade Union Structure

      body of members. Whether the post to be filled be that of assistant secretary at the head office or distrijcf delegate to act for one part of the_counil3!:,Jli£LJCn^jnber have jealously- retained'Therji^pl^^^ent^in-jh^^ nri3ie-foger trade iooeties" of fhe^ present day^lHF genera secretary finds himself, therefore, at the head, not of a staff o) docile subordinates who owe office and promotion to himself, but of a number of separately elected functionaries, each holding his appointment directly from the members at large.' Any attempt at a personal dictatorship is thus quickly checked. There is more danger that friction and personal jealousies may unduly weaken the administration. But the usual outcome is the close union of all the salaried officials to conduct the business of the society in the way they think best. Instead of a personal dictatorship, we have, therefore, a closely combined and practically irresistible bureaucracy. ^ Under a constitution of this type the Trade Union may attain a high degree of efficiency. The United Society of Boilermakers and Ironshipbuilders (established 1832; membership in December 1896, 40,776) is, for instance, admittedly one of the most powerful and best conducted of English trade societies. For the last twenty years its career, alike in good times and bad, has been one of continuous prosperity. For many years past it has dominated all the shipbuilding ports, and it now includes practically every ironshipbuilder in the United Kingdom. As an insurance company it has succeeded in paying, even in the worst years of an industry subject to the most acute depressions, benefits of an unusually elaborate and generous character. Notwith- standing these liberal benefits, it has built up a reserve fund of no less than ;^ 175,560. Nor has this prosperity been

      1 Even the office staff ha^jjaeen, until quite recently, invariably recruited by the members from the members ; and only in a few unions has it begun to be realised that a shorthand clerk or trained bookkeeper, chosen by the general ' secretary or the executive committee, can probably render better service at the desk than the most digible workman trained to manual labor. The OperatiTe Bricklayers' Society, however, lately allowed their executive oommittee to appoint a shorthand clerk.

      Primitive Democracy 29

      attained by any neglect of the militant side of Trade Unionism. The society, on the contrary, has the reputa- tion of exercising stricter control over the conditions of its members' work than any other union. In no trade, for instance, do we find a stricter and more universally enforced limitation of apprentices, or a more rigid refusal to work with non-unionists. And, as we have elsewhere described, no society has more successfully concluded and enforced elaborate national agreements applicable to every port in the kingdom. Moreover, this vigorous and successful trade policy has been consistent with a marked abstention from strikes—a fact due not only to the financial strength and perfect combination of the society, but also to the implicit obedience enforced upon its members, and the ample dis- ciplinary power vested in and exercised by the central executive.^

      The efficiency and influence of this remarkable union is, no doubt, largely due to the advantageous strategic position which has resulted from the extraordinary expansion of iron- shipbuilding. It is interesting, however, to notice what a perfect example it affords of a constitution retaining all the features of the crudest democracy, but becoming, in actuak practice, a bureaucracy in which effective popular control has sunk to a minimum. The formal constitution of the Boiler- makers' Society still includes all the typical features of the early Trade Union. The executive government of this great national society is vested in a constantly changing committee,

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