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its assumptions concerning the fixed territoriality of states, petitions, treaties, and citizenship), property ownership, race, ethnicity, (minority and liberal individual) rights, and the Christian faith.

      As might be expected, some of the most prominent voices of Native American political thought in British North America – and, in turn, the early republic and antebellum United States – were evangelical Christian ministermissionaries like Samson Occom and William Apess, fired, in some cases by the First Great Awakening, to bring the gospel to the land’s indigenous heathens, while simultaneously arguing for their just and humane treatment. Others, like the Seneca orator Red Jacket (Sagoyewatha) or the Sauk warrior Black Hawk, either advocated on behalf of their tribes’ traditional religions, or simply continued to practice their native cosmologies and faiths.

      While Africans in America were relative newcomers when considered in relation to the continent’s indigenous peoples, they arrived on its shores at about the same time as North America’s white European explorers and settlers. Although there were sixteenth-century antecedents in short-lived Spanish settlements dotting the littoral southeast, the forced labor of Africans brought against their will to North America began in earnest in Virginia in 1619 – the year before the Puritan settlers landed at Plymouth. At the time, forced labor was not a unique burden of coercively imported Africans: indentured servitude of whites, to say nothing of women (who in many respects were conceived of as living in service to their husbands), was a pillar of the settler-colonial economic, social, and political order. In time, however, this form of servitude faded, and slavery in the Americas, in contradistinction to bondage in the ancient world, was racialized.

      In the mid-eighteenth century, Great Britain’s North American colonies were increasingly implicated in that era’s global imperial wars, struggles, and crises. The metropole’s initial oversight was light, and its authority weak: while not forgotten, those colonies were an afterthought. To be sure, they were enmeshed in a web of (it was said, mutually beneficial) imperial regulations concerning imports and exports. But the colonies were taxed only lightly, and left largely to govern themselves. Each colony had an elected representative legislature that directed its own internal affairs. Their economies thrived, and the population grew.

      Things began to change, however, with the French and Indian War (1756–1763), the North American front of the globe-spanning Seven Years War, which ultimately pitted a coalition led by Great Britain against a rival coalition led by France. Britain won the war, leading France to surrender nearly all of the territory it had previously claimed in North America east of the Mississippi River, including in what is today Canada. This drew Britain into an increased focus on its North American colonies and on the extensive – and expensive – responsibilities it now bore for defending them. Britain argued that it had shielded the free Protestant colonies – at the urging, for that matter, of New Englanders – from the threat of tyrannical popery (French Canada), marauding (French-allied) Indians, and foreign attacks and bids for conquest. The British believed that, under these new circumstances, it was only proper for the colonies to bear some of the massive costs of Great Britain’s titanic war debts, and their own self-defense.

      The argument expanded over a series of thrusts and parries concerning subsequent revenue acts (and partial retreats, but with a British refusal to cede the authority to tax). These included not only boycotts and other incendiary protests (some led in Boston by Samuel Adams’s Sons of Liberty), but also outsized explosions of rage and violence against what many were now complaining was a system of unjust and, finally, intolerable rule by a distant and tyrannical government. English “country” party and republican political thought (James Harrington, Algernon Sydney, and others) had descried the corruption of the distant urban elite governing class under the sway of and resident at the King’s “Court.” In seeking to understand their growing list of grievances and predicament, the American colonists drew from this thought, in the process forging penetrating new reflections on sovereignty, government by consent, representation, and rights, with frenzied outrage over ostensible depredations of rights that, in a less fraught context, might have seemed like lesser slights. (An inflamed “rights consciousness,” many have observed, has continued to characterize the American temperament.) In time, as the British increasingly took extraordinary steps to suppress resistance – including closing Boston harbor; altering and then suspending Massachusetts’s colonial charter to reinforce their control; landing waves of troops, some of whom were coercively quartered in colonial residences; disarming colonial militias; and expatriating rebellious colonists for trial in England – a critical mass of the most vocal colonists moved from complaining of transgressions of their traditional, common law and natural rights as Englishmen under the British Constitution to contemplating a permanent political break.

      The game-changer, however, was the anonymously published incendiary pamphlet Common Sense (1776), which turned public opinion sharply in favor

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