The Philosopher's Toolkit - Julian Baggini

Скачать книгу

remains so common and so easy to commit, it has been classified as a fallacy and given a name. It’s a fallacy, however, only in an informal way.

      Now, logicians speak in these precise ways about fallacies (as ‘formal’ and ‘informal’), but remember that sometimes ordinary speech deviates from logicians’ technical usages. Sometimes any widely held though false belief is described as a ‘fallacy’. Don’t worry. As the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) said, language is like a large city with lots of different avenues and neighbourhoods. It’s alright to adopt different usages in different parts of the city. Just keep in mind where you are.

      SEE ALSO

      1 1.5 Invalidity

      2 3.11 Conversion, contraposition, obversion

      3 4.5 Conditional/biconditional

      READING

       * S. Morris Engel (1974). With Good Reason: An Introduction to Informal Fallacies

       * Irving M. Copi (1986). Informal Fallacies

       * H. V. Hansen and R. C. Pinto (1995). Fallacies: Classical and Contemporary Readings

       Scott G. Schreiber (2003). Aristotle on False Reasoning

       * Julian Baggini (2006). The Duck that Won the Lottery

      Samuel Johnson was not impressed by Bishop George Berkeley’s argument that material substance does not exist. In his Life of Johnson (1791) James Boswell reported that, when discussing Berkeley’s theory with him, Johnson once kicked a stone with some force and said, ‘I refute it thus.’

      To refute an argument is to show that its reasoning is bad. If you, however, merely register your disagreement with an argument, you are not refuting it – even though in everyday speech people often talk about refuting a claim in just this way. So, how can one really refute an argument?

      Refutation tools

      There are two basic ways of doing this, both of which are covered in more detail elsewhere in this book. First, you can show that the argument is invalid: the conclusion does not follow from the premises as claimed (see 1.5). Or, second, you can show that one or more of the premises are false (see 1.4).

      There is a third method of refutation, too – or at least quasi‐refutation. All you have to do is simply show that the conclusion must be false. From this it can be argued that therefore, even if you can’t identify exactly what is wrong with the argument, something must be wrong with it (see 3.25). This last method, however, isn’t strictly speaking a refutation, since one has failed to show what is wrong with the argument, only that it must be wrong. Nevertheless, this understanding that something must be wrong often accomplishes all that’s needed.

      Inadequate justification

      Conceptual problems

      More contentiously, you might also reject an argument by arguing that it utilises a concept inappropriately. This sort of problem is particularly clear in cases where a vague concept is used as if it were precise. For instance, consider the claim that the government is obliged to provide assistance only to those who do not have enough to live on properly. But given that there can be no precise formulation of what ‘enough to live on properly’ means, any argument must be inadequate that concludes by making a sharp distinction between those who have enough in this sense and those who don’t. The logic of the argument may be impeccable and the premises may appear to be true. But if you use vague concepts in precise arguments you may well end up with distortions.

      Using the tool

      There are many more ways of legitimately objecting to an argument without actually refuting it. The important thing is to keep in mind the difference between refutation and other forms of objection and to be clear about what form of objection you’re offering.

      SEE ALSO

      1 1.4 Validity and soundness

      2 1.5 Invalidity

      3 3.4 Bivalence and the excluded middle

      READING

       Imre Lakatos (1976/2015). Proofs and Refutations

       Karl Popper (1963). Conjectures and Refutations

       * Jamie Whyte (2005). Crimes Against Logic

       * Julian Baggini (2008). The Duck That Won the Lottery and 99 Other Bad Arguments

       * T. Schick, Jr, and L. Vaughn (2020). How to Think about Weird Things, 8th edn

      Obtaining a guaranteed true conclusion in a deductive argument requires that the argument be sound – that is, it requires both (1) that the argument be valid and (2) that the premises be true (1.4). Unfortunately, the procedure for deciding whether or not a premise is true is much less determinate than the procedure for assessing an argument’s validity. Unless premises are to be justified by arguments whose own premises are to be justified by still other arguments ad infinitum, and unless premises are to circle back on themselves in a loop of justification, there must be a stopping point where fundamental or basic premises are just accepted as true (see Agrippa’s trilemma in 1.1).

      Defining axioms

      For this reason, the concept of an axiom becomes a useful philosophical tool. An axiom is a proposition that acts as a special kind of premise in a specific kind of rational system. Axiomatic systems were first formalised by the Alexandrian geometer Euclid (fl. 300 BCE) in his famous work the Elements. In these kinds of systems, axioms function as initial, anchoring claims that stand in no need of justification – at least from within the system. They are the bedrock of the theoretical system, the basis from which, through various steps of deductive reasoning, the rest of the system is derived. In ideal circumstances, an axiom should be such that no rational agent could possibly object to its use.

      Axiomatic vs natural systems of deduction

Скачать книгу