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new system engineering knowledge for a better integration of these technologies in a homogeneous system (Sapolsky 2003).

      In the face of this complexity, two types of knowledge can be distinguished: one related to system architecture and the other to components (Henderson and Clark 1990). This distinction is essential when studying duality (Mérindol 2010). Indeed, while complex systems emerged in the military field, they then spread to civilian sectors, driving the development of competences in the field of system integration. From then, it was possible for the civilian and military sectors to share knowledge on the technological components as well as system engineering. Consequently, the observation of duality became even more difficult and subtle.

      Nevertheless, this way of assessing whether duality between two knowledge systems is related to one of the knowledge components shared by two systems, or to two systems relying on the same knowledge architecture, is not trivial. On this subject, contemporary literature points out that the specificity of knowledge in the defense field is more often at the system architecture level than at the component level (Lazaric et al. 2011). In other terms, defense systems combine technologies that, taken individually, are used by both defense and civilian sectors, but associate them in an original manner.

      This distribution of knowledge between defense and civilian sectors obviously evolves depending on the various technical systems developed and on the innovations they generate. A proper understanding of duality requires the consideration of temporal dynamics. Duality should be considered at the very beginning of a product life, namely during the research phase, and should obviously stop during the development phase (Gagnepain 2001).

      In the 1990s, Foray (1990) and Chesnais (1993) noted a transformation in the relation between civilian R&D and military R&D. Foray highlighted the weakening of the role of military R&D in the increase of industrial productivity and pointed out the following two factors:

       – the distortion of the scientific and technical system related to the technical specificities of the military material. As such, they highlighted the operational nature of R&D programs financed by defense, which favors the development expenditure as well as a strong product instead of process orientation of these programs;

       – the end of the four types of spin-offs identified by Mowery and Rosenberg (1991): direct effects (commercial application of technologies directly issued from defense), second-order effects (only one part of technology is embedded, either in a material form or as knowledge), effects related to research (reflected in knowledge dissemination) and organizational effects (for example, through a community of researchers); these disappear with the end of the generic nature of technologies.

      Based on this observation, Foray recommends two organizational transformations: on the one hand, organizing the increasing dependence of military technology on civilian R&D and, on the other hand, promoting the idea of defense financing for civilian programs, as a guarantee for their development. In the particular case of France, the upstream study programs are presented as one of the means of “insertion of defense R&D policies in global technological policies” (Foray and Guichard 2001). It is the interaction of these programs with the other devices that should be considered, in view of its role as an instrument of duality.

      Besides these long-term dynamics, a microanalysis facilitates the understanding of short-term dynamics. From an evolutionary perspective, the dual potential of a technology varies in time, and also depends on the type of R&D program (Cowan and Foray 1995).

      During the standardization phase, the application domains require specific adaptation to the defense case or to the civilian case (norms, regulations, etc.). Each application caries on developments that lead to technological trajectories diverging between the two domains, and reduce the number of potential collaborations.

      Then, things depend on the type of project: once more, according to Cowan and Foray, the potential of a product-oriented project is not the same and does not evolve at the same pace as the potential of a process-oriented project. A product-oriented project has a lower dual potential, as it is limited by demands specific to the application domain. Moreover, the standardization phase strongly reduces this potential even further. A process-oriented project is, on the other hand, less limited by the civilian or military specificities and the standardization phase can be at least in part jointly conducted, leading to civilian and military convergence on the implementation of the technology.

      In this approach, duality is perceived as a mechanism for the joint production of technology. Organizing R&D according to duality principles would then enable a larger number of potential applications, the delay of standardization-related technology lock-in and consequent preservation of technology variety.

      A last note on temporality is worth making in relation to the life time of a defense program, and particularly to its maintenance in operational conditions (MOC). This characteristic of defense programs increases the complexity of the civilian–defense relation. Indeed, even if, as underlined by Droff (2013), in MOC duality facilitates the proximity between civilian and military activities, the fact remains that, due to regulatory and operational constraints of military MOC, manufacturers have to maintain competences and technologies for a very long time after their development. In these types of activities, duality is related to transfers or to the provision of equipment adequate for a given territory.

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