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COSSAC. Stephen C. Kepher
Читать онлайн.Название COSSAC
Год выпуска 0
isbn 9781682475218
Автор произведения Stephen C. Kepher
Издательство Ingram
Until recently, of course, the initiative remained in the enemy’s hands. I think that we can now say that recently the initiative passed to us, although it must be confessed that hitherto there have not been many signs of our knowing exactly what to do with it now that we have it….
About a year ago it became possible to regard the invasion of Europe as a practical proposition, and attempts were made to define the problem in terms that really meant something. These were not entirely successful, and then, while they were still under discussion, came a sudden change of policy that brought about the campaign in North Africa that is now drawing to a successful conclusion in its first phase.
… I need not go into too much detail with regard to the many vicissitudes that have overtaken this planning. A large number of very able people have done an immense amount of work and have at least produced what is going to be very useful to us, an immense amount of invaluable data bearing on the job in hand. They have produced no plan worthy of the name, but that, I should like you to understand clearly, was no fault of theirs; it was simply because they lacked direction from above.
… I want to make clear that, although the primary object of COSSAC is to make plans, I am certain that it is wrong to refer to it in any way as a “planning staff.” The term “planning staff” has come to have a most sinister meaning—it implies the production of nothing but paper. That (which) we must contrive to do somehow is to produce not only paper; but ACTION!24
Morgan then reemphasized that they were not a planning staff but the beginnings of an operational staff serving as the vanguard for a powerful army being gathered in the United States, which would join with British, Canadian, and American forces already in Britain. Their mission was not to plan another raid or just to cross the Channel. His job was “to plan nothing less than the re-conquest of Europe.”25
He accepted that the planners were frustrated, but time was short, the work would be hard, the expected standards of performance were high, and he was depending on them. He made it clear that while the initial challenge was to get across the Channel, their goal was Berlin. As a reminder of the full scope of the effort facing them, Morgan announced that the map in his office would not be the routine view of the English coast facing northern France but one that featured San Francisco to the west and Berlin to the east.26 He finished his remarks by showing everyone a draft organizational outline so each person could see where they fit in; he let them know that regarding both the plans and Morgan’s obligation to keep his superiors informed as to the progress of their work, “I rely entirely upon you.”27
Morgan knew that while organizational charts were necessary, “the more highly coloured the better, for purposes of academic argument and for bulldozing the personnel-supply authorities, it is the chaps not the charts that get the job done.”28 He worked hard to motivate “the chaps” and the women who joined COSSAC. Molding this disparate group into an effective, motivated team, and quickly weeding out those who couldn’t work in a multinational environment was one of his great accomplishments.
Morgan, Barker, and the senior officers worked six and half days a week, with Morgan sometimes sleeping next to his desk. As one might expect under the circumstances, there was no “routine” day for them. As Barker described it, they “free lanced.” They met each morning to share information. Barker might go to one of the British ministries or to ETOUSA, and Morgan might head for a meeting at the War Office or at COHQ. Both were well known at many of the ministries by this time, with Barker on a first-name basis with many British civilian and military officials. The schedule for one week of Morgan’s meetings in June shows him visiting HMS Vectis and Force J at Cowes for an inspection of a new landing craft, the LCI(S), and then meeting Admiral Little in Portsmouth; a visit to Gen. Ira Eaker, Eighth U.S. Air Force; meeting Lt. Gen. W. D. Morgan of General Headquarters Home Forces to discuss the relationship between COSSAC and Home Forces; meeting with Gen. Sir Ronald Adam, adjutant general, who told Morgan that it had been proposed to transfer four U.S. and three British divisions from the Mediterranean back to England for OVERLORD, adding veteran units for the assault; an interview with Sir Percy James Gregg, the secretary of state for war, to discuss civil affairs; a visit to the Civil Affairs School in Putney; an interview with the head of the French department of the Foreign Office; and a visit to Fighter Command headquarters to hear General Montgomery and Air Marshal Sir Harry Broadhurst speak about air-ground cooperation in North Africa.29 Some weeks were busier.
They also spent a great deal of time working with the planners “on the next lower level, giving them our ideas, checking on what they were doing.”30 They worked late into the night, either working on a specific problem, on sets of figures produced by the planners, or “just having a bull session on how things seemed to be going—trying to size up the situation.”31
Out of many of those late-night conversations would come questions about the feasibility of a project or issue. Morgan and Barker would gather the people concerned and get their views. Then Morgan or one of the planners would draft a paper on the subject, which would be circulated for comments to the appropriate sections. As Barker said, “It was quite informal.” Even though Morgan and Barker were both experienced staff officers, they were still trying to find the most effective ways of making the machine work—which, they discovered, came from consultation, mutual respect, and a shared sense of purpose.
There was barely enough time to accomplish their three assignments: the feint attack across the Channel, the plan to cope with German collapse, and the cross-Channel assault. The reentry into the Continent in either guise was going to occur sometime in the first six months of 1944. The plans for both those operations were subject to evaluation and approval in slightly less than three months. In less than five months COSSAC also had to plan, organize, and execute the feint toward the Pas-de-Calais. The operation needed to be large enough so the Germans would feel compelled to respond and the German air force could be engaged and damaged, notwithstanding the fact that there were now fewer amphibious resources based in England than there were for the Dieppe Raid.
The feint was named Operation STARKY, which was part of a larger deception effort called COCKADE. The COS hoped that COCKADE would hold the German forces in northern France in place, preventing the reinforcement of the troops that would be facing the Allied invasion of Italy. The quick reentry across the Channel with whatever forces were on hand in case of German collapse was code-named RANKIN. The outline plan for the reconquest of Europe was initially called Operation RUDGE, but from 5 June 1943, when the report from the Washington conference (TRIDENT) reached COSSAC, they knew it as OVERLORD.
Morgan decided to take an approach that was the opposite of what had been attempted before. Earlier plans started by trying to estimate what it would take to conduct a successful landing against opposition, with SKYSCRAPER being the clearest and most detailed example of that method. After coming up with a plan, the planners would then be told resources on that scale were not available and their estimates of German opposition were off the mark. Consequently, the plan would be shelved. Morgan took the other approach: he demanded to know a specific force level up front as well as the intended date of its use. He then considered whether the assigned mission could be accomplished with that force and how it could best be employed. This way COSSAC arrived at a practical plan.
In addition to all this, the “shop” had to be established. All the daily details of a functional office needed to be organized. This led to at least one relatively lighthearted adventure amid the pressure to produce the plans that could change the course of the war in Europe. Space was at a premium in London. The COSSAC team was scattered in billets all over the city. The normal work-week was five and half days—more for Morgan and Barker. Additionally, the British and Americans had different work habits. The Americans preferred a workday that started at 9 a.m. and ended at 5 p.m. The British would start at 10 a.m. and quit at 6 p.m. Rather than dictate a start and end time, Morgan allowed the Americans to keep to their schedule and the British to theirs.
For Morgan it was not about “control”; it was about motivating a remarkably diverse group to work together to produce a workable, “sellable” plan against the odds.